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Ingrid van Biezen & Hans-Martien ten Napel
Leiden University
Th e increase in party regulation
Th e question of how parties are, and ought to be, regulated, has assumed 
increased importance in recent years, both within the scholarly community 
and among policy-makers and politicians. Given the traditionally 
private and voluntary character of political parties, the state in liberal 
democratic societies would not normally intervene in the regulation of 
their behaviour and organization. But in recent years the legal regulation 
of parties has become more and more common, to the point that party 
structures have now become ‘legitimate objects of state regulation to a 
degree far exceeding what would normally be acceptable for private 
associations in a liberal society’ (Katz 2002: 90). In that sense, parties 
in contemporary democracies are to a growing extent managed by the 
state, in that their activities are increasingly subject to regulations and 
state laws which govern their external activities or determine the way in 
which their internal organization may function. Even in countries such 
as the Netherlands, where the regulation of parties has traditionally been 
relatively non-existent, the issue is assuming increasing importance. Th is 
can be demonstrated, for example, by the impending review of the party 
funding law and the recent court cases around the question of female 
representation within the Political Reformed Party (SGP). Both these 
cases are addressed in the present volume.
Th e increased importance of the law in describing, prescribing, or 
proscribing the operational activities and functions of political parties 
implies that the state is assuming an increasingly substantive role in the 
management of, and control over, their behaviour and organization. Th is 
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raises important questions and concerns, ranging from the motivations 
inspiring specifi c regulations to their eff ect on the parties and the party 
systems and the underlying conceptions of the role and place of political 
parties in modern democracies. 
Surprisingly, however, despite the increasing relevance of state 
regulation of political parties, this phenomenon has hitherto received 
relatively little systematic and comparative scholarly attention, from 
political scientists or lawyers. Th us, a recently published handbook on 
comparative constitutional law acknowledges that ‘[p]olitical parties and 
party system dynamics are … critical to understanding how constitutions 
work, and why they may not, in spite of well-intentioned designs’. It is 
added, however, that ‘[u]nfortunately, much of the recent literature in 
comparative constitutional law has paid little attention to the multiple 
ways our basic constitutional structures are conditioned by political parties 
and party system dynamics’ (Skach 2012: 875; see also Pildes 2011: 254-
264). Hirschl has advocated the idea of incorporating the social sciences 
in general, and political science in particular, in the comparative study of 
constitutions (2013; see also Von Bogdandy 2012).
Until such time, however, except in Germany, the ‘heartland of party 
law’ (Müller and Sieberer 2006: 435), the subject of party law tends to be a 
neglected aspect of research into political parties, with discussions limited 
to passing references and lacking a comparative dimension (Avnon 1995: 
286). Th e very few existing comparative texts are generally not available in 
English (e.g. Tsatsos 2002). In addition, while some comparative work has 
been published on the fi nancing of parties, this is not generally written 
from the perspective of party regulation more generally that is adopted in 
the present volume (e.g. Nassmacher (2009).
Th e current volume aims to address part of the gap identifi ed above by 
discussing the various dimensions of party regulation, in the Netherlands 
as well as in Europe and in other regions of the world, referring to both 
conceptual issues and recent empirical fi ndings. It is based on the papers 
presented at an international symposium held at Leiden University in June 
2010, organized by the editors. Th e symposium brought together national 
and international scholars from the disciplines of law and political science 
to discuss the regulation of political parties, in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere, from an interdisciplinary and comparative perspective.
Th is volume is embedded within a larger, EU-funded research project 
(Re-conceptualizing party democracy),1 which investigates the changing 
conceptions of parties and democracy in post-war Europe through a 
focus on public law and involves, among others, the development of a 
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comprehensive database on ‘Th e Legal Regulation of Political Parties in 
Post-War Europe’.2 Within the framework of the volume, some of the 
empirical results emerging out of this research project are being published 
for the fi rst time.
Outline of the volume
Th e volume provides an overview of the practical and theoretical 
dilemmas of state regulation of party fi nancing and party organization 
(Chapters 1 and 2), and the historical patterns of party regulation and 
constitutionalization in the Netherlands and other European democracies, 
as well as the European Union (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). In addition, several 
case studies and focused comparisons shed light on prevalent instances of 
party regulation and judicialization, such as the Dutch courts compelling 
the orthodox SGP party in Th e Netherlands to end the practice whereby 
women are denied passive voting rights (Chapter 7), the consequences of 
legal bans on political parties (Chapter 8), and the practices of regulation 
of ethnic parties (Chapter 9). Furthermore, the comparative reference is 
extended also to include an analysis of practices of party regulation in 
Latin America (Chapter 10). 
Th e volume opens with a chapter by Richard S. Katz on ‘Democracy and 
the Legal Regulation of Political Parties’. Th e chapter has two related 
objectives. Th e fi rst is to argue that evolving standards regarding the 
legal regulation of political parties are excessively weighted in favour of 
the expressive functions of parties (articulation), at the expense of their 
governing functions (aggregation). Th e second is to argue that this bias in 
favour of expression is based on a vision of democracy that, whether seen 
as a throw-back to the pre-democratic era of the cadre party in the 18th 
and 19th centuries or as being in the vanguard of a move to a post-partisan 
nirvana in the mid 21st century, essentially assumes away politics.
Th e second chapter, by Ruud Koole, deals with ‘Dilemmas of 
Regulating Political Finance, with special reference to the Dutch 
case’. Th e chapter explores the dilemmas faced by governments when 
introducing or changing the public fi nancing regime for political parties. 
It concentrates on the importance of ideological considerations for the 
variation of political fi nance regimes, most notably general views on the 
role of the state. It presents two such opposing perspectives on the scope 
of state involvement, which are subsequently used to construct a typology 
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of rationales of political fi nance by confronting these general views with 
recent calls for more transparency in the fi eld of political fi nance.
In Chapter 3, entitled ‘Lessons from the Past: Party Regulation in 
the Netherlands’, Remco Nehmelman provides an historical overview 
of the development of party regulation in Th e Netherlands. It discusses 
the desirability of special legislation on political parties, and focuses on 
the question which minimum standards of regulation should be adhered 
to such that the principle of democracy is guaranteed. In addition, the 
question is raised whether lessons can be drawn from the past discussions 
on regulating political parties. 
In the following chapter, ‘Th e Constitutionalization of Political 
Parties in Post-war Europe’, Ingrid van Biezen shows that political parties 
in contemporary democracies are increasingly often accorded formal 
constitutional status. Th e chapter explores the temporal patterns of party 
constitutionalization and reveals their connection with moments of 
fundamental institutional restructuring such as democratization and state 
building. It furthermore reveals the diff erent dimensions that lie beneath 
the constitutionalization of political parties in old and new democracies, 
and discusses the diff erent models of party constitutionalization in light 
of the underlying conceptions of party democracy. 
Chapter 5, by Fernando Casal Bértoa, Daniela Piccio & Ekaterina 
Rashkova, is entitled ‘Party Laws in Comparative Perspective’. Th is chapter 
provides an overview of regulation by means of party laws in post-war 
European democracies. Th e chapter presents a qualitative and quantitative 
overview of the content of party laws in terms of the range and magnitude 
of party regulation, thus mapping the changes in regulatory trends over 
time. Th e chapter furthermore addresses the question which aspects of 
political parties are regulated most intensively and most frequently, and 
whether there are signifi cant diff erences in the evolution of regulation 
between diff erent groups of countries. Th e fi nal part of the chapter 
supplements the quantitative examination of party regulation with a 
qualitative case study on the peculiarities of the party law of Spain.
Chapter 6 by Wojciech Gagatek is called ‘Explaining Legislative 
Confl ict over the Adoption of Political Financing Law in the European 
Union’. Th is chapter proposes an organizing perspective leading to the 
identifi cation of sources and dimensions of the confl ict over the adoption 
of party law in the EU. It then discusses the legislative procedures that 
led to the adoption of Regulation 2004/2003, which governs political 
parties at the European level and their funding. Finally, the fi ndings of 
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this research are discussed by analysing the role of and divisions in the 
European Commission and, subsequently, the European Parliament (EP).
Chapter 7, by Hans-Martien ten Napel and Jaco van den Brink, is 
dedicated to a case study of ‘Th e Dutch Political Reformed Party (SGP) 
and Passive Female Suff rage’. Th e chapter fi rst analyses the two – partially 
confl icting – judgments of the highest Dutch courts in this case, the 
Council of State and the High Court. Th en, the authors discuss the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in order to 
determine to what extent the ensuing admissibility decision in the SGP 
case corresponds to the Court’s conception of democracy.
‘Will it all end in tears? What really happens when democracies use 
law to ban political parties’, is the question Tim Bale asks in Chapter 
8. An earlier comparative empirical investigation by the author of the 
consequences of recent bans on ‘extremist’ parties in three self-styled 
European democracies (Turkey, Spain and Belgium) found that those 
consequences were not as dire as predicted. In this chapter Bale attempts to 
answer the question whether the three countries still defy the predictions 
that bans will make no diff erence, that they will make things worse, or 
that they will put existing achievements at risk. Or, upon refl ection and 
a return visit, did the fears of the critics turn out to be justifi ed after all?
Chapter 9, by Ekaterina R. Rashkova and Maria Spirova, looks into 
‘Ethnic Party Regulation in Eastern Europe’. Th e political integration 
of national minorities is one of the most challenging tasks facing the 
new EU member states. Th is chapter focuses on one form of political 
representation – political parties – and studies how legal arrangements 
in the region encourage or discourage the existence of ethnic parties. 
Focusing on the experiences of Bulgaria and Romania the paper argues 
that regulatory arrangements are important in but not key to achieving 
meaningful political representation.
In Chapter 10, ‘On the Engineerability of Political Parties: Mexico 
in Comparative Perspective’, Imke Harbers and Matthew C. Ingram 
examine how public law provisions regarding political parties have 
changed over time in the Mexican case, and how the extent of regulation 
has grown to the present day. Looking ahead, the authors demonstrate 
that party regulation has increased steadily since the 1950s and that it has 
had mixed eff ects on political contestation, cleaning up elections while 
simultaneously generating an electoral landscape that is markedly unfair 
and biased in favour of major parties.
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Patterns of party regulation
On an overview of the various chapters, one is fi rst of all struck by the 
apparent increase in party regulation that has taken place in recent years. 
Th e chapter by Casal Bértoa, Piccio & Rashkova clearly demonstrates 
that this trend is visible throughout Europe. It also holds true for the 
Netherlands, a country that has traditionally known little, if any, specifi c 
party regulation. As Nehmelman notes, Dutch political parties have 
for a long time been dominated by civil law and their own statutes. 
Today, however, it is not just the Electoral Law that contains references 
that specifi cally concern political parties, but also the Act on State 
funding for political parties, while the  Media Act has certain sections 
guaranteeing their (cost-free) use of the public broadcasting media. 
Recently, moreover, a new Dutch law on party fi nance was adopted by 
Parliament, ‘a combination of a subsidy law and a transparency law’ as 
Koole characterizes it in his contribution to this volume. Th e SGP case 
might have led to further regulation, although, as Ten Napel and Van den 
Brink point out, this has not materialized in practice. Still, Nehmelman 
believes the time has come to include a specifi c Constitutional provision to 
guarantee the free shaping of the political will of political parties. Such a 
reform of the Constitution was proposed as early as in 1950 by the Dutch 
State Commissioner Van Schaik, but is perhaps even more relevant today, 
given the way in which Dutch and European courts apply in particular the 
principles of non-discrimination and of secularism. Van Biezen also notes 
that the Netherlands is one of the few countries where the judicialization 
of party politics has not yet aff ected their constitutional enshrining.
Secondly, it is interesting to see that the objectives of such party 
regulation tend to diff er. As Katz argues in his chapter, the common 
justifi cation for an increase in party regulation, used for example by the 
Venice Commission for Democracy through Law, is that states must 
protect and improve democracy. Another important reason given is 
that parties perform a number of crucial functions in the realization of 
democracy. Regardless of the exact objective, however, the volume also 
contains a clear warning, in the sense that it is clear from the various 
chapters that the objectives of the regulations are not always achieved. For 
example, according to Harbers and Ingram, the Mexican case illustrates 
that even extensive and detailed regulation is insuffi  cient to guarantee 
responsible party government, and thus casts doubts on the idea of the 
‘engineerability of political parties’. In the case of ethnic party regulation 
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in Eastern Europe, the eff ects are often also indirect, as the chapter by 
Rashkova and Spirova illustrates.
Th irdly, there appears to be a trend towards regulation not just at 
the systemic level, but also at the level of individual parties. Although 
historically regulation started at the level of elections (the systemic level), 
increasingly also the units (parties) have to subscribe to the basic principles 
of the constitutional and political system (see also van Biezen & Piccio 
2013). Th us, it is possible to discern a trend in the direction of a more 
militant democracy, a subject that Bale investigates for Turkey, Spain and 
Belgium. Bale concludes that we would be mistaken if we were to suggest 
that the consequences of party bans are always and everywhere malign. 
An intriguing question is whether the same applies to the regulation of 
internal party democracy, German style, which equally appears to be on 
the rise.
All in all, the developments as documented and analysed in this volume 
to a large extent point in the direction of a developing interpretation of 
political parties from, originally, essentially private into essentially public 
entities (cf. Persily and Cain 2000; van Biezen 2004; Webber 2012). In 
the process, the more public the parties become, the more regulation they 
appear to invoke. Dutch professor on Constitutional Law and former 
Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union, A.M. Donner, 
suggested in a contribution to the annual Dutch constitutional conference 
in 1982:  ‘Let us postpone as long as possible the offi  cial recognition of the party 
system (in the Netherlands), because in its nature Law just brings regulation, 
and he who regulates, restricts.’ According to Nehmelman, who uses this 
quotation in his chapter, although by nature the law may indeed just bring 
regulation, regulation entails not only restrictions but also guarantees. Th e 
precise ways in which the law constrains or facilitates political behaviour, 
however, remain to be investigated in more detail.
At this stage, what seems clear is that the more parties become 
regulated, the more public they become. Th e contributions tie in, 
therefore, with current debates within the academic community on the 
changing nature of political parties, whereby recent processes of party 
organizational adaptation are seen to refl ect a gradual strengthening of 
their relationship with the state (Katz & Mair 1995; see also Gauja 2008). 
As the legal regulation of parties through public law can be seen as one 
of the ways in which the link between parties and the state has acquired 
increased importance in recent years, this volume will no doubt be of 
interest to scholars concerned with such processes of party transformation, 
e.g. regarding the cartel party thesis. Party regulation leads, as Van Biezen 
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puts it in her chapter, to the transformation of political parties into integral 
units of the democratic state.
It is quite possible that this development will lead to a further 
withdrawal of citizens from existing party-political structures. In terms of 
political participation this can hardly be regarded as a positive outcome. 
In so far as this risk becomes more imminent, this volume thus not just 
documents and analyses but also contains a certain warning against 
taking the regulation of political parties too far. Perhaps the EU can serve 
as a model in this respect, because – as Gagatek demonstrates – at least 
since the Tsatsos 1996 report the subsequent drafts and proposals for a 
political fi nancing law have become less and less strict, to arrive in the fi nal 
version only at a model of fi nancing political parties. On the other hand, 
should ours indeed be a time of ‘expressive individualism’ (Taylor 2007) 
or ‘radical pluralism’ (Gauchet), both party discipline and party ideology 
may soon belong to the past (Vogelaar 2012). In that case increasing party 
regulation will at most be a supplementary explanation for the decline in 
organized political participation. 
Notes
1 Th e research project Re-conceptualizing party democracy is funded by the 
European Research Council (ERC_Stg07_205660). Th eir fi nancial support 
is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Th e online database can be found at http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl.
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By the early 1950s, democracy had achieved near universal recognition 
as the best available form of government, or even as the ideal form of 
government in a more absolute sense. At that time, the commitment to 
democracy was in many cases more rhetorical than practical, and in any 
case there was considerable dispute as to exactly what democracy means 
in terms of institutions and practices at the practical level (McKeon 1951). 
Are ‘people’s democracies’ or ‘guided democracies’ really democracies at 
all (Macpherson 1966)? Are ‘majoritarian democracies’ and ‘consensus 
democracies’ equally democratic (Lijphart 1999)? What is the proper 
balance of functions and activities between elites and ordinary citizens 
(Bachrach 1967)? Does democracy require that the distribution of citizens 
among demographic (ethnic, cultural, gender) groups be mirrored in the 
distribution of political offi  ces (Pitkin 1967)? Should or can democratic 
participation be limited to those who are juridical citizens, or even among 
those who are citizens, to those who are in some sense loyal to the state 
as currently constituted or who satisfy some non-trivial standard of 
competence? 
One thing that all of these questions have in common is that at some 
level the answers have implications for political parties and party systems. 
Moreover, as the defi nition of democracy has been elaborated explicitly to 
exclude the ‘sham democracies’, and to make explicit accommodation for 
the various ‘democracies with adjectives’ (Collier & Levitsky 1997), it is 
increasing obvious that, as Schattschneider observed, ‘the political parties 
created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of the parties’ (1942: 1)
Th e debate concerning the defi nition of democracy and its optimal 
institutionalization of course continues, and questions concerning the 
optimal nature and role of political parties have played a large role in 
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that debate. Increasingly over the last half century, however, the debate 
concerning political parties has also moved into the realm of law. As van 
Biezen (2008) has shown, provisions concerning political parties have 
become part of the constitutions of a growing number of countries. Even 
when parties are not explicitly recognized as having constitutional status, 
many aspects of their structures, fi nances, and practices have become the 
subjects of statutory or administrative regulation. Obligations concerning 
states’ responsibilities both to foster and to regulate political parties have 
found increasing prominence within the corpus of international law (e.g., 
‘Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE’, June 1990 - Copenhagen Document). 
Th e increased legal regulation of political parties,which in earlier times 
were regulated, if at all, simply as another form of private association, 
commonly is justifi ed on the grounds that states must protect and enhance 
democracy. Th is often has been taken to imply an obligation to regulate 
or constrain the infl uence of all organizations in which considerable 
social or economic power is concentrated, a category into which political 
parties clearly fall. Even more, however, regulation of political parties 
has been justifi ed by the recognition that parties perform a number of 
crucial functions in the realization of democracy, with the implications 
that, on the one hand, regulation of parties is justifi ed by their particular 
importance, and on the other hand, that regulation is justifi ed because 
parties play a role that eff ectively makes them semi-state rather than 
purely private entities.1
Among the functions of parties in modern electoral and representative 
democracies are the recruitment, selection, and presentation of candidates; 
even in the absence of formal restrictions on independent candidacies, as a 
practical matter a party nomination is virtually a prerequisite for election. 
In most countries, parties dominate political campaigns, defi ning the 
issues (both which issues will be prominent and what positions with regard 
to those issues will be presented to the voters), providing most of the actual 
propaganda, and receiving the lion’s share of media attention – and even 
where, as in the United States, control of campaigns is vested in, and media 
attention is focused on, candidates as individuals rather than parties as 
organizations, it is still candidates as the nominees of the major parties that 
matter. Between elections, parties play central roles in the organization 
of government. Th is is, of course, particularly obvious in parliamentary 
systems, but it is hardly restricted to them. Between elections as well, 
parties provide important venues for popular discussion of political 
issues and the formation of public opinion, as well as structures through 
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which the politically engaged citizenry can communicate eff ectively with 
their elected representatives. And at election time, parties are even more 
prominent in providing opportunities for politically engaged citizens to 
act collaboratively.
Th is list of functions can be both extended and elaborated in greater 
detail. Moving in the direction of greater generalization, however, and 
adopting the vocabulary of the functionalist paradigm, one can identify 
two particularly important complexes among these functions. On one 
hand, parties play a central role in performing the function of interest 
articulation: through their manifestos and other propaganda, they do this 
as ‘speakers’ in their own right; through their organizational structures, 
they provide mechanisms through which interested citizens can ‘speak’ 
for themselves as well as providing ‘megaphones’ by means of which 
other interest articulators (e.g., unions or trade associations) can make 
their voices be heard more eff ectively. Th ey express, or facilitate the 
expression of, the desires and demands, the aspirations and the fears, 
of citizens and organizations. On the other hand, parties also play a 
central role in performing the function of interest aggregation (putting 
forward comprehensive proposals in their manifestos and later crafting 
compromises in the process of coalition formation) and then (at least 
to the extent that one accepts the appropriateness of a principal-agent 
understanding of democracy2) acting, and being held accountable, as the 
agents of the electorate in the process of governing. Th ey decide which mix 
of desires and demands the government will attempt to satisfy and which 
will go by the board; in short, they determine who wins and who loses. 
Neither the individual party format, nor the party system format, that is 
best suited to the performance of one of these complexes of functions is 
best suited to the performance of the other; some compromise is necessary. 
In this paper, I have two related objectives. Th e fi rst is to argue that 
evolving standards regarding the legal regulation of political parties 
are excessively weighted in favour of the expressive functions of parties 
(articulation), at the expense of their governing functions (aggregation). 
Th e second is to argue that this bias in favour of expression is based on 
a vision of democracy that, whether seen as a throw-back to the pre-
democratic era of the cadre party in the 18th and 19th centuries or as being 
in the vanguard of a move to a post-partisan nirvana in the mid 21st 
century, essentially assumes away politics.3 Since the claim of ‘excessive’ 




Th e relative weight to be accorded to the two sets of functions just 
articulated is intimately, albeit imperfectly (because neither set of 
functions can be emphasized to the exclusion of the other) related, to a 
complex of three other questions. First, is there, in principle even if not in 
easily operationalisable practice, a unitary ‘national interest’ or a ‘volonté 
générale’ in the Rousseauian sense? Is there a set of policies that all would 
accept as optimal, if only they were suffi  ciently rational, suffi  ciently far-
sighted, and suffi  ciently informed?4 Or alternatively, are the only real 
interests or preferences the separate interests or preferences of individuals, 
which may be more or less directly in confl ict at any given time or on any 
given question, which can be aggregated into a collective decision in many 
diff erent ways, and which may be more or less eff ectively contained, but 
which cannot be eliminated. Second, does the primary value of democracy 
follow from the idea that self-government in a reasonably literal way ‘is an 
essential means to the full development of individual capacities’ (Bachrach 
1967: 4; see also Mill 1962 [1861]: 49-52, 71-73) or from the importance of 
community to moral life (Sandel 1982: 179) – or from the acceptance of 
the unitary public interest (Barber 1984:221), or is it that democracy is a 
means by which what Finer (1974) identifi es as the problem of politics can 
be resolved while respecting the principle that each individual (or at least 
each adult citizen) should be considered as an equal and that fundamental 
liberal political rights should be respected? Th ird, of a diff erent order but 
particularly relevant here, should political parties properly be understood 
as organizations of citizens and as organizations within which large 
numbers of citizens can and should engage in politics, or are democratic 
parties primarily to be understood as teams of politicians acting in concert 
to secure election with the primary political activity of ‘ordinary’ citizens 
being choice among and support of parties, but as outsiders rather than 
as ‘members?’5 
Th e single national interest, or wholistic, position is, of course, typical 
of the pre-party era of western political history, in which what would later 
be identifi ed as parties were instead identifi ed as ‘factions’ that were, by 
their very nature, inimical to the national interest (see Scarrow 2002, 
2006). But it would equally apply to Edmund Burke, who in defi ning 
party as ‘a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours 
the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all 
agreed’, accepts the existence of a national interest, even as he suggests the 
legitimacy of prior disagreement concerning what that interest is. But to 
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quote Burke further, ‘Government and Legislation are matters of reason 
and judgement, not of inclination; and, what sort of reason is that, in 
which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one sett [sic] 
of men deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the 
conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear 
the arguments?’ (Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 3 November 1774) Th e 
same emphasis on argumentation is obviously at the core of the more 
contemporary ‘deliberative democracy’ school, even when translated into 
the realm of representative institutions; better deliberation in parliament 
will produce better legislation, with ‘better’ meaning not just legislation 
that is technically/professionally to a higher standard, or legislation that 
is more eff ective in producing the results desired by its supporters, but 
legislation that is better in the normative sense of being in the public 
interest, which in turn is somehow exogenously defi ned.6
Th e holistic view has implications for the meaning of representation 
and the role of representatives, and thus for the nature of parties, as 
well as for the purpose of elections and the involvement of individual 
citizens. With regard to representation, it can only be an argument for 
representation by ‘trustees’, that is, by people expected to use their own 
judgement to decide where the public interest lies, rather than to act as 
conduits for the expression of the judgement or preferences of those they 
represent. As Burke observed, if the representative comes to parliament 
already fi rmly committed to particular positions there is not much point 
in holding parliamentary debates – except perhaps as propaganda aimed 
at the media and the next election. While in theory the ‘representative’ in 
the holistic vision might be understood to be either the individual MP or 
a political party delegation (Katz 2003), almost always the emphasis is on 
the individual, and indeed this understanding of representation is one of 
the roots of prohibitions against an imperative mandate, which although 
expressed generically are usually understood to be directed against the idea 
that representatives might be required to follow the instructions of their 
party organizations (Janda 2009). Although the Burkean argument most 
often is raised with regard to the relationship between the representative 
and his/her constituents, it is equally applicable to the relationship 
between the representative and any membership organization of his/
her party; the representative takes part in the parliamentary debate and 
the members do not. Although this is an argument against strong party 
discipline imposed by the party-on-the-ground (the extra-parliamentary 
membership organization), however, it would not necessarily be satisfi ed 
simply by limiting attention to the party as an organization of elected 
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politicians, if only because party discipline imposed by the party leader or 
caucus would be equally inimical to rational deliberation. 
If, as this ideal assumes, legislative assemblies are made up of 
rational and public spirited men and women open-mindedly seeking the 
commonweal, then eff ective representation requires that all reasonable 
arguments be brought to their attention. Obviously, this is most likely to 
occur if those arguments are espoused by individuals who are members of 
the assembly, but even in the absence of such members it may be reasonable 
to suppose, as Canadian Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci did in 
the case of Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General) [1 S.C.R. 912 [2003]], 
that the arguments of defeated candidates and the opinions of those 
who voted for them will be ‘taken into account by those who ultimately 
implement policy, if not now then perhaps at some point in the future’ 
(para. 44). Th us, not only debate in parliament, but also debate in the 
context of election campaigns, and presumably also debate within a party’s 
membership organization, contributes to the rational identifi cation of the 
public interest, and so should be as free and wide-ranging as possible – 
and since parties are the principal articulators of contending views, the 
range of parties participating in a campaign should likewise be as broad as 
possible. Indeed, the value of elections is seen to lie at least as much in the 
campaign as in the ultimate choice made on election day. While equality 
of citizens is, of course, important, equality of opportunity or standing for 
the various view points to be expressed is even more important.7 Moreover, 
even if the campaign is about policy, the choice made on election day 
must be about popular confi dence in the would-be representative and the 
granting to him or her of a ‘general power of attorney’ – to listen to and 
participate in debates in parliament, before using (in Burke’s words) ‘his 
unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience’ to 
reach a decision.8 
Th e alternative view might be identifi ed as responsible or parliamentary 
party government (see Katz 1986, 1987). Debate is important for identifying 
and testing ideas, and for informing citizens regarding the proposals 
of their would-be governors. While such debate may lead to changes of 
opinion, either among citizens or within the governing elite, however, 
there is no illusion that unanimity is, in most cases, either theoretically 
possible or indeed even desirable. Th ere are real confl icts of interest and 
values that will not be obviated by either intellect or good will. Legislation 
ultimately is about the aggregation of preferences rather than the weighing 
of arguments, and parties, rather than being united by a common view of 
the public interest are united by sharing, or speaking for, the same bundle 
democracy and the legal regulation of political parties 23
of particular interests, even if each party fi nds it politically advantageous 
to call its particular bundle the ‘public interest’. In contrast to the Burkean 
trustee, who is trusted by the electors to do what s/he decides is right after 
hearing the debate and evaluating the arguments, the responsible parties 
representative is delegated to pursue the aims that s/he, or more accurately 
that his or her party, promised, and on the basis of which voters made their 
choices of whom to support. Election campaigns are important because 
they inform the voters of the programmes espoused by the contending 
parties (and may indeed induce some voters to change their partisan 
preferences), not because they lead the voters to abandon their underlying 
interests or values in favour of a previously unrecognized common interest, 
or because they lead the parties to adopt ‘better’ (as opposed to trying to 
fi nd more popular) policies. Ultimately the primary purpose of an election 
is the making of a choice among parties, each of which, it is assumed, 
will put its programme into eff ect (albeit modifi ed to refl ected changes 
in conditions over time) if it achieves a parliamentary majority, or failing 
a majority, will try to advance its programme to the degree possible in 
coalition with other parties.9 Simply, in the holistic view, elections are 
about individual expression; in the party government view they are about 
collective choice, and not just choice of a local representative but choice of 
government, and thus also of policy, whether directly through the election 
of a coherent single party majority or indirectly as the result of coalition 
negotiations among a number of cohesive parties. 
In the holistic view, the juridical legitimacy of parliamentary decisions 
fl ows from the delegation of the authority to decide to members of 
parliament by their constituencies, but the more substantive legitimacy 
of decisions fl ows from their acceptance as being ‘right’ on the basis of 
the arguments adduced to support them. As the name implies, in the 
parliamentary party government vision, the representative is the party as 
a collectivity. Th e legitimacy of parliamentary decisions fl ows from the 
fact that the parties are enacting policies, that at least the broad outlines 
of which have been substantively approved by the voters.10 Th ere are no 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ policies– only policies that are preferred by more rather 
than fewer citizens, and that are more or less eff ective in achieving the 
aims of the coalition that supports them.
In the holistic view, democracy is primarily about reason and process, 
because it is argued that the deliberative process will help decision makers 
to ‘fi nd’ the common interest. For the responsible parties view, democracy 
is about outcomes, primarily in terms of policy. In fact, in greater detail 
there are two versions of what I am calling here the responsible parties 
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view. From the perspective of what I have called elsewhere ‘popular 
sovereignty democracy’, it is about maximizing the likelihood that the 
policies best identifi ed as the will of the people – defi ned as a majority 
choice – are enacted; that is, the question is what policies are enacted. 
From the perspective of ‘liberal democracy’, it is about preventing the 
enactment of policies that will excessively work against the interests of 
some groups (Katz 1997); the question is what policies are avoided. In 
either case, however, both the intellectual or moral capacities, and the 
preferences, of citizens (at least as they exist on election day) are taken 
as given, and the primary focus of citizen activity is electoral choice to 
put the right parties in offi  ce (or to prevent the wrong parties from being 
in offi  ce), and secondarily to engage in activity between elections that 
signals to the parties what policies will be rewarded or punished at the 
next election. In both cases, parties are assumed to be coherent, and to be 
pursuing strategies that are largely dictated by the exigencies of the pursuit 
of offi  ce (see especially Downs 1957; Schumpeter 1950). Th at is, this view 
is associated with the idea that parties are primarily associations of offi  ce-
seekers and offi  ce-holders. 
In sum, then, we have two complexes. Th e fi rst complex combines 
the primacy of the expressive functions of parties and elections with the 
idea of democracy as an instrument of moral, intellectual and community 
development; belief in a unitary public interest to be discovered through 
rational deliberation; and the notion that parties are appropriately 
understood as associations of citizens. Th e second complex involves the 
opposites: the primacy of the decisional functions of elections; a pluralist or 
partisan (one might even say a ‘political’ in Finer’s terms) view of interests; 
the idea that parties (re)present alternative comprehensive programmes; 
and an understanding of parties as being primarily teams of professionals.
Regulation of Parties
Against this background, what can we say about the legal regulation of 
political parties? At the risk of some oversimplifi cation, these regulations 
can be classifi ed under three main headings, although in practice the 
regulations are generally more interconnected and overlapping in intention 
than this classifi cation might suggest. Th e fi rst concerns the regulation 
of parties as organizations, and addresses questions of membership and 
internal structure and decision-making (in particular, the choice of party 
offi  cers and candidates and the formulation and adoption of the party’s 
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programme and rules). Th e second concerns the regulation of parties as 
contestants in elections, and addresses questions of campaign practices 
(including campaign fi nance), the allowable content of party programmes, 
and qualifi cation for a position on the ballot as well as any other rights, 
privileges, or obligations accorded to parties in elections that are denied to 
(or not required of) individual citizens or other organizations. Th e third 
concerns the activities of parties in government, and addresses questions 
of patronage and other possible abuse of state resources for partisan 
advantage, requirements for the formation of party groups in parliament 
(and the advantages that accrue to them), and restrictions on party 
switching by MPs during a parliamentary term.
Parties as Organizations
With regard to parties as organizations, legal regulations appear to be 
based on some combination of three models. Th e fi rst, the oldest, and 
the most prominent in the academic literature, sees parties primarily as 
organizations of candidates for offi  ce or of those who already hold offi  ce 
and organize in some way to coordinate their activity and maximize their 
infl uence, or perhaps a bit more broadly as organizations of candidates 
and/or offi  ce-holders plus their supporters. Th is model clearly is associated 
with the second of the two complexes discussed above. While it may lead 
to regulations concerning party activities outside of formal elections, 
especially those regarding the raising and spending of money, in this model 
these generally have been directed at politicians as individuals rather than 
parties as organizations, which indeed the law may not recognize at all in 
countries using a candidate-centered electoral systems; in list PR systems, 
parties must be recognized in the guise of lists of candidates, but extra-
electoral organizations need not be recognized. Th is model eff ectively 
precludes state regulation of the internal decision-making procedures of 
the party. While it does not preclude the party adopting rules and having 
them become legally enforceable in the same way as the rules of any other 
private association, the default would be, as Jack Brand described the 
traditional constitution of the British Conservative Party (analogizing to 
Czarist Russia): ‘autocracy, tempered by assassination’.
In the second model, rooted in the model of the mass party of 
integration (although not necessarily tied to all of the sociological and 
ideological assumptions on which that model is based), parties are 
understood/defi ned as associations of citizens who work together on 
a long term basis to advance their collective interests and to secure the 
election of their preferred candidates. In structural terms, this reverses the 
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dominant/subordinate roles of party members and candidates/offi  cials. To 
use a sports analogy, in the fi rst model, party members (to the extent that 
such a category is recognized as extending beyond candidates or elected 
offi  cials at all) are the organized boosters or ‘cheerleaders’ for the party 
team (Mayhew 1974), or perhaps they are the equivalent of the season 
ticket holders; those making decisions for the team may take the fans’ 
preferences into account – after all, loss of its fan base can be economically 
costly for a team – but the fans do not decide who will play and who will 
sit on the bench. In the second model, the party’s members are the analog 
of the corporate ‘owners’ of the team, able to hire and fi re the coaches and 
players. Because this view recognizes the electoral/governmental role of 
parties, it is commonly associated with explicit requirements of internal 
democracy – in particular, the choice of both party offi  cials and party 
candidates through a process that ultimately is legitimated by a vote of 
the membership. Moreover, it also tends to be associated with regulations 
limiting the grounds on which citizens can be denied party membership, 
both in general (restrictions on the categories eligible to form or be 
members of parties) and by a particular party (for example, prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of gender or ethnicity).11
In both of these views, parties are still seen as essentially private 
entities. In the third view, most clearly exemplifi ed by the United States at 
the state level, parties are best seen as semi-public entities. While they may 
be recognized as having some of the rights of independent organizations, 
they are also implicitly understood to be exercising public functions (e.g., 
‘Political parties shall participate in the formation of the public will...’ 
[German Basic Law, art. 21])12 or to be part of the structure of elections 
rather than merely being participants in them. In this case, parties are 
likely to be subject to even more detailed regulation – for example, rather 
than merely being required to be internally democratic, their entire 
structure may be prescribed in detail.13 Parties may have no discretion at 
all concerning their membership.14,15
Th e fi rst of these models is, in eff ect, the default position. While it may 
be implicit in regulatory regimes, it requires no explicit party legislation. 
Parties may, however, be subject to the same regulations (for example, a 
requirement to have a set of standing orders, or to have its accounts subject 
to audit) as any private association that is given legal personality 
Th e second model, however, is increasingly prominent both in actual 
regulatory regimes and in the guidelines of such groups as the European 
Commission for Democracy Th rough Law (Venice Commission). First, 
party regulations generally defi ne parties as associations of citizens.16 
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Laws regarding the offi  cial recognition or registration of parties often 
specify a minimum number of members as a precondition.17 Moreover, 
although the requirement of a minimum number of members might be 
narrowly understood to be no more than a threshold of support required 
for eligibility to receive public resources, and hence to imply nothing 
about the internal rights or privileges accruing to party members, in fact, 
regulations often require that parties be internally democratic – thus 
institutionalizing the idea that parties are primarily mass membership 
based, rather than elite based, organizations. Th e Venice Commission 
‘Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties’ for example asserts 
that ‘a commitment to internal democratic functioning reinforces’ the 
‘good functioning’ of democracy at the national level. Th e article of the 
German Basic Law cited above goes on ‘Th eir internal organization must 
conform to democratic principles.’18 Looking to the third model, although 
the structure of American national parties is largely unregulated, they are 
federations of state parties, the internal structure of which is in many cases 
nearly completely prescribed by law. And those laws, generally dating 
from the Progressive era, were designed specifi cally to empower the party 
base – defi ned not as party members in the mass party sense, but as those 
who have chosen to register as partisans as part of the general process of 
voter registration or as self-professed party supporters or voters.
Th e specifi c meaning of internal democracy in these regulations is that 
important decisions – in particular the selection of party candidates and 
party offi  cials – be made by vote of the members. A somewhat weaker 
sense of internal democracy, that these decisions be made by elected 
representatives of the members is often accepted as adequate, but still seen 
as inferior.19
If the objective is to maximize the opportunities for direct participation 
in decision-making on the part of the maximum possible number of 
people, then direct internal democracy is fi ne. If the objective is to assure 
that the party is responsive to its members, then internal representative 
democracy within the party may be no less acceptable than representative 
democracy at the governmental level – although one might argue that 
if parties are necessary to structure eff ective representative democracy at 
the governmental level, then their functional equivalent, that is organized 
factions, may be necessary within parties. 
If, however, the objective is eff ective popular choice of government, 
internal democracy presents a number of problems, discussed by Austin 
Ranney for the two party American case under the rubric of the responsible 
party model’s ‘little civil war about “intraparty democracy’’’(1962: 156), 
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but generalisable mutatis mutandis to multiparty systems. On one hand, 
the idea of internal democracy invites party members to use their votes 
to express their personal preferences for policies or leaders, rather than 
to act strategically to choose the candidates or policies that have the 
greatest chance of success in the general election, or the greatest capacity 
to negotiate eff ective interparty agreements20. While accurate refl ection 
of the party’s constituencies’ preferences is desirable at the election stage, 
once the election is over, the party government model requires fl exibility 
to compromise, but internal democracy threatens those who make 
compromises with intraparty punishment – as illustrated in the United 
States by the defeat of ‘responsible’ politicians by more ideologically ‘pure’ 
partisans in primary elections, only to have the ‘pure’ partisan defeated in 
the general election.21 
Moreover, unless internal party democracy results in a system in which 
a single winner literally takes all, it must be assumed that some party 
offi  cials, and presumably some party candidates and ultimately some party 
holders of public offi  ce, will represent the internal party minority. Why 
should they be expected to act cohesively with the representatives of the 
internal majority – any more than the parliamentary minority is expected 
to act with, rather than to oppose, the parliamentary majority? But if all 
of the candidates of a party cannot be expected to act cohesively, how can 
the electorate, whose choice is naturally limited to those candidates who 
actually appear on the ballot, make a meaningful collective decision?
Parties as Election Contestants
Particularly in the newer and the (not necessarily the same thing) less 
self-confi dent democracies, concern that some party programmes may be 
subversive of the regime has led to regulation of the allowable content 
of a party’s programme. Violation of these regulations may lead to the 
disqualifi cation of the party from the ballot, or even to its dissolution and/
or the banning of its offi  cials from political activity for a period of years. 
Least problematic among such regulations would be those that bar the 
advocacy of the use of violence or other illegal means to achieve the party’s 
objectives. Appeals to or incitement of racial or other group hatred might 
also be barred, although there is some question as to whether incitement 
to hatred must also imply incitement to violence before it becomes a 
valid ground for sanction. Another question concerns the permissibility 
of advocacy of fundamental constitutional change (abandonment of 
democracy, secession, etc.) by constitutional means. Related to this, as well 
as to the question of internal party organization more generally, would 
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be regulations that require a party to have an organizational presence, 
a signifi cant number of members, or to present candidates within a 
very large proportion of the national territory, eff ectively as a back-door 
way of barring separatist parties – or even parties that seek to represent 
territorially specifi c interests without challenging the territorial integrity 
of the existing state. 22
A second regulatory area concerning parties as contestants in elections 
addresses the ability of parties to gain a place on the election ballot, and 
in turn to gain or retain access to other public resources, privileges or 
standing that are accorded to parties on the ballot – or indeed to parties 
tout court. Th ese might relate to the size or support of the party, as 
indicated by votes received or members elected in a prior election, by 
petition signatures secured in support of recognition of the party, or by 
the size of the party’s membership.23 Th e fundamental questions are the 
status to be accorded to small parties (parties with unpopular ideologies 
or simply appealing to a very narrow interest, as well as parties appealing 
to a highly circumscribed subset of the electorate, such as those living in a 
particular locality or sharing a minority ethnicity), and the height of the 
obstacles to be erected against the entry of new parties into the electoral 
marketplace. Th e presumption here would be that high barriers to entry 
will work in the same way as an electoral system with a high threshold of 
representation (a strong electoral system, in Sartori’s terms) to discourage 
the fragmentation of the party system, as a result either of the entry of new 
parties or of the splitting of old ones, and encourage the formation of ‘big 
tent’ parties.
To the extent that small parties are allowed to enter the electoral contest 
(and indeed also to the extent that not all ‘major’ parties are of equivalent 
strength24), a third regulatory question concerns the balance of fi nancial 
(and other) resources that will be available to them. Two aspects of this 
question are of particular relevance. Th e fi rst concerns the permissible 
sources of resources – particularly money, but also other potentially 
valuable resources, such as in-kind contributions, the seconding of staff , 
or the guaranteeing of loans. Potentially restricted sources might include 
government contractors, all (or some types of) corporations, unions, 
foreign entities, and possibly citizens living abroad.
Th e second aspect concerns the levels of resources that parties may deploy 
in an election, and the amount that third parties25 may deploy in support 
or opposition to parties contesting an election. In terms of regulatory 
philosophy, the major distinction here is between the ‘libertarian’ ideal 
of minimizing public regulation and accepting the resulting disparities 
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of resources, and the ‘egalitarian’ ideal of seeking a level playing fi eld 
by restricting the activity of third parties, by limiting spending of and 
contributions to parties, by providing equal time on state (and potentially 
privately owned but publicly licensed) broadcast media etc. Relating back 
to ballot access and eligibility for special treatment, implementation of the 
egalitarian model requires that some threshold of eligibility be established 
lest parties enter the fi eld merely to benefi t from public resources.26 Th ese 
may be identifi ed as restrictions on ‘frivolous’ candidacies, but of course 
the defi nition of frivolous remains open to dispute. As well, the rules/
model may not be the same for all types of resources (for example, an 
egalitarian regime for the allocation of broadcast time may coexist with a 
libertarian regime for party spending – but coupled with restrictions on 
the sources of the money that parties may spend).
Th e general thrust of regulation – and particularly of evolving 
international standards regarding acceptable regulation – has been toward 
greater freedom of access to the ballot. Th e Copenhagen Document (sect. 
7.5, for example) of the CSCE makes explicit reference to the right of 
independents to contest elections. Similarly, the ODIHR 2003 summary of 
‘Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating 
States’ emphasizes ease of access to the ballot both for new/minor parties 
and for independents. A series of Canadian court decisions have ruled 
barriers to ballot access such as a monetary deposit – and especially a 
monetary deposit required in a large number of constituencies – not to 
be justifi ed ‘in a free and democratic society.’ Th e major exception to this 
trend is the United States, in which barriers that often are tantamount 
to the statutory requirement that there be exactly two parties – and that 
they be the Democrats and Republicans – are common. Again, the trend 
is to value the expressive function of political parties, so as to increase the 
opportunity for citizens ‘and to exercise their right to vote in a manner 
that accurately refl ects their preferences’ (Figueroa para. 88). 
Th e expressive function of elections has also been privileged with 
regard to regulations concerning the campaign activities of third parties. 
In contrast to ballot access, the United States, particularly after the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
has probably the most libertarian regime, in that so-called independent 
expenditures27, by corporations as well as by natural persons, may not 
be legally restricted. While other countries generally do limit third party 
expenditures – and indeed the expenditures of candidates and parties on 
their own behalf – there is a clear trend (often imposed by courts) toward 
weakening those limits, even while recognizing that the limits may be 
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more restrictive than those applied to candidates themselves. For example, 
in Bowman v. Th e United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights 
overturned a British third party spending limit of £5 as violating the free 
speech rights of a third party because the limit was so low as to eff ectively 
ban third party spending altogether.28 In the case of Harper v. Canada, the 
Supreme Court of Canada allowed a much higher limit (CAN$150,000 
per general election, no more than CAN$3,000 used to infl uence the 
election in a single district) to stand because, while recognizing that the 
limits infringed on the free speech rights of the applicants, the Court also 
recognized the danger that unlimited third party spending would allow 
well-fi nanced interests to drown out their opponents, thus undermining 
the expressive (free and vigorous debate) egalitarian regime otherwise 
established by the Elections Canada Act.29 Th e complementary danger 
– that a proliferation of spending by a large number of third parties 
will result in confusion, with serious arguments drowned out not by a 
single interest but by a general cacophony – has received less attention, 
although one Canadian court has recognized that danger with regard to 
a proliferation of candidates. (De Jong v. Ontario (Attorney General) 287 
D.L.R. (4th) 90 [2007])
Parties in Government
Once the candidates who have been elected to parliament (or other offi  ces) 
have been determined, three important questions must be addressed. 
First, to what extent do regulations allow the parties that then form the 
government to use the resources of the state for their own ends. Here there 
are two major categories to consider – each of which may be portrayed in 
a positive or a negative light, with the problem sometimes described as 
striking the correct balance, but actually being disagreement as to what 
constitutes ‘abuse of public resources.’ One category concerns patronage, 
that is the introduction of partisan criteria into the allocation of jobs or 
public contracts. In a negative light, this would appear to represent the 
conversion of public resources for partisan advantage, and thus to give 
those currently in power an unfair advantage over their challengers. In 
a positive light, however, patronage appears as the placing of individuals 
who will be sympathetic to the policy aims of those in power not just into 
policy-making positions, but into policy-implementing positions as well, 
with the aim of making government more eff ective. Th e question is where 
placing those who will be vigorous allies in governing into offi  ce becomes 
primarily a reward for partisan service, and where in turn that becomes a 
simple bribe. 
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Th e same kind of questions arises with regard to the other category of 
concern, policy. Even if there are policies that can be said in some objective 
sense to be in the long term public interest, there are no policies that are 
perceived by everyone to be optimally in his or her own immediate interest. 
Presumably, government policy will always be skewed toward the interests 
of those groups that supported the parties in power. If votes are motivated 
by policy, then this merely represents the fulfi llment of campaign pledges. 
Even here, however, does there come a point at which, for example, policies 
enacted by labour parties that favour the interests of unions over those of 
capitalists become partisan abuses? But policy can be far more specifi c: 
rather than favouring unions in general, it can be drafted so as to favour 
a particular union over others; rather than allocating money for public 
works projects, it can be drafted so as to concentrate the benefi ts of those 
projects in particular places.30 Again, the motivation can be the pursuit of 
ideologically informed policy goals that happen to advantage supporters; 
or the policy may be ideologically informed, but shaded so as to reward 
identifi able supporters; or it can be a reward for party supporters; or it 
can be the pay-off  for benefi ts given to (or expected by) policy makers in 
their private capacity. While clearly out-right bribes, and the conversion of 
public resources for the private use of those doing the converting (roughly, 
embezzlement), are illegitimate, beyond this the question largely hangs on 
one’s understanding of politics. If it is about the discovery of the public 
interest, then a politically neutral administration is appropriate, and the 
partisan targeting of benefi ts is at least questionable. If, however, politics 
is about building coalitions among confl icting interests, then patronage, 
log-rolling and the targeting of club goods and side-payments may be 
integral to the process. 
Second, and continuing the line of argument already raised with 
regard to the choice of an electoral system, standards for registration or 
recognition as a party, for ballot access and for access to public resources, 
what are the conditions for the formation of a recognized parliamentary 
group – and what advantages do such groups have? While this is often 
specifi ed in the standing orders of parliament rather than in statute law, 
in many ways this is a distinction without a diff erence. Rules of this sort 
have an important bearing on the resources (both fi nancial and in terms 
of infl uence on the agenda, committee positions, etc.) available to small 
parties, and thus on their capacity to operate as independent entities as 
well as on the costs to schismatics of leaving an established party group.31
Th ird, what restrictions might be placed on the freedom of MPs to 
switch parties during the course of a parliamentary term? Th is phenomenon 
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is relatively uncommon in the established democracies, although by no 
means unknown.32 In these systems, those who switch parties are often 
severely criticized, but rarely sanctioned.33 In many of the newer and non-
western democracies, however, party switching has been perceived to be 
a greater problem, both undermining the stability of governments and 
preventing parties from progressing beyond the stage of personal cliques 
always ‘for sale to the highest bidder’ among would-be prime ministers. In 
a signifi cant number of these cases, there has been recourse to legislative 
action to enforce party stability.34 In general, anti-party-switching laws 
deprive MPs who switch parties of their seats in parliament. Th e question 
is exactly what actions trigger this loss of mandate. On one hand, is it 
simply leaving the party for which one was elected, or is the further act of 
joining another party required?35 On the other hand, is it only voluntary 
resignation from the party, or can an MP be deprived of his or her seat on 
expulsion from the party?
Th e adoption of anti-party-switching regulations appears to be the one 
area in which movement is toward the aggregative rather than expressive 
end of the continuum, in that they appear to recognize that, particularly 
in list-PR systems but more generally in any functioning parliamentary 
system, voters are generally choosing, and thus giving a mandate to, 
an MP as a representative of his/her party and not as an autonomous 
individual. Nonetheless, both provisions of many constitutions, and 
widely accepted international norms, continue to hold, for example, that 
the ‘56. Representative mandate makes a representative independent 
from his or her party once it has been elected....’ (Venice Commission) 
Particularly the international organizations have tried to justify opposition 
to party switching by asserting that it is usually a symptom of corruption 
rather than of principle. But perhaps the more fundamental question is 
the one left unasked – whether the idea that an MP has an independent 
and personal mandate is itself compatible with realistic understandings of 
democratic government in the modern world. 
Conclusion
To summarize the argument that I want to make in a single (overly long) 
sentence, it is that both the trend in existing party legislation and in 
the guidelines and guidance for future legislation emanating from such 
organizations as ODIHR and the Venice Commission are derived from 
a conception of democracy – or more properly of bourgeois liberalism – 
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that eff ectively became obsolete with the advent of mass suff rage and 
the associated advent of the mass party, even as they assert the centrality 
of parties and assume that parties should have most of the structural 
characteristics of the mass party. In the pre-democratic era from which 
that view of government is rooted, politics was a gentleman’s game. 
Gentlemen would pursue the national interest which just coincidentally 
happened to be the interest of their class, the working class not having 
representation in parliament to tell them otherwise. Gentlemen would 
be independent, taking orders neither from their parties nor from their 
constituents; they would use their own judgement.
In the era of the mass party, this ideal was replaced by the idea of 
party government, which continues to be the fundamental principle both 
underlying and legitimizing modern parliamentary government (Castles & 
Wildenmann 1986; Katz 1987). In the last decades, as catch-all parties 
have become cartel parties, and as all citizens have become ‘middle class’, 
there has been a growing distaste for parties and partisanship (for the 
idea that politics has become a sport for players rather than gentlemen), 
and a longing for a return to a mythical age in which public spirited 
gentlemen – and now ladies as well – would pursue the common interest. 
Bi- (or multi-) partisanship, or simply consensus democracy, are preferred 
to party confl ict and competition. One result has been a marked decline 
in both party membership and in electoral turnout – trends that have been 
widely interpreted as indicating a serious problem for democracy. And one 
response frequently has been legislative action intended to increase popular 
participation and to reduce partisan confl ict – basically, to try to move 
party politics in the direction of articulation, deliberation and individual 
expression, at the expense of aggregation and collective decision.
Th e problem, however, is not just a kind of philosophical inconsistency 
between the ideals of popular expression and deliberation on the one hand 
and party government on the other. It is also that the rules enacted and 
the recommendations made for further reforms have the capacity to be 
positively pernicious – to undermine, rather than to support, popular 
government. In particular, while opportunities to ‘have one’s say’ may be 
appreciated, coordination is required in large scale societies if any voice 
is to be heard. Reforms to ‘democratize’ political parties and electoral 
competition may have the eff ect of making this coordination diffi  cult 
or impossible. Th e most obvious examples concern policies that, in the 
name of openness of competition or a ‘level playing fi eld’, lead to such 
a fragmentation of competition that the legitimacy of the outcome is 
undermined: the 1993 Polish election of the Sejm, with over 30% of the 
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vote going to parties that could not clear the 5% threshold; the 2002 
French presidential election, in which fragmentation led to a second round 
in which neither of the candidates had received as much as 20% of the vote 
in the fi rst round – and one (le Pen) could not achieve 20% in the second 
round either; the 2000 Canadian general election (the last before 2011 to 
choose a majority government), in which one party won more than 57% 
of the seats with less than 41% of the vote. Empowering party members 
can have a similarly pernicious eff ect – punishing political leaders for the 
‘crime’ of acting responsibly. Ultimately, the question is what balance is 
to be struck between active participation by the relatively small number 
of people who choose to be politically engaged, and collective decision by 
the far broader range of citizens for whom politics is eff ectively a spectator 
sport. Or, put another way, the question is whether ‘democracy on a 
large scale is ... the sum of many little democracies’, (Sartori 1965: 124) a 
question to which Sartori’s answer is ‘no.’
Notes
1 For example, although the ‘Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political 
Parties’ adopted by the Venice Commission in 2008 [CDL-AD(2009)021] 
identifi es parties as non-state agencies, it continues (pp. 16): ‘Political parties 
are major actors in any democratic society, hence they enjoy the benefi ts 
of the guarantees of [the rule of law, democracy and human rights] by the 
State, and, accordingly, they must respect and promote these very same 
principles’, and goes on to call for regulation in a number of areas that would 
be unregulated for most ordinary associations.
2 See Blyth & Katz 2005; Katz 2006 for reasons why one might not accept the 
principal-agent understanding as empirically justifi ed.
3 Adapting Finer’s defi nition of politics as what happens when ‘a given set of 
persons of some type or other require a common policy; and ... its members 
advocate, for this common status, policies which are mutually exclusive’ 
(1974: 8), I understand politics to be about reaching a common policy in a 
way that resolves or contains this kind of confl ict, whereas the alternative, 
a-political, view would suggest that the confl ict can be dissolved altogether, 
or be found to have been illusory in the fi rst place.
4 Note that ‘Optimal’ in this sentence is stronger than ‘Pareto optimal.’ For 
a decision to be optimal in the fi rst sense, it must be the unanimous fi rst 
choice; for a decision to be Pareto optimal only requires that there be no 
alternative that is unanimously preferred to it. 
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5 I use the quotes around ‘members’ to emphasize that the distinction concerns 
the essential nature of the party, not simply whether it has formal members, 
in the sense of people who take out membership cards and pay dues. For 
example, the traditional nature of the British Conservative Party was clearly 
as an organization of politicians (e.g., the party leader was chosen by – 
‘emerged from’ – the parliamentary party alone; the party conference made 
recommendations and requests, not decisions), although the Nation Union 
of Conservative and Unionist Associations was an organization with formal 
members.
6 Th e idea of an exogenously defi ned interest – that is an outcome that is 
‘correct’ not simply because it is what the people want, but by some standard 
that is separate from, and superior to, mere preferences – can be illustrated 
by the choice of abbots and bishops in the early medieval Catholic Church. 
Th ese were elected, not because election would allow the private preferences 
of the voters to determine the outcome, but because the votes were understood 
to be the medium through which the will of God would be expressed. Hence 
it would be possible for even a nearly unanimous electorate to ‘get it wrong’, 
and hence also the requirement of confi rmation by an ecclesiastical superior 
to make a canonically valid election.
7 In this regard, it is signifi cant that the ‘egalitarian’ in the contrast between 
egalitarian and libertarian models of election administration seems to 
emphasize the equality of positions rather than of citizens, for example 
when it calls for equal spending per candidate, independent of the size of 
that candidate’s support (that is, independent of the number of citizens who 
support him or her). See Feasby (1999, 2003); Manfredi & Rush (2008).
8 One diffi  culty with this view is to reconcile the active involvement in real 
decision-making on the part of citizens with the exercise of independent 
judgement by MPs. Ideas like deliberative polls may partially bridge this gap 
by allowing citizens (or at least a sample of them) to participate in parliament-
like debates with the purpose not only of educating themselves and whatever 
other ‘ordinary’ citizens care to observe, but also MPs and other opinion 
leaders. See Fishkin 2009.
9 ‘Th e candidate of one of the major Parties stands for a connected policy and 
for a certain body of men who, if a majority can be obtained, will form a 
Government. Th is is well understood by the electors. If the Member fails to 
support the Government or fails to act with the Opposition in their eff orts 
to turn the Government out, he is acting contrary to the expectation of those 
who have put their trust in him.’ British Prime Minister Clement Attlee 
(1957: 15).
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10 While ideally this might be taken to require the approval of an absolute 
majority of the voters, which might further be taken to require a suffi  ciently 
proportional electoral system to assure that only coalitions with majority 
electoral support also enjoy majorities in parliament, here it can be understood 
only to require a duly elected majority in parliament, with the electoral 
system that potentially ‘manufactures’ the majority accepted as a legitimate 
counting and/or weighting rule for determining whether a coalition has 
adequate popular support. In the most obvious example, SMP elections often 
produce single party parliamentary majorities that were supported by less 
than a majority of those voting. If one were to insist that strict numerical 
equality of citizens as isolated and totally autonomous individuals is 
required, then this would create a serious problem of legitimacy. However, 
if one alternatively understands citizens to be social beings whose identity is 
partially defi ned by their membership in communities, then, as Canadian 
Chief Justice (then Chief Justice of British Columbia) Beverly McLaughlin 
put it in Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [59 D.L.R. (4th) 247 
[1989]] , ‘Factors like geography, community history, community interests 
and minority representation may need to be taken into account to ensure 
that our legislative assemblies eff ectively represent the diversity of our social 
mosaic. Th ese are but examples of considerations which may justify departure 
from absolute voter parity in the pursuit of more eff ective representation; the 
list is not closed.’
11 For example, Article 11, sec. 4 of the Constitution of Bulgaria, which 
prohibits parties based on ‘ethnic, racial, or religious lines’.
12 Very similar language is used in article 8A of the Treaty of Lisbon with 
regard to parties at the European level (‘4. Political parties at European level 
contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will 
of citizens of the Union’) and in Article 3 of the Constitution of Hungary 
(‘(2) Political parties shall participate in the development and expression of 
the popular will’). In a quite opaque section, the Spanish Organic Law on 
Political Parties says ‘although political parties are not constitutional bodies 
but association‐based private entities, they are nonetheless an essential 
part of the constitutional architecture; they perform functions of primary 
constitutional relevance’
13 For example, Vermont law requires that the base unit of a political party be 
the town committee, elected by a town caucus that must be organized in 
each odd-numbered year, and in which all ‘voters of the party residing in 
town’ may participate (17 V.S.A. §§2301-2320). Th e law specifi es that the 
town committee is to elect fi ve offi  cers (chair, vice chair, secretary, treasurer, 
assistant treasurer), as well as at least two county committee members (the 
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number is based on the town’s vote for the party’s gubernatorial candidate at 
the last election). Th e county committees elect their own fi ve offi  cers as well 
as at least two delegates (one male and the other female) to form, along with 
the county chairs, the state committee. In the same vein, although much less 
detailed in its prescription, the Romanian party law specifi es that (art. 13: 
1) ‘Th e general meeting of the members and the executive body, regardless 
of the name given in the statute of each party, are compulsory governing 
forums of the political party and its territorial organizations.’ and that the 
national ‘general meeting of the members of the political party or of their 
representatives’ be ‘convened at least once every 4 years’ (art. 14:1). It also 
requires that the organization of parties be based on territory, rather than (for 
example) occupation (art. 4).
14  In Vermont, tests of party loyalty or ideological compatibility for admission 
to a town caucus are specifi cally prohibited by law, although the law does, at 
least, limit each voter to participation in only one party’s caucus. Obviously, 
verifi cation that only the voters of a party participate in its town caucus is 
impossible in the context of a secret ballot. Th e Portuguese party law prohibits 
denial of membership in any party ‘due to ancestry, gender, race, language, 
territory of origin, religion, education, economic situation or social status.’ 
(art. 19)
15 In the United States, partisan registration is generally regarded as the 
equivalent of party membership, and since it is – at least in those states that use 
‘closed primaries’ – the criterion for admission to participate in the selection 
of party candidates and offi  cials, it satisfi es at least part of the Katz & Mair 
defi nition of membership. On the other hand, however, partisan registration 
entails no obligations to the party, is not subject to party approval, and is 
generally administered by the state rather than by the party.
16 Note that although laws often defi ne parties as associations of citizens, at 
least implicitly barring non-citizens from party membership, this in fact 
appears to violate Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Article 3 of the (First) Protocol, and would be particularly problematic 
with regard to EU nationals residing in another EU state – in which they 
would have the right to vote and to be elected in all but national elections. 
In the case of Estonia, art. 48 of the Constitution specifi cally limits party 
membership to citizens, although sect. 5 of the party law allows EU citizens 
who are residents of Estonia to be party members.
17 For example, registration requires 1,000 members in Estonia; 2,500 in 
Bulgaria; declarations of 5,000 voters that they wish the party to be registered 
in Norway.
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18 Similarly, the Portuguese party law requires that ‘Political parties shall be 
governed by the principles of democratic organization and management and 
of participation by all their members.’
19 ‘36. Whether directly or indirectly, party leaders must be democratically 
chosen at any given level (local, regional, national and European). Th is means 
that members must be able to vote for their selection....’ Venice Commission 
Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties.
20 Barber (1984) raises what is eff ectively the same argument against state-level 
representative democracy with a secret ballot – that it encourages expression 
of private preference rather than public judgement.
21 An example is the 2008 defeat of moderate Republican Congressman Wayne 
Gilchrist (MD-1) by hard-right state senator Andy Harris in the Republican 
primary, only to have Harris lose what had been regarded as a rock-solid 
Republican district to Democrat Frank Kratovil in the general election. An 
analogous case from the UK would be the 1976 deselection of Labour MP 
Reg Prentice by his Newham North East constituency party, essentially 
for the ‘crime’ of not being suffi  ciently left wing. Given the stronger role 
of party in British electoral choice, and the ability of candidates to switch 
constituencies, however, this did not cost Labour the seat in the next election. 
Where Gilchrist nominally remained a Republican, but publicly endorsed 
Kratovil in the general election, Prentice became a Conservative and was 
elected for the party at the next election from a diff erent constituency 
(Daventry).
22 For example, Turkish legal scholars argue that art. 68 of the Constitution, 
particularly as extended by the Law on political parties, would not only bar 
secessionist parties, but also parties calling for a more federalized structure 
of government. (Venice Commission Opinion on the Constitutional and 
Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey – 
CDL-AD (2009) 006.) Secessionist parties could also be banned in Bulgaria.
23 For example, eligibility for public subsidy is limited in Austria to parties 
represented in parliament or that have received 1% of the vote; in Portugal to 
parties with at least one seat or that received 50,000 votes; in Canada to parties 
that won 2% of the national vote or 5% of the vote in the constituencies in 
which they had a candidate. 
24 For example, the Liberal Democrats versus the Labour and Conservative 
parties in the UK, the NDP versus to Conservatives or Liberals in Canada 
(at least until 2011), or the FDP and Greens versus of SPD and CDU in 
Germany.
25 In this context, the phrase ‘third party’ is derived from contract law, and 
refers to individuals or organizations that want to participate in, or infl uence, 
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an election campaign without themselves being/having their own candidates. 
It is, thus, to be distinguished from the use of the phrase in the literature of 
electoral systems, in which it refers to small parties – particularly those that 
are not expected to fi nish fi rst or second in a single-member district.
26 For example, it was claimed that the Canadian Natural Law Party used 
the advantages of candidacy to advertize its philosophy of transcendental 
meditation, and its related fee-based programmes, rather than to participate 
in debate of public issues. On a more restricted level, in the 1986 Fulham 
(UK) by-election a London wine merchant stood as the candidate of the 
‘Connoisseur Wine Party’, using the election address that his candidacy 
entitled him to have delivered to every house in his constituency as a cheap 
(the cost of his lost £500 deposit) way to advertize his business (Rawlings 
1988: 182-183).
27 Independent expenditures are those made in support of, or opposition to, 
candidate (in the US) or party (more generally) without the collaboration of, 
and not in coordination with, that party or candidate.
28 On the other hand, third party broadcast advertizing is eff ectively banned 
in Italy by a provision requiring broadcasters to identify the political party 
paying for it; the Belgian Law of 4 July 1989 eff ectively barred third party 
campaign spending by requiring that it be included in the allowable totals 
for parties and/or candidates; a 2000 report by the Israeli State Comptroller 
identifi ed ‘extra-party’ propaganda as falling into the category of prohibited 
contributions. See GRECO evaluation of Belgium, http://www.coe.int/t/
dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3%282008%298_
Belgium_Two_EN.pdf; Legge 22 febbraio 2000, n. 28; Report of the Results 
of an Audit of the Party Lists for the Election Period of the Fifteenth Knesset 
and for the Prime Minister (State Comptroller Offi  ce, January 2000).
29 Th is danger is also the basis for the widespread opposition to the US Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizens United.
30 Note that this can stop well short of American congressional ear-marks, which 
specify a particular project to be put in a particular place by instead specifying 
a nominally neutral set of criteria – that just ‘happen’ to concentrate spending 
or other benefi ts in areas where the governing parties are strong, or hope to 
become stronger. In a famous American example, Congress specifi ed that a 
particular variety of olives were to be purchased for military dining facilities; 
it was purely ‘coincidental’ that olives meeting those requirements were 
only grown in the district of one infl uential congressman. More generally, 
however, public works spending can be directed to urban transport or to 
rural roads, to seaports or to airports, to railways or to highways, each choice 
favouring one identifi able interest, and potential party clientele, over another. 
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31 For example, the programme of business of the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
must be agreed by the conference of presidents of the parliamentary groups 
(rule 23), but a party must have at least 20 deputies in order to form a group 
(rule 14) and therefore be included in the conference. 
32 Recent examples would include Belinda Stronach’s defection from the 
Canadian Conservatives to the Liberals in 2005, which allowed the Paul 
Martin minority government to remain in offi  ce, US Senator Arlen Specter’s 
2009 shift from the Republicans to the Democrats, and British Conservative 
MP Quentin Davies’s 2007 shift to Labour. Between 1996 and 2001, ‘almost 
one-fourth of members of the lower house in Italy...switched parties at least 
once’ (Heller and Mershon 2005: 546), but the Italian party system was at 
that time clearly in a state of fl ux. Perhaps the most famous case of party 
switching was Winston Churchill’s 1904 move from British Conservative to 
Liberal parties, only to return to the Conservatives in 1925.
33 Shortly after Stronach switched parties, a private members bill was tabled 
that would have required a by-election within 35 days of an MP leaving his 
or her party, but the bill was never voted upon. Th e Ethics Commissioner of 
Canada was asked to investigate whether the promise of a senior cabinet post 
had illegitimately induced her to switch parties; he refused, saying that even 
if the allegation were true (she did become Minister of Human Resources 
and Skills Development and Minister responsible for Democratic Renewal), 
it would not have been illegal.
34 According to Janda (2009), 14% (fi ve [sic]) of older democracies (India, 
Israel, Portugal, Trinidad & Tobago), 24% of newer democracies, and 33% 
of semi-democracies have laws against parliamentary party defections.
35 For example, the Portuguese Constitution (Article 160 1.c.) specifi es that 
an MP who joins a party other than the one for which s/he was elected loses 
his or her mandate; this sanction is not applied, however, if the MP merely 
becomes an independent. Similarly, Israeli law sanctions party switchers, 
with the result that those who might otherwise have switched parties remain 
formally in their old party while coordinating action and voting with their 
‘new’ party. (Rahat 2007: note 25). In contrast, a member of the Th ai 
parliament who is expelled from his/her party only loses his/parliamentary 
mandate if the member fails to join another party within 60 days.
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Dilemmas of Regulating Political Finance, 
with Special Reference to the Dutch Case
Ruud Koole1
Leiden University
Introduction: the costs of democracy
Money is power and the struggle for political power always has a fi nancial 
aspect as well. Th e democratic principle, however, asks for specifi c criteria 
concerning the sources and the use of money. Pure fraud, for example, 
donating money to a party or a candidate in exchange for concrete political 
favours, is allowed nowhere in the world. But apart from that, criteria 
are rather diff erent, depending – among other things – on the nature of 
the electoral system, conceptions of the state, the level of the rule of law, 
and the economic development of a country. It is, for example, diffi  cult 
to demand a high degree of transparency of the fi nances of political 
parties in countries where politicians from opposition parties that receive 
fi nancial support from foreign sources are not sure that disclosure of their 
sources will not be used to imprison them or worse, even when that kind 
of support was not formally forbidden. And, to give another example, 
in various poor countries a plea for grass roots fi nancing ( i.e. political 
parties and/or candidates receive small donations from many people) may 
be considered to be naïve, because some parties do not receive money 
from small people, but rather give them money or bread or milk during 
campaign rallies. Th is may be considered as vote buying, which is seen to 
be incompatible with campaign practices in well established democracies.
Th erefore, when we speak about party fi nance in this chapter, we limit 
ourselves to western democracies where the rule of law is well established 
and free media exist, and that are affl  uent enough to allow for strict criteria 
with respect to political fi nance.
Although the costs of democracy (Heard, 1960) vary among western 
democracies, most of these democracies have introduced a new source 
of income for parties and/or candidates: public money. From about the 
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mid-1960s, many countries started to grant state money to political 
parties (IDEA, 2003; Nassmacher, 2009; Van Biezen, 2010). Increased 
expenditure, mainly as a consequence of higher campaign costs, was hard 
to cover by less growing or even decreasing income from membership fees. 
Th e state came to the rescue.
West Germany was the fi rst European country to introduce state 
subsidy of political parties (1967), but in that country a very principled 
reason was also behind this decision. Memories of the fact that Hitler’s 
NSDAP in the interwar period had received enormous sums of money 
from some German enterprises convinced many people that a one-
sided dependence of parties on donations from corporations should be 
prevented and donations by a democratically controlled state were to be 
preferred. Th e latter took place on a large scale, resulting in very high costs 
of democracy, also in comparison with the costs in for example the United 
States, Canada, Austria and the Netherlands (Nassmacher, 1982; Koole 
1985; Cordes , 2002). Is is true that comparisons of real fi nancial data 
between countries are notoriously diffi  cult to make, but the relatively high 
costs of democracy in Germany (and other countries on the European 
continent for that matter) are to be explained by the fact that parties spend 
a lot of money not only on campaigns, but also on their permanent party 
organizations. 
Th us, for a good understanding of political fi nance one has to distinguish 
between campaign costs and routine costs, as well as between expenditure 
by individual candidates and by party organizations. Combined with the 
specifi cs of the various electoral systems, these elements allow for great 
variation in the regimes of political fi nance between countries. 
Variation, however, is not just the refl ection of the technical features 
of political systems. Behind these technicalities, diff erent ideological 
conceptions of the role of the state in democratic systems may also 
explain diversity among distinct regimes of political fi nance. Recently, 
various pleas have been made to treat political fi nance as the dependent 
variable: instead of looking for the consequences of specifi c forms of state 
regulation, the emphasis has shifted to the question why state regulation 
has taken these specifi c forms. Scarrow (2004) points to the importance 
of political strategies of political parties for the outcome of debates on 
political fi nance reform. Van Biezen (2010, 84) stresses the salience of 
more philosophical considerations: ‘debates over political fi nance are 
essentially based on competing conceptions of democracy’. Koss (2010, 
205) also emphasizes the need to treat public funding as a dependent 
variable, and he concludes that ‘a consensus of the relevant parties is a 
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necessary condition for the introduction and reform of state funding to 
political parties’. According to Koss, the consensus is often catalysed by 
a debate on corruption. Th e substance of that consensus, however, may 
vary as well. 
Th is chapter explores the importance of ideological considerations for 
the variation in political fi nance regimes. A political agreement between 
the major political forces on public subsidy of political parties (and, more 
generally, on the regulation of the political fi nancing of candidates and 
parties) may refl ect either the dominant conception of the role of the 
state in a society or the compromise made between diff erent conceptions. 
Lawmakers do not act in an ideological vacuum, and their regulatory 
work on political fi nance, be it in reaction to corruption scandals or to 
profound societal changes, is diffi  cult to isolate from prevailing views on 
the role of the state. Th e approach in this chapter, therefore, diff ers from 
the analysis of the legal regulation of political parties from the perspective 
of competing conceptions of democracy (Hopkin, 2004; Katz in this 
volume), in that it starts from another level of abstraction: general views 
on the role of the state.
Th e next section presents two opposite general views on the role of the 
state which will be used to construct a typology of rationales of political 
fi nance by confronting these general views with the recent call for more 
transparency in the fi eld of political fi nance. Based on this typology, the 
following section deals with dilemmas of state funding of political parties 
that lawmakers in modern democracies are faced with when trying to 
formulate legal regulations. Th e dilemmas of state funding are closely 
related to the dilemmas of the more general question of state regulation 
of political parties. Th e latter exist also in countries where public funding 
is hardly available. Th erefore, although it concentrates on dilemmas of 
public funding of political parties, this section also includes some broader 
dilemmas of state regulation of parties and candidates where these can 
help us to understand the problems of state support for parties.
In the fi nal section of this chapter, we will apply this typology and 
these dilemmas to the case of the new Dutch law on party fi nance. 
A typology of rationales of political fi nance regulation 
In a famous judgment, the Canadian Supreme Court stressed the 
importance of underlying ideologies for the assessment of political fi nance 
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regulation. In the case about limits on expenditures by third parties 
(Harper v. Canada, 2004) the Court concluded: 
“Th e Court’s conception of electoral fairness as refl ected in the 
foregoing principles is consistent with the egalitarian model of 
elections adopted by Parliament as an essential component of our 
democratic society. Th is model is premised on the notion that 
individuals should have an equal opportunity to participate in the 
electoral process. Under this model, wealth is the main obstacle to 
equal participation... Th us, the egalitarian model promotes an electoral 
process that requires the wealthy to be prevented from controlling 
the electoral process to the detriment of others with less economic 
power. Th e state can equalize participation in the electoral process in 
two ways... First, the State can provide a voice to those who might 
otherwise not be heard. Th e Act does so by reimbursing candidates 
and political parties and by providing broadcast time to political 
parties. Second, the State can restrict the voices which dominate the 
political discourse so that others may be heard as well. In Canada, 
electoral regulation has focussed on the latter by regulating electoral 
spending through comprehensive election fi nance provisions. Th ese 
provisions seek to create a level playing fi eld for those who wish to 
engage in the electoral discourse. Th is, in turn, enables voters to be 
better informed; no one voice is overwhelmed by another. In contrast, 
the libertarian model of elections favours an electoral process subject 
to as few restrictions as possible.” (Supreme Court of Canada, 2004, 
s 62)
Th e diff erent models of elections in this quotation correspond with broader 
conceptions of the state. Th ese conceptions may be helpful in analysing 
the diff erent approaches states take to regulating and fi nancing political 
parties and candidates. Depending on the conception of the role of the 
state, the willingness to grant public money to parties will vary. In a narrow 
conception, the state serves only as the institution that is to provide basic 
goods (like internal and external security) that cannot be brought about 
without its help. In a wider conception the state must also act when goods 
that could be produced without the help of the state can be distributed 
more evenly only with its help. Th e fi rst conception does not leave much 
room for limits and obligations posed on the citizens (therefore this model 
is sometimes refered to as the ‘libertarian model’), while in the second 
view these limits and obligations are – up to a certain level – defended 
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(‘the egalitarian model’). Th e adherents to both conceptions will claim 
that their approach contributes most to a desired society. But while for the 
fi rst the ideal society is determined by individual freedom, for the second 
freedom for all is predominant.2 A long history of political philosophy 
lies behind these two conceptions (Hopkin, 2004; Feasby, 1999).3 Th eir 
popularity changes over time and varies between diff erent countries, and 
within countries between diff erent political families. Essentially, it is an 
ideological debate that also impacts on the debate about public funding of 
parties and candidates.
In recent times, another theme has come to dominate the discussion on 
political fi nance: transparency. Th e nature of this theme is less ideological 
than the aforementioned views on the role of the state. Th is may be one 
of the reasons that the call for more transparency very often transcends or 
cuts trough ideological divisions.
Th is call is not limited to countries granting state subsidies to parties 
and candidates, and is increasingly being heard. In order to increase trust 
in the political system, democracies are more and more willing to introduce 
higher standards for the transparency of political fi nance. Accountability 
has become the international buzz word for good governance, and a high 
level of transparency is seen as a precondition, as well as a good thing 
in itself. Th e United Nations launched a Transparency & Accountability 
Initiative (UNTAI) in 2007 and International Transparency has become 
an infl uential NGO that critically assesses the level of transparency and 
corruption in many countries all over the world. 
Th e increased attention given to transparency left its traces in the debate 
on political fi nance, although the demand for transparency is not new. 
Th e German constitution (basic law, 1949) prescribes that parties must 
publish information about their income and expenditure, as well as about 
their fi nancial reserves.4 Disclosure was the central element of the new 
Federal Campaign Act (FECA, 1971) in the United States. Donations of 
more than 200 dollars a year had to be made public. A few years later, the 
Canadian Elections Expenses Act (1974) set the treshold at 100 Canadian 
dollars (today: 200 dollars). In western Europe the disclosure treshold 
varies from 125 euros in Belgium to 10,000 euros in Germany (IDEA, 
2012).
Even if one does not want to limit donations above a certain amount of 
money or to ban gifts from certain types of donor altogether, a high degree 
of transparency can be defended with the argument that in a democracy 
it is the voter who decides about the desirability of certain donations. To 
be able to make an informed decision, the voter needs to have reliable 
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information about the fi nancial resources of parties and candidates. 
Hence, the plea for as much transparency as possible.
Th e principle of transparency, however, cannot be easily categorized 
along the ideological dimension. Of course, transparency needs some 
action of the state (disclosure needs enforcement), but it can be combined 
with both a narrower and a wider conception of the state. Th is leads to a 
two-dimensional typology of political fi nance rationales: 
Figure 1. Typology of political fi nance regimes
Th e dimension of state conceptions relates to the normative, ideological 
view that the state’s role in enhancing fairness in electoral competition 
should be limited (narrow) or active (wider). Th e transparency dimension 
ranges from no transparency at all to full transparency. In recent 
decades, a general trend towards more transparency has been observed 
(the arrows in the fi gure), both in the narrower and the wider state 
conception. Th eoretically, other shifts are possible as well, for example 
from the closed libertarian model towards the open egalitarian model. 
Countries without any form of state regulation of political fi nance may 
introduce transparency rules and egalitarian regulation at the same time, 
thus moving from regime 1 to regime 4. Another country may give up 
its eff orts to reach a more egalitarian model of political fi nance, while 
introducing more transparency in order to let the voters judge, hence 
moving from regime 3 to regime 2. Countries can be ordered according 
to this typology, and a fi rst eff ort will be made after we have described 
the most important reasons that are given for the introduction of public 
subsidies to parties and discussed some of the dilemmas lawmakers face in 











1. closed libertarian 2. open libertarian
3. closed egalitarian 4. open egalitarian
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Reasons to introduce state subsidy to political parties
Public fi nancing of political parties (and/or candidates) is now routine 
practice in many countries. Th e reasons lawmakers put forward to 
introduce state subsidy to parties are diff erent, of course. Apart from the 
rather general reasoning that parties are instrumental in the formation of 
the political will in a democracy, and therefore deserve to receive money 
from the state, we will highlight some of the most frequently cited other 
reasons.
Th e example of Germany, already mentioned above, shows that 
events in the past strongly impacted upon the willingness to introduce 
state subsidies. As early as 1950, the professional organization of German 
lawyers advocated state subsidy to fi ght undesirable infl uences on political 
parties. It explicitly mentioned the important donations by corporations 
(like Th yssen, IG Farben, AEG and Siemens) to Adolf Hitler’s NSDAP 
(Dragstra, 2008, 404). Th e idea was that state subsidy would make parties 
(and/or candidates) less inclined to look for other sources of income, that 
were considered to be undesirable, although not forbidden. 
Fighting corruption is a second argument in favour of public funding 
(cf Koss, 2010). Th is is not the same as trying to prevent big donors 
infl uencing political decision making. As long as formal rules do not 
forbid donations from corporations or unions or rich individuals, such 
gifts do not fall into the category of corruption, except in cases of clear 
fraud (i.e. gifts in exchange to concrete political favours). Th e argument 
that public funds help to fi ght corruption is the following: parties are in 
permanent – and often increasing – need of money. Without enough help 
from the state, parties will be tempted to look for other resources, even 
if they are illegal, thus perverting the outcome of democratic elections. 
Th is kind of reasoning reveals a rather cynical, but in some cases no less 
realistic, view of the nature of parties: they would be prone to corruption 
if the fi nancial need were high enough. Although a direct relationship 
between the level of corruption and the level of state funding is hard to 
assess (van Biezen, 2010, 70), it would be worth investigating whether 
this kind of reasoning is used more often in countries where the level of 
corruption is relatively high. In countries with a low level of corruption, 
the argument of introducing state subsidy to fi ght corruption is probably 
not very convincing. Political culture in these countries is likely to be one 
of ‘rather bankrupt than corrupt’.
A specifi c problem linked to the problematic relationship between state 
funding and corruption is what I would call the corruption paradox. State 
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funding is always accompanied by regulation, in some countries more 
than in others. Th e higher the level of formal regulation, the higher the 
chances of illegal practices. Rules that do not exist cannot be broken. Of 
course, various informal or moral rules may exist that can be broken, 
and corruption defi ned – by the World Bank – as ‘the abuse of public 
offi  ce for private gain’ is not limited to cases in which formal rules are 
broken (sometimes formal rules can even be considered as tools for abuse 
of public offi  ce for private gains). What is meant here, however, is the 
idea that attempts to fi ght corruption by stricter regulation (possibly as 
a consequence of the introduction of state subsidy) may result in more 
cases of illegal practices. And illegal practices are generally conceived by 
the general public as corruption. To give an example: the political life of 
German chancellor Helmut Kohl was in serious trouble at the end of the 
1990s, because he admitted to having received undeclared contributions 
for his party, but he refused to give the names of the donors. In his own 
words at the time:
“Th ese donors trusted me with this sum of money under the condition 
that they wouldn’t be named. Th ey were German citizens who had 
nothing to do with government decisions or policy in any sector. Th ey 
wanted to help me. And I don’t intend to reveal any names because I 
gave them my word.”(Deutsche Welle, 2010).
Investigations followed, but the names of the donors and the exact amount 
of money remain unknown. Th e very refusal to disclose the names of 
the donors was against the law in Germany. If Kohl had been the prime 
minister in the Netherlands in the same period, a scandal might have 
arisen as well, but he could not have been accused of illegal practices, 
simply because the Dutch rules at the time did not contain an obligation 
to declare contributions.
A third reason for introducing state subsidy lies in the wish to promote 
a level playing fi eld for all political parties and/or candidates (see also 
section 2). If resources are distributed unevenly between parties, state 
money may help to level out these diff erences. Perfect equality of political 
competition will never exist, but public money will at least make it possible 
for poorer parties to have a chance to reach the voters. Th is idea of fairness 
is refl ected in the abovementioned judgment of the Canadian Supreme 
Court (Harper v. Canada, 2004), and was also an important reason for 
introducing public subsidy in the new Central and Eastern European 
democracies, immediately after the removal of the Iron Curtain. Without 
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help from the state, the rich former Communist parties would have had a 
quasi-monopoly on the electoral market. Th us, state subsidies were meant 
to correct market failures (van Biezen and Kopecký, 2007). Th e same 
holds for various African countries where opposition parties have little 
fi nancial power when the incumbent party has a majority position using 
state resources for its own benefi t (Saff u, 2003).
Germany tried to go one step further. Chancengleichheit (equality of 
chances) has always been one of the main principles that guide German 
regulation of party fi nances, but in 1984 a very complicated system was 
introduced to compensate poorer parties for the fact that they would 
profi t less from an increase in the tax deductibility of donations to parties. 
Th is system of Chancenausgleich (levelling of chances) was abolished 
again in 1992, because the German Constitutional Court ruled that it 
had created new inequalities, and hence was at odds with the principle of 
Chancengleichheit (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1992, 264).
Dilemmas of regulating political fi nance in Western democracies
Decisions to introduce public subsidies and the accompanying regulation 
are further complicated by the eff ects lawmakers foresee or fear. State 
subsidy may have unwanted consequences, just like the absence of state 
subsidy. Not all of the possible unwanted consequences are guaranteed to 
take place. Uncertainty rules. State subsidy will indeed give parties more 
fi nancial means, but will it – for example – also inevitably lead to the 
petrifi cation of the party system? Even if this is not the case, legislators may 
not be sure about that or may have to reckon with possible allegations by 
political opponents that they intend to prevent new political parties from 
entering the electoral market. In other words, they are faced with dilemmas 
and they try to anticipate them. Th us, they are forced to concentrate on the 
possible eff ects of the intended legal measures, but in order to fi nd a way 
out of the dilemmas they may rely on pre-existing ideological views. Here 
the recent scholarly emphasis on the independent variables (the reasons 
why specifi c types of political fi nance regimes emerge) meets the practical 
prominence legislators give to the dependent variables (possible eff ects of 
legal measures) when deliberating and deciding about political fi nance.
State Subvention and the Status Quo
In democratic systems, political parties through their representatives in 
parliament decide about laws, including laws on the state funding of 
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parties.5 Th is makes them vulnerable to accusations that they (too) easily 
decide on tax-payers’ money for their own interests. Popular criticism 
of political parties often includes the alleged self-serving attitude of 
politicians and parties. Almost everywhere in the world, parties fi gure 
high on the lists of institutions that are perceived by the ordinary citizens 
to be corrupt (Transparency International (2007). Public subsidy for 
parties easily fi ts into this rather cynical view, even if state subvention 
itself is not corruption. Although individual politicians are not necessarily 
considered to enrich themselves, their parties are sometimes accused of 
‘legal theft’ by using public money to subsidize their own organizations. 
Apart from this popular – no to say populist – idea that parties 
and politicians tend to enrich themselves with tax money coming from 
‘hardworking citizens’, a more general argument against state subsidy is 
often put forward: the danger of petrifi cation of the party system (f.e. 
Alexander and Shiratori, eds, 1994; Pinto-Duschinski, 2001). State 
money may have the eff ect of preserving the status quo, which is diffi  cult 
to reconcile with the ideal of equality (between old and new parties). Th is 
argument has been further developed in the thesis of the cartel party 
(Katz and Mair, 1995). Th e most discriminatory feature of the cartel party 
is the high dependence on public subsidies. If public funding is allocated 
in favour of incumbent and larger parties, it may become less easy for 
new and small parties to be successful in the political arena. Although the 
term ‘cartel’ suggest a conscious conspiracy among the larger incumbent 
parties to serve themselves to the detriment of the outsiders, which is 
hard to prove (Koole, 1996), the possibility of the suggested petrifying 
eff ect (or ‘cartellization’) cannot be excluded, although it has not been 
proven as yet. Legislators wishing to avoid accusations of serving only 
the established parties will have to look for conditions of state subsidy to 
parties that minimize this alleged eff ect. 
Equality of Chances and the Freedom of Speech
As stated above, Chancengleigheit (equality of chances) is an important 
principle for German political fi nance. Under other labels (level playing 
fi eld, fairness, equality), it also exists in other countries. In this respect, 
state activism by way of public subsidies or regulations about spending 
and expenditure limits is defended as a way to improve the fairness of 
political competition and the proper working of an electoral market.
Sometimes the equality of chances for parties is accompanied by the 
equality of chances for citizens. Th e introduction of direct subsidies to 
parties in Germany was the result of this combination. Not very long after 
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tax deductablity of donations to parties had been introduced in 1954, 
the German Constitutional Court observed confl ict with the principle of 
Chancengleicheit, because parties with rich members would profi t more 
from this opportunity than parties with less wel-to-do people among their 
members, but also because the equality of citizens was at stake. Th e tax 
deductability of donations would give individuals with a higher income 
a greater say in politics than poorer people. Th is ruling led to an eff ort 
to introduce direct and general state subsidies to parties. Again, the 
Constitutional Court proved to be an obstacle. According to the Court, 
general subsidies are at odds with another principle, that of Staatsfreiheit 
(autonomy of parties). But it also ruled that the state is allowed to 
introduce state subsidy (on the basis of Chancengleichheit) to give relief 
from the specifi c costs of election campaigns, since those costs are directly 
related to the free and fair elections that are prescribed in the German 
constitution. Th e result was the Parteiengezetz (party law) of 1967.
In 1992, in yet another ruling, the Court changed its position and 
decided that state money was allowed not only to fi ght the costs of 
campaigns (Wahlkampfkostenerstattung), but also to be used by parties for 
general purposes, while at the same time the tax deductabilty of donations 
was abolished (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1992).
In the United States and Canada, a completely diff erent debate took 
place around the principle of equality of chances. In the USA the Federal 
Election Campagn Act (FECA) dealt not only with transparency, but also 
with the principle of fairness. After the Watergate aff air (1972) limits on 
campaign expenditure were considered to be an adquate instrument to 
create a more level playing fi eld. But the Supreme Court, in a famous 
judgment (Buckley v. Valeo - 1976), ruled diff erently. Limits on 
expenditure were seen to impose too great restraints on the freedom of 
speech. Spending money is a form of speech; important limits on it violate 
the First Amendment and are thus unconstitutional. Th e Supreme Court 
considered the idea of ‘equality’ in this respect ‘wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment’ (Persily, 2006).
Th e debate in Canada centred around the same dilemma, but with a 
diff erent result. Expenditure limits in order to improve equality of chances 
also collided with the principle of speech, but in 2004 the Canadian 
Supreme Court – as we have seen above – accepted a more egalitarian view 
on political fi nance. Th us, while in Canada and Germany the principle 
of equality of chances (for both parties and citizens) leads the debate on 
political fi nance, in the USA freedom of speech is paramount. 
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Transparency and Privacy
Th e call for more transparency is not uncontested. Th e main argument 
against a high degree of openness is the donors’ right to privacy. Does one 
have the right to do good by stealth? When exactly does the public interest 
in the disclosure of fi nancial sources outweigh the individual’s right to 
privacy? As stated above, in Canada and the United States, the individual 
right to privacy with respect to donations is limited. In Germany, on the 
other hand, the threshold above which donations must be disclosed is 
rather high.
Th e recent trend towards more transparency is clearly visible in some 
Scandinavian countries. Traditionally, in Sweden and Norway there was 
great resistance against the obligation to disclose donations (Van Dijk, 
2009, 14-17). Th e right to privacy was strengthened by yet another 
argument: the autonomy of parties (see also the next section). Th e state 
was to refrain from any interference with the internal aff airs of parties; 
even an obligation to account publicly for the way the very high state 
subsidies are spent was considered to infringe the organizational freedom 
of parties. In 2002, after much hesitation, in both countries independent 
committees of experts were set up. As a result, the transparency of political 
fi nance was put high on the political agenda. In Sweden this has not yet 
resulted in obligations to disclose donations above 20,000 SEK (ca 1,800 
Euro) as the Swedish committee suggested; in Norway all donations 
above 30,000 NOK (approx 3,300 Euro) at the national level, 20,000 
NOK (2,200 Euro) at county council level and 10,000 NOK (1,100 euro) 
at the local level have to be disclosed (Greco, 2009). Th e Swedish and 
Norwegian examples show that the transparency argument has gained 
salience over time, but this does not mean that all arguments against it 
have disappeared. In Norway, the importance of the autonomy of parties 
continues to be stressed, there are no conditions for how state subsidy is to 
be spent by the recipients.
State Regulation and the Freedom of Organization
All the above mentioned dilemmas touch upon the more general question 
of how compatible state regulation is with the autonomy of political parties. 
Th e Swedish and Norwegian hesitation in accepting rules on transparency 
comes close to the German principle of Staatsfreiheit (freedom from the 
state), which was the main argument for the Constitutional Court initially 
forbidding the introduction of general subsidies to political parties. In the 
North American continent, however, the autonomy of political parties 
does not fi gure prominently in the debate on political fi nance. Regulations 
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on political fi nance are geared more to individual candidates than to party 
organizations. 
Nevertheless, in all countries the state plays a steering role vis-à-vis 
political party organizations. Each electoral system has a profound impact 
on how parties organize. Th e debate, therefore, is not about whether the 
state has the right to infl uence parties, but about the quantity and the 
domain of infl uence. States need to have regulations on how general 
elections are organized; this is fairly uncontroversial. Every democracy 
has an electoral law. Th e contents of that law and of other regulations 
concerning candidates and parties, however, is often at the heart of 
political discussions, because it concerns the distribution of power.
Th e simple statement that ‘free and fair elections’ form the core feature 
of democracies in itself bears the seeds of many political quarrels. Free 
from the state? But is the state not needed to ensure fair elections? A 
special Declaration on criteria for free and fair elections issued by the Inter 
Parliamentary Union in 1994 holds that the state should be active on both 
fi elds. On the one hand, ‘states should take all necessary and appropriate 
measures to ensure that the principle of the secret ballot is respected, and 
that voters are able to cast their ballots freely, without fear or intimidation’, 
and on the other hand ‘in order that elections shall be fair, states should 
take the necessary measures to ensure that parties and candidates enjoy 
reasonable opportunities to present their electoral platform.’ (IPU, 1994) 
What exactly is meant by ‘reasonable opportunities’? Is a (fi nancial) level 
playing fi eld necessary for “reasonable opportunities” to exist? Th e answer 
to this question is the quintessence of the debate on political fi nance.
As said, states always have a certain steering infl uence on the functioning 
of political parties, especially through electoral laws. But a consensus exists 
that this infl uence ought to be limited to the party organization (although 
of course not unconstrained), and not extended to the party orientation. 
Norway, which has always put great emphasis on the autonomy of parties, 
has now accepted some regulation relating to transparency, but on the 
condition that the freedom of orientation remains unchallenged, not only 
with respect to ideology and policy, but also in terms of control over the 
goals for which state subsidy is used.
In Germany, the concept of Staatsfreiheit remains very important, but 
its interpretation has changed over time. Before 1992, it mainly addressed 
the principle that the state should not intervene in the free formation 
of the political will. In 1992, the Constitutional Court used a broader 
interpretation. Parties need to be staatsfern (at distance from the state) and 
bürgernah (close to the citizens). As a consequence, parties must rely on 
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citizens for a considerable part of their income, and state subsidy to them 
may not exceed the income of the party from all other sources. Th e Court’s 
new vision has been interpreted as ‘an obligation to ensure the anchoring 
of parties in society’.6 Especially in Germany, where parties receive an 
enormous amount of money from the state, this new interpretation of the 
concept of Staatsfreiheit was not unexpected. Table 1 give an impression of 
the relatively high level of German (and Austrian) public subsidy. 
Table 1: Direct public subsidies to political parties in selected European 
countries, 2008*
Country Total amount 






Germany 477,000,000 82,369,548 5.79
Austria 41,46,233 8,205,533 5.11
Belgium 19,85,560 10,403,951 1.89
France 74,22,853 62,150,775 1.20
Ireland 5,609,962 4,156,119 1.35
Th e Netherlands 15,446,167 16,645,000 0.93
United Kingdom 2,256,594 60,943,912 0.04
* Including subsidies for election campaigns and for ancillary organizations.
Source: Lucardie, Voerman and Van Zonneveld (2010), 16. See also: Algemene 
Rekenkamer (2011), 21.
Th e information in this section about rules on political fi nance in various 
countries allows us tentavively to place those coutries in order according 
to the typology mentioned in fi gure 1: the United States in quadrant 2 
(‘open libertarian’ regime); Norway and Sweden in quadrant 3 (closed 
egalitarian), although Norway has recently moved towards 4 (open 
egalitarian); Canada and Germany in quadrant 4. Of course, positions 
within a quadrant can also vary and change over time. A more detailed 
analysis of the Dutch situation may illustrate this. It will also show that a 
debate characterized at fi rst sight by pragmatic argument is dominated by 
rather ideological orientations when inspected more closely.
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A new Dutch law on political fi nance
Th e new Dutch law on party fi nance (Wet Financiering Politieke Partijen - 
Wfpp), which replaces the 1999 law on state subsidy to political parties 
(Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen – Wspp), deals with both state subsidies 
and the transparency of party fi nances. With the new law the Dutch 
government also responded to the very critical report of the Group of 
States against Corruption (GRECO, 2008), part of the Council of 
Europe, on the Dutch regulation on the transparency of party funding. 
Th e 1999 law was considered to be powerless with respect to enforcing 
the transparency of party fi nances. It took a rather long time before 
the new law was introduced into parliament, which in a sense refl ects 
the traditional unwillingness in the Netherlands to regulate the life of 
political parties.
Dutch parties and constitutional law
In the constitution of Th e Netherlands, political parties are still not 
mentioned, notwithstanding the fact that in recent decades a ‘hidden 
process of codifi cation’ has taken place (Koole, 1992). As well as the 
electoral law, all kind of formal stipulations were introduced, resulting in 
the aforementioned law on state subsidy for political parties (1999), but 
parties continue not to be mentioned in the Constitution. Several attempts 
have been made to change this situation. In 1954, for example, an offi  cial 
commission set up by the government concluded in its report that the 
absence of political parties in the Dutch constitution was an ‘anomaly’, 
and therefore ‘the image of the Dutch political system in de Constitution 
is not real’. (Eindrapport, 1954, 55). Th e government, however, did not 
adopt the idea of repairing this ‘anomaly’. 
Th e traditional reluctance to give the state a more than minimal role 
when dealing with political parties is due to the long term predominance 
of protestant political ideas current in Dutch politics (including the parties 
ARP and CHU, which merged into the Christian Democratic Appeal in 
1980). Th e protestant conception of the state (called ‘sovereignty in its 
own circle’) was one in which the state was only one among other ‘circles’ 
in society, albeit a special one. Th ese circles were to stay aloof from each 
other as much as possible, thus granting each other as much freedom 
as possible. Even in 1982, Donner, an infl uential and eminent lawyer 
with an ARP background, said in this respect, ‘Let us postpone offi  cial 
recognition of political parties as long as possible, because by nature law 
implicates regulation; and he who regulates also introduces limitations’ 
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(Koole, 1992, 216). Liberals, who in general argue for a low level of state 
interference in societal matters, sided with this protestant reluctance.
Notwithstanding this predominant attitude, the Dutch parties have 
become subject to a growing set of legal stipulations. Of course, the 
electoral law has always had an important impact on the way parties 
organize themselves. As in other countries, the organizational structure of 
political parties generally refl ects the way elections are organized. Th e local 
party chapter deals with elections to the municipal council, the regional 
party body with the provincial elections, and the national party organs 
with the national and (since 1979) the direct elections for the European 
parliament. Th e proportional electoral system (PR list system) equally has 
an important impact on how parties prepare for elections. In the electoral 
law, however, the term ‘political party’ is not used. Instead, the law 
mentions ‘political groupings’ next to individual candidates. By avoiding 
explicit mention of the term ‘political party’, the Dutch legislator allows 
non-party individuals to participate in elections by presenting their own 
lists of candidates; thus guaranteeing an open electoral system. At the local 
level, these personals lists are presented regularly, although they constitute 
a minority of the lists of candidates. At the supra-local level almost all lists 
of candidates are presented by parties, and not by individuals. One rather 
recent and well-known exception was the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) during 
the national elections of 2002, when Pim Fortuyn was ousted from his 
party Leefbaar Nederland and immediately afterwards presented his own 
list for the impending elections.
Apart from the electoral law, other formal regulations impact on 
Dutch political parties. As early as in 1954 donations to political parties 
were tax deductible, since parties came to be considered as registered 
charities or ‘institutions for the public good’. Th e rules on associations in 
the Civil Law also apply to political parties. Almost all parties are formally 
associations. Th at was also the case before 1989 when a change in the 
Electoral Law stipulated that henceforth parties could use their names or 
acronyms on the ballots sheets only of they were associations by law. As 
early as in the 1930s, political parties were allotted free time on the radio; 
since 1957 this has equally been true for (public) televisison. And from 
the 1970s state subsidy was given to political parties at the national level 
only, and destined for specifi c purposes: research institutes, educational 
institutes and youth organizations. All parties represented in Parliament 
were entitled to receive state subsidy, consisting of a fi xed amount plus an 
amount that depended on the number of parliamentary seats. In order to 
receive these goal-oriented subsidies, special foundations had to be set up. 
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At the time, direct subsidy to political parties was still a bridge too far, 
because of the dominant view that the state should remain at a distance 
from the functioning of parties. Paradoxically, activities that had hitherto 
been carried out within the framework of the parties themselves were now 
taken care of by these affi  liated foundations. Only money to fi ght the 
production costs of radio and television programmes in the free time on 
the public channels allotted to parties was given directly to parties. 
In 1999 the Law on State Subsidy to Political Parties (Wspp) was 
introduced. Th e law introduced a basis in formal law for subsidies for 
research, educational work and youth programmes. Th e 1999 law 
introduced some changes. From 1999 onwards the subsidies were given 
directly to the parties. Th ey continued to exist at the national level only 
and remained goal-oriented, but the list of goals was broadened somewhat 
(now also including: the maintenance of contacts with sister parties outside 
the Netherlands, information to party members, etc). Campaign spending 
was still explicitly excluded from state subsidy, for two reasons: 1. the risk 
of continual demands for extra subsidy because campaign spending tends 
to rise incessantly; 2. the state should stay aloof from the direct struggle 
for power at elections, and should concentrate on supporting other ways 
to reinforce the intermediary position of political parties (for example. 
subsidies for more specifi c goals). In 2004, however, this reasoning was 
abandoned, and from then on state subsidy could also be spent on election 
campaigns. In the same year the total amount of state subsidy to all 
political parties was raised from 10 million euros to 15 million euros. 
From the very start, the 1999 law was critized for its vagueness in terms 
of transparency and enforcement. Various eff orts were made to draft a 
new law. As stated before, the Greco report of the Council of Europe 
in 2008 put pressure on this process. In February 2011 the Netherlands 
Court of Auditors critized the Dutch government for being very slow in 
implementing the proposals suggested in the Greco report (Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 2011). Later that year a proposal for the new law on party 
fi nance (Wet Financiering Politieke Partijen - Wfpp) was submitted to the 
Dutch parliament. Th e new law was adopted by the Senate in March 2013.
Th e new law on party fi nance (Wfpp)
Th e new law is a combination of a subsidy law and a transparency law.7 
Especially, with respect to transparency, the new law includes somewhat 
stricter regulation. Th e main new elements of the law are: donations from 
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both natural persons and legal entities to political parties, their affi  liated 
organizations and/or individual candidates above 4,500 euro have to be 
made public; in-kind donations are subject to the same rule; a stronger 
regime of sanctions is imposed, including administrative fi nes of up to 
25,000 euro; and political parties that enter parliament for the fi rst time 
may use their state subsidy to pay for campaigns costs incurred before 
entering parliament. With respect to transparency and enforcement, the 
new law is more precise compared with the former one. But the Council of 
Europe will probably remain critical, because no independent enforcement 
agency is introduced (enforcement will remain the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Home Aff airs, although an ‘independent’ committee of 
experts will be set up to advise the minister); no annual limits (‘ceilings’) 
for receiving gifts from the same donor are included in the law; and the 
new law only deals with political parties at the national level, leaving much 
room for the circumvention of rules via sub-national party branches.8 
Th is modest result in terms of legislative progress contrasts with the 
eulogy on political parties in the explanatory notes to the bill. Th e reasons 
for granting public subsidy to political parties are worded as follows:
‘Political parties are an essential and necessary condition for the 
functioning of democracy. Th ey form the bridge between political 
decision-making and the citizens… A well functioning political 
party adds to a stable democracy. A future without political parties 
is diffi  cult to imagine. Political parties voice the wishes and opinions 
of the populace, and – for the benefi t of political decision-making – 
they integrally weigh distinct and often contradictory wishes and 
interests. Th ey inform and stimulate voters to go to the ballot box 
in a well informed way, and they take care of the education of party 
members. Th e recruitment and selection for political functions is a 
special responsibility of political parties. Th e activities of political 
parties are done in the democratic interest. Because of these reasons 
the government furnishes subsidy to political parties’.9
Notwithstanding this appraisal, the Dutch goverment was faced with 
dilemmas. More far-reaching proposals like caps on donations, a lower 
threshold above which donations have to be made public, or the inclusion 
of sub-national party organs in the law did not reach the bill. Th e 
government explicitly refers to a dilemma between the completeness and 
consistency of the law on the one hand and its feasibility on the other.10 
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Th e argument of feasibility is often linked to the argument of avoiding 
too much red tape for parties. Th is reasoning was also useful to overcome 
ideological diff erences between several parties in parliament. For example: 
while the conservative-liberal VVD warmly agreed with the absence of 
caps on donations and with the general striving for a low administrative 
burden for the parties, the social-democrat PvdA wanted an annual cap 
on donations of 50,000 euro and a prohibition on gifts from abroad. Th e 
VVD clearly adhered to a narrow conception of state and the PvdA to a 
wider one. Common ground was found in the goal of more transparency.
One party, the PVV, clearly objected to the striving for more 
transparency. Th e party takes a ‘closed libertarian’ perspective on party 
fi nance and perceives the bill as an ‘anti-PVV law’, especially drafted to 
deprive the party of sources of income.11 Th e PVV fears losing donors both 
from abroad (the United States especially) and in the Netherlands if their 
names are to be disclosed. Th e earliest proposals to sharpen the 1999 law 
in terms of transparency, however, were drafted long before the PVV was 
founded in 2005. And the irony of history is that it was the governmental 
coalition of the CDA and the VVD, which in a special construction was 
supported by the PVV, that fi nally sent the bill to parliament in April 
2011. Th e bill, however, was no part of the governmental deal with the 
PVV, and therefore the CDA and VVD felt free to seek support from 
other parties for this proposal. Th at is why they stressed the importance 
of transparency (which is acceptable to all parties except the PVV), 
while at the same time staying as much as possible within the dominant 
paradigm of reluctance to intervene in party matters, which marries so 
well the ideological views of the CDA and the VVD. Parties with a wider 
conception of state were disappointed by the limited scope of the changes 
made by the law, but supported the adoption of the new law in order to 
avoid the continued existence of the much criticized 1999 law.
According to the government, the wish to increase the transparency 
of private fi nancing of political parties was at the basis of the drafting of 
the new law in order to serve ‘the purity of political decision making’.12 
When explicitly asked why this new law did not take into consideration the 
principle of equality, the minister answered in 2012 that the government 
had not opted for promoting a level playing fi eld, because it considered 
transparency ‘at this moment’ to be suffi  cient and adequate: transparency 
makes it possible for a political party to be held accountable and it will 
possibly have a moderating impact on the size of a donation. Five years after 
its introduction an evaluation of the new law will take place, which will 
also go into the question of big donations, and eventually lead to changes in 
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the law.13 During the fi nal debate in the Senate in February 2013, the new 
minister positively answered the question whether the principle of equality 
would be taken explicitly into consideration during this evaluation.14
Conclusion
Governments are confronted with dilemmas when introducing rules on 
party fi nance. Public subsidy to political parties and the wish for more 
transparency of political fi nance have considerably broadened state 
regulation of political parties. However, the intended goals of state measures 
are almost always linked to the possibility of unintended consequences of 
such measures. Th e resulting dilemmas confront lawmakers and courts 
with choices between, for example, giving state subsidy to existing parties 
and avoiding the preservation of the status quo, between transparency 
and privacy, between equality of chances and the freedom of speech, or 
between state regulation and the freedom of organization. Th e particular 
history of the legal treatment of political parties in a specifi c country 
reveals a dominant (ideological) view that impacts on the content of the 
choices to be made. Th ese choices are to a large extent path-dependent, 
but developments such as decline in party membership, changing power 
relations within a country or growing international pressure for more 
transparency may infl uence decisions on party fi nance. Th us, the political 
fi nance regime in a specifi c country may change as well.
In this chapter particular attention was paid to the Dutch case. Th e 
Dutch tradition of aversion to state interference with political parties is still 
visible in the decisions of government and parliament on whether and how 
to regulate parties. Nevertheless, a gradual codifi cation of Dutch political 
parties has taken place, although the Dutch constitution still ignores 
their existence. Also recently this process of codifi cation was visible in the 
drafting of the new bill on political fi nance (Wfpp). When positioned in 
the typology of political fi nance regimes presented earlier in this chapter, 
the political fi nance regime of the Netherlands has consequently changed. 
As fi gure 2 shows, the adoption of the new Dutch law on party fi nance 
(NL 2013) indicates that the Netherlands has moved in the direction of a 
more open regime of party fi nance, while hardly changing its intermediary 
position between an egalitarian and a libertarian regime of political fi nance. 
Pressure from the Council of Europe (Greco) helped to push the Dutch 
government in that direction, although the steps taken will probably not 
fully satisfy the Council.15 Th e refusal of the government to consider the 
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new law not only as a vehicle to promote transparency, but also as an 
instrument to advance a more level playing fi eld in Dutch political fi nance 
corresponds to the abovementioned tradition. But the choices made by 
Dutch lawmakers with respect to the dilemmas of regulating political 
fi nance reveal the ideological centrist position between a narrower and a 
wider conception of state. State subsidy is given to all parties represented 
in parliament proportionally to the number of seats they hold, but with a 
slight advantage for smaller parties due to a fi xed basis amount of subsidy. 
And the allocation of free time on radio and television on the public 
channels is equal for all parties, irrespective of their size. Th ese measures 
refl ect an egalitarian approach. On the other hand, the new law does not 
introduce caps on donations, while these donations are at the same time 
tax-deductable, thus revealing a libertarian perspective. Although the 
latter corresponds with the traditional reluctance of the Dutch state to 
interfere with political parties, the former shows that path dependency 
is not complete. Th is is equally true for the transparency dimension. Th e 
predominance of the philosophy of ‘sovereignty within one’s own circle’ 
had already declined somewhat with the introduction of state subsidies in 
the 1970s. Th e new law takes an important further step: the obligatory 
disclosure of donations and its enforcement. But again this development 
stops at a rather centrist position: the disclosure threshold is relatively high 
(indicating the enduring importance of the argument of privacy), and 
the new rules do not (yet?) apply to the sub-national level. Th ese results 
demonstrate the compromisory character of the Dutch political fi nance 
regime, which – after all – comes as no surprise in a country long known 
for its consensus-seeking political system. 


















1 Th anks to Ingrid van Biezen and Hans-Martien ten Napel; to the participants 
in the panel on Regulating Party Finance at the IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference, 
University of Sao Paolo, Brazil, February 16-19, 2011; and to the participants 
in the symposium on Political Parties and Public Law: Th e Netherlands in 
Comparative Perspective, Leiden, 25 June 2010, for their valuable comments 
on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2 Nassmacher (2001, 14) speaks about ‘Political Funds between Freedom and 
Equality’.
3 Feasby (1999), following John Rawls, makes a distinction between ‘equality of 
liberty’ and ‘absolute liberty’: ‘equality of liberty may be achieved by limiting 
the freedoms of the wealthy,’ and ‘this may be achieved only through State 
action’, but this state interference ‘must not impose any undue burdens on 
the various political groups in society and must aff ect them all in an equitable 
manner’. Th anks to Tanja van Dijk for showing me this last reference (Van 
Dijk, 2009, 22). 
4 ‘Die Parteien (…) müssen über die Herkunft und Verwendung ihrer Mittel sowie 
über ihr Vermögen öff entlich Rechenschaft geben’ art 21.1 German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz).
5 Note that state funding must be clearly distinguished from the practice of 
incumbent parties in some countries of using state money and state functions 
for their own organization and their own people. Corruption and patronage 
are illegal, or at least informal, practices that must not be confused with state 
subsidy based on formally adopted laws.
6 ‘Gebot zur Sicherung der Verankerung der Parteien in der Gesellschaff t’, 
Schwartmann, as cited in Dragstra (2008, 354).
7 Wet fi nanciering politieke partijen. Staatsblad, 2013, nr 93 (Wet van 7 maart 
2013, houdende regels inzake de subsidiëring en het toezicht op de fi nanciën 
van politieke partijen).
8 Pressure from the Lower House in parliament resulted in the insertion into 
the law of a stipulation that parties that participate in national, regional and/
or local elections must have internal rules on (the transparency of) donations 
(art. 34). Th ese rules have to be made public, and also apply to the subnational 
party chapters. However, in December 2013 the minister announced to erase 
this stipulation, because the administrative burdens for the parties would be 
too high.
9 Proceedings of Dutch parliament, 32752, nr 3 (Memorie van Toelichting, 27 
April 2011), p1 (my translation – RK).
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10 Proceedings of Dutch parliament, 32752, nr 7 (Nota naar aanleiding van het 
verslag, 26 oktober 2011).
11 De Volkskrant (Dutch newspaper), 27 January, 2012.
12 Proceedings of Dutch parliament, 32752, C, p. 2, 13 July 2012.
13 Ibidem.
14 Proceedings of Dutch Parliament, 32752, nr 18, p. 2 (26 February 2013).
15 Financiëel Dagblad (Dutch newspaper), 17 juli 2012: ‘Financiering partijen 
nog niet transparant’. 
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Dutch professor on Constitutional Law and former Judge of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, A.M. Donner, suggested in a contribution 
to the annual Dutch constitutional conference in 1982: ‘Let us postpone as 
long as possible the offi  cial recognition of the party system (in the Netherlands), 
because in its nature Law just brings regulation, and he who regulates, 
restricts.’ Th e Dutch legislator has taken this statement into account, 
because hitherto the legislation on Dutch political parties has been very 
limited. Now and then the question arises whether it is desirable to embed 
the special constitutional position of these organizations in the Dutch 
Constitution, but these attempts have also been unsuccessful. Although 
Dutch public law does not pay much attention to political parties, they are 
very important in daily political practice in the Netherlands. 
Th e aim of this paper is to give an overview of the diff erent discussions 
in the past on regulating Dutch political parties. Furthermore the aim of 
this contribution is to see if lessons can be drawn from the past discussions 
on regulating political parties. First of all I will give an overview of the 
development of Dutch political parties. Special attention will be paid to 
the question how legal doctrine criticized these developments. Secondly 
an outline of the legal discussion is given. In this section one will notice 
that occasionally the question arises whether political parties need to have 
a provision in the Dutch Constitution. Th irdly an inventory is made of 
the current legal provisions concerning Dutch political parties. Although 
these legal provisions in Dutch public law are few and far between, there 
are provisions which are important if one wants to participate in Dutch 
politics. At the end of this contribution some fi nal remarks and suggestions 
will be made.
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Th e development of political parties in the Netherlands
Th e amendment of the Dutch Constitution of 1848 can be seen as one of 
the most important constitutional reforms in the Netherlands; most of 
these amendments still apply. One of the most important was probably 
the introduction of political ministerial responsibility.2 Before 1848 it was 
the King who was fully in charge and could not be held responsible in 
parliament for his actions. After 1848 ‘the King could [no longer] do no 
wrong’, but ministers were held responsible for the actions of the King 
as well as for their own actions. Th e power of the Dutch parliament 
was born. Furthermore in 1866-1868 an important unwritten rule was 
vested in Dutch constitutional law. When a minister or the Cabinet 
loses the confi dence of Parliament (especially of the Dutch Lower House 
(Second Chamber), the minister or Cabinet has to resign. Due to these 
developments the Netherlands became a parliamentary system. 
Early steps towards party formation: the new 1848 electoral system
Although both rules (ministerial responsibility and the rule of confi dence) 
can be seen as the most important constitutional rules which developed 
in the nineteenth century, in the constitutional amendment of 1848 two 
other changes were introduced into the Constitution which led to the early 
development of Dutch political parties. In the fi rst place the fundamental 
right of freedom of association and assembly was guaranteed. Th is provision 
was further developed in 1855 in an Act on freedom of association and 
assembly. In the second place a modifi cation of the Electoral system 
was achieved. Before 1848 (1815-1848) the 100 members of the Second 
Chamber of the Dutch States-General were elected by the representatives 
of the Dutch Provinces. In this period the King appointed the members 
of the First Chamber. After 1848 the system fundamentally changed. Th e 
members of the First Chamber where elected by the representatives of 
the Dutch Provinces. For the members of the Second Chamber general 
elections were introduced. Although this sounds very progressive, the right 
to vote for the members of the Dutch Lower House was granted to only 
certain groups of male taxpayers. Nevertheless, for the fi rst time in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (since 1814) citizens were allowed to choose 
their representatives directly. Th ese elections were organized on a majority 
system. Th e country was divided into 100 districts. Th e candidate who 
had the absolute majority was elected to the Second Chamber. Th is system 
of ‘general’ elections also led to the early development of political parties 
in the Netherlands. In the fi rst few years after 1848 this development was 
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limited. Th e reasons for this can be found in the fi rst place in the fact 
that the focus of (taxpaying) voters was limited to representatives of their 
own district (Elzinga 1982, P. 27). Furthermore certain provisions of the 
Penal Code still applied in the Netherlands, which, for instance, meant 
that political meetings could be forbidden by the Dutch government. Th is 
led in the period prior to 1848 to secret political meetings. Th e provisions 
of the Penal Code were no longer fully observed. Besides in 1848 the 
fundamental right of freedom of association was also introduced in the 
Netherlands. In the early period after 1848 one can see that certain 
so-called voting associations came to promote their candidates in the 
diff erent voting districts. Moreover it was the liberals who bravely decided 
in 1846 to gather together in the ‘Amstelsociëteit’ (Elzinga 1982, p. 24). 
After the constitutional amendment of 1848 other political movements 
followed. 
Legal constitutional scholars in those days were very critical of these 
developments. J. de Bosch Kemper (1865, p. 177), a very well-known 
constitutional scholar, stated in his book ‘Handleiding tot de kennis van 
het Nederlandse Staatsregt en Staatsbestuur’ that the voting associations 
were in his opinion oligarchies. Only a very few members attended 
the meetings of these associations, although important decisions, 
such as who would stand as candidate, were being made during those 
meetings. Furthermore he stated that the members of the boards of the 
diff erent voting associations had too much infl uence on the members of 
parliament. In his opinion this infl uence was contrary to the fundamental 
parliamentary rule that members of parliament should not be bound by a 
mandate or instructions when voting.3 Th ese critical views on these voting 
associations were very widespread (see e.g. Vissering 1864, p. 260; Olivier 
1876, p. 45). Despite the critics the voting associations transformed 
themselves into more solid party organizations. Th is resulted in the 
development of the fi rst political party in 1879, the Anti-Revolutionary 
Party founded by Abraham Kuyper, a member of the Second Chamber 
and prime minister (1901-1905). In the following years other political 
movements (socialists, liberals) followed. Th e critical view of these 
political organizations decreased a little. Some scholars stated that the 
rule that members of parliament should not be bound by a mandate or 
instructions when voting did not confl ict with the existence of political 
parties. J.T. Buys (1883, p. 454), a well-known constitutional scholar and 
professor (Amsterdam and Leiden), at the end of the nineteenth century 
stated that voters were seeking sympathizers and therefore political parties 
fulfi lled a valuable role in society. Another famous scholar and professor 
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of Constitutional Law (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam) at that time, A.F. 
de Savornin Lohman (1907, p. 397), demanded that there be a moral bond 
between voter(s) and representative(s). Nevertheless legal scholars were 
still suspicious of the new political organizations. Academic communis 
opinio was that these political organizations should not have too much 
infl uence in the relationship between the electorate and its representatives 
(De Beaufort 1904, p. 184). 
Th e consolidation of Dutch political parties 
In 1887 the Dutch Constitution was reformed again, which led to an even 
more consolidated organization of political parties. More citizens (men) 
were granted the right to vote. Beside taxpayers, other people who had 
certain signs of capability and prosperity (for instance PhDs) were also 
able to vote.4 Th e enlargement of the electorate was an important incentive 
for the formation of political parties. 
In 1917 a major constitutional event led to the fi rm consolidation of 
political parties. Besides the recognition of the general right to vote 
for all men and women, a new electoral system was introduced in the 
Netherlands. Th e absolute majority (district) system for elections to 
the Second Chamber was abandoned and exchanged for a system of 
proportional representation. Th is system still exists to this day. Th e system 
of proportional representation creates a direct relationship between the 
number of votes cast and the number of seats allocated to the parties in 
parliament. Under this system of proportional representation groups of 
voters (political parties) present lists of candidates; these lists are linked to 
a nationwide list because the total number of votes obtained in the country 
is of crucial importance and decisive as regards the number of seats in 
parliament obtained. Th e country of the Netherlands has therefore since 
1917 no longer been divided into electoral districts. Th e country as a whole 
can be seen as one district with nationwide electoral lists of candidates 
and leaders. Th e system of proportional representation de facto entailed 
the recognition of political parties in the Netherlands (Elzinga 1982, p. 
31). Parties transformed themselves into real oligarchies with centralized 
organizations. Th e introduction of proportional representation resulted in 
the reinforcement and fi rm consolidation of political parties.
Th is consolidation also resulted in a new era of criticism from 
constitutional scholars of the functioning of political parties. In the 
interbellum period it was mainly A.A.H. Struycken and R. Kranenburg, 
both professors of Constitutional and Administrative Law in Amsterdam, 
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who dominated this debate. Although both stated that political parties 
could be seen as a precondition for a parliamentary democracy, both 
scholars also had strong criticisms of those organizations in the new 
electoral system. A.A.H. Struycken (1925, p. 21) criticized the emergence 
of centralization of political parties due to the new electoral system. Party 
leaders became too dominant in his opinion. R. Kranenburg (1928, p. 115) 
also feared that strong political parties would harm the common interest, 
which in his opinion should be dominant in a democracy. Despite this 
criticism, general opinion of political parties was positive in the period 
between 1917 and 1928. Th is changed however in the years to come. 
During 1928-1945 public opinion of the multi-party system changed in 
the Netherlands (Elzinga 1982, p.33-38). In this period confi dence in 
democratic organizations, including political parties, decreased due to 
the economic crises and the emergence of national socialism. Th e Dutch 
cultural historian, J. Huizinga (1946, p. 42), expressed severe criticism of 
political parties, as is illustrated by his observation that “the party system 
shows daily that it is superfl uous and ineffi  cient.” 
Th is criticism of the functioning of political parties found broad 
resonance. Even the prime minister in the 1930s, H. Colijn (1940, p.48) 
(Anti-Revolutionary Party), was not in favour of the increasing infl uence 
of political groups. Others were even more sceptical. Th ey had especially 
strong feelings against anti-democratic political movements such as the 
Dutch National Socialistic Movement (Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, 
(NSB)). Th is Dutch fascist political party was very hostile to other political 
movements. In its opinion, political parties crippled strong leadership. 
Th e NSB never gained much infl uence in Dutch politics before World 
War II. After 1936 existing and new political movements challenged the 
National Socialistic Movement. A famous constitutional scholar in those 
days, C.W. van der Pot (professor of Constitutional Law, Groningen) 
(1940, p.205), wrote in the fi rst edition of his leading handbook on Dutch 
constitutional law that one should not be too critical of the electoral system 
on proportional representation as introduced in 1917. In his opinion the 
objections to the functioning of political parties were grossly exaggerated. 
In particular,the constitutional provision which guarantees that a member 
of parliament cannot be bound by a mandate or instructions when casting 
his vote5 was, in C.W. van der Pot’s opinion, very important to protect a 
Member of Parliament. Although political parties can be very infl uential in 
Dutch politics, in the end it is (the conscience of) a Member of Parliament 
who is decisive in a parliamentary vote. 
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During the war period (1940-1945) criticisms were made of the system 
of political parties. After the war a new national unity was to be brought 
about, without a diverse landscape of political parties. Despite the criticism 
of the party system, very quickly after the War the old political parties 
were re-established. Th is was proven by the fact that the main political 
movements were still present in Dutch society. Due to the fact that in the 
fi rst period after 1945 the governments were very stable, political parties 
were accepted by Dutch society. Although they were accepted, they ought 
not to be given too many privileges in the opinion of constitutional 
scholars. A bottom-up approach was therefore much appreciated for 
those organizations. Political parties should evolve from the population 
itself. Political parties were seen as the hinge between the electorate and 
the representatives (Van Raalte 1958, p.5-9). Th is bottom-up approach 
in which political parties were seen as civil organizations became the 
dominant doctrine after 1945. Th e state should not have too much 
infl uence on political parties, let alone regulate those organizations. 
Proposals for the regulation of political parties
Since 1848 many attempts have been made to regulate political parties in 
one way or the other. Th ese attempts can be divided into four questions: fi rst, 
whether a special provision for political parties in the Dutch constitution 
is desirable or not; second, whether the organization of political parties 
should be regulated; third, whether there should be a legal provision to 
ban political parties; and, fi nally, whetherf there should be a law which 
regulated the fi nances of political parties. Due to the fact that political 
parties were for long very controversial, all proposals were of a defensive or 
even repressive nature. Th e infl uence of political parties in public decision-
making should be restricted. In this section we will discuss the proposals 
that have been made to regulate certain topics concerning Dutch political 
parties such as (1) limiting the infl uence of political parties in nominating 
candidates; (2) a legal provision on the banning of certain political parties; 
(3) a provision for political parties in the Dutch Constitution; and fi nally 
(4) a (special) Act for political parties. 
Early proposals: the nomination of candidates
It was J. de Bosch Kemper (1865, p.178) (Member of the Second Chamber 
(Liberal) and social scientist) who in 1865 formulated probably the fi rst 
proposal for a legal provision to restrict the infl uence of political parties 
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on the nomination of political candidates. In his opinion political parties 
had too much infl uence in putting their favourites on the nomination 
list; he proposed legally to guarantee every voter the right to nominate 
his own (political) candidate. In 1918 A.A.H. Struycken (1917-1918, p. 
401-404) strongly recommended introducing a certain provision in the 
Electoral Act on political parties concerning their role with regard to the 
nomination of candidates. In contrast to De Bosch Kemper, in Struycken’s 
opinion this competence of political parties should be legally formulated 
in the Electoral Act. Others dramatically went even further; he proposed 
abolishing all general elections (Harthoorn 1929, p. 150). Instead of 
those elections, each citizen should join (obligatorily) a political party. 
Th e general board of the political party should provide for parliamentary 
candidates who were elected by the members of the political party itself. 
In 1926 and 1931 both N.J.C.M. Kappeyne van de Copello (lawyer 
and public prosecutor Amsterdam) (1926) and N. Kolff  (constitutional 
lawyer) (1931) agreed with A.A.H. Struycken (professor of Constitutional 
Law Amsterdam) that political parties had too much infl uence on the 
nomination of candidates for parliament. From their point of view this 
infl uence of political parties was contradictory to the equal right of each 
Dutch citizen to elect the members of the general representative bodies. 
Only a small minority of the electorate were members of a political party. 
Why should only they decide who would be nominated as candidates for 
a representative body, especially both Chambers of the States-General. To 
restrict the infl uence of political parties on the nomination of candidates, 
Kapeynne van de Copello proposed a system in which each member of 
a political party could nominate himself; during a general election voters 
could state their preference by voting for these candidates, which would be 
presented on an alphabetical list of candidates rather than by party. Kolff  
was not in favour of the system proposed by Kapeynne van de Copello. 
He was not convinced that the infl uence of political parties on this issue 
would diminish. He promoted a system in which some form of regulation 
concerning the democratic structure of a political party was introduced. 
In his opinion it was allowable for the state to intervene if a political party 
misused the freedom of the organization of political parties due to the fact 
that these organizations were of public interest. Furthermore Kolff  (1931, 
p. 165-168) was in favour of introducing some form of deposit if a party 
wanted to participate in general elections. Th e reason behind this measure 
was to prevent a fragmented landscape of political parties.
In the 1930s the emphasis of the debate on regulating political parties 
shifted towards the question how anti-democratic political parties should 
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be prevented from rising or banned from the political process. In his 
inaugural speech in 1936, Professor Van den Bergh (1936, p. 1-22), professor 
of Constitutional Law (Amsterdam), paid special attention on this issue. 
Van den Bergh recognized that a liberal democracy in principle should not 
impose restrictions on the freedom of political association. Nevertheless 
he considered the banning of an anti-democratic political party to be 
justifi ed if such party violated the principles of spiritual freedom and 
equality in law. In his opinion the High Court in the Netherlands (Hoge 
Raad) should answer the question whether or not a ban on a political party 
is justifi ed. Furthermore another related question came up in this period; 
is it possible to end the membership of parliament of a politician who has 
strong revolutionary opinions? Although in 1934 a special (independent) 
Commission of the government (State Commission) concluded that such 
a provision in the Dutch constitution would be desirable, the amendment 
of Constitution never took place due to the fact that a two-thirds majority 
was lacking in the Second Chamber (Elzinga 1982, p. 42). 
A provision for political parties in the Dutch Constitution?
After World War II the question arose whether a special provision in the 
Dutch Constitution or a special Act of Parliament should be made in which 
political parties were regulated. Shortly after 1945, a multitude of questions 
was raised concerning the need to change the constitutional system. Th e 
ideas of Kapeynne van de Copello and Kolff , which have already been 
discussed, were further elaborated in a report of a Commission on the 
‘League of the Constitutional State’ (Genootschap van den Rechtsstaat) 
(Kappeyne van de Copello 1946). Th e constitutional problems in the 
Netherlands in the interbellum period were, in the Commission’s opinion, 
caused by too great a diversity of political parties which were an obstacle 
to the effi  cient formation of a government. Furthermore these political 
parties, in the Commission’s view, had too much infl uence and power 
in politics as well as in society as a whole. According to the Commission 
strong political leadership was lacking in the 1918-1940 period. At the 
end of its report the Commission suggested new radical ideas concerning 
the regulation of political parties. Th e Act on associations and assemblies 
(of 1855) should be amended in such a way that political parties were 
recognized by law as organizations. Furthermore one-issue parties should 
be banned, according to the Commission. Also, the statutes and practice 
of political parties should be periodically reviewed. What should be 
reviewed in particular was the question whether political parties complied 
with the Constitution and other Acts of Parliament. If not, a political party 
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could lose its seats in parliament. Besides political parties which had fewer 
than 50,000 members should not have the right to participate in general 
elections. Finally a provision was proposed legally to end the situation in 
which a representative could be held accountable for his (parliamentary) 
actions towards the political party he belonged to. 
Not only were legal scholars engaged in questions concerning the 
regulation of political parties. Political parties themselves were also 
participating in this discussion. Anti-revolutionary and Christian-
Historical political movements were basically against any form of regulation 
concerning political organizations. Th e former Dutch Catholic Party 
(Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP)) however was convinced about regulating 
the banning of certain anti-democratic political parties. It also proposed 
a legal provision guaranteeing the transparency of the proceedings of 
political parties (J.J. de Jong 1957, p. 40). In 1950 C.H. Rutten (1950, p. 
17-25) summarized the ideas of the Dutch Catholics as follows: 
‘Given the very specifi c and partly public character of political parties and 
the fact that they can employ constructive as well as destructive activities 
in terms of our Constitution, legislation on political parties must be 
considered necessary.’
Th e Social Democrats had a diff erent approach towards the discussion 
on political parties. In their opinion it was not the increasing political 
infl uence of political parties that was a reason to regulate those 
organizations, but the fundamental function of the party system should 
be the motivation to do so (Van der Goes 1945, p. 62-65). M. Van der 
Goes Naters, a leading party member of the Dutch Social Democrats, 
felt that a strong party system was essential for a ‘healthy’ structure of 
the State’. In his opinion the disadvantageous side of the functioning of 
political parties was not a reason to eliminate the party system as a whole. 
His answer was to give political parties public status in an Act on political 
parties, in which transparency and supervision would be included. In this 
Act all kind of provisions would be regulated; supervision by the Civil 
courts would be noteworthy and for disciplinary measures concerning 
confl icts with Members of Parliament a special Honorary Court should be 
established. In 1950 a special Commission of the Scientifi c Bureau of the 
Social Democrats (Wiarda Beckmannstichting) (1950, p. 674-700) came to 
the same conclusions, although that Commission above all emphasized 
that a political party should be obliged to have an internal democratic 
structure. In the Commission’s opinion such an obligation would be the 
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best provision for discouraging political parties with anti-democratic 
purposes. 
Th ese diff erent ideas on the regulation of political parties from legal 
scholars as well as from political parties themselves led to special attention 
being given to this topic in the diff erent State Commissions which were 
constituted in the 1950s. Firstly the State Commission on Constitutional 
reform (1950 p. 55), so named by its Chairman Van Schaik,6 proposed in 
its fi nal report in 1950 to include a special provision on political parties 
in the Dutch Constitution. More specifi c this provision was to read that 
‘In the interest of a pure political will shaping, regulations can be made on 
political parties in an Act of Parliament.’ 
Th e Commission explained its proposal as follows: Given the very 
important position which political parties in the Dutch constitutional 
state have, the Commission saw it as an anomaly that the Constitution 
took no notice of their existence. Th e Commission wanted to fi ll this 
gap by amending the Constitution in such a way that a new provision 
was added, in which is stipulated that in a Act of Parliament regulations 
could be made in the interests of pure political will shaping. Furthermore 
the parliamentary debate on such a provision should lead to formal 
consideration by the legislator of this issue.
In 1958 however another State Commission on the subject of the 
Electoral system and the regulation of political parties (1958, p. 21-29) 
came to a negative conclusion on the question whether special legal 
provisions on political parties were necessary. A legal provision on banning 
political parties was considered inappropriate. Furthermore regulations 
on the transparency of party funding (subsidy) were also not necessary 
because the Commission had not noticed any form of abuse on this issue. 
Besides the Commission also did not want to take any legal measures 
concerning the internal organization structure of political parties. Th e 
nomination of candidates for Parliament should not be regulated because 
political parties, in the eyes of the Commission, did not have a monopoly 
on nominating candidates. Th e Commission (State Commission on the 
subject of the Electoral system and the regulation of political parties 
1958, p. 21-29) concluded therefore that introducing legislation relating 
to political parties was altogether not suffi  ciently justifi ed. 
In 1966 a draft proposal on a new Dutch Constitution was made by 
several leading constitutional scholars (Ministerie van Binnenlands Zaken 
1966). Th ey came to the same conclusion as the State Commission on 
the Electoral system and the regulation of political parties of 1958. A 
minority of another State Commission on the (Dutch) Constitution and 
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the Electoral Law (1971) proposed a Constitutional provision on political 
parties. However the majority of this Commission concluded that such 
a provision would not be of much help because it could not be achieved 
and furthermore was not desirable. Th e (majority of the) Commission had 
serious objections to a general Act concerning political parties because such 
an Act could lead to a limitation on the freedom of political association 
and the risk that the rights of political minorities would not be suffi  ciently 
guaranteed (Van den Brink 1959 and Boukema 1968).
During the Parliamentary debate on the Constitutional reform of the 
Dutch Constitution of 1983, Members of the Social Democrat group 
(Partij van de Arbeid, the Dutch Labour Party) in particular insisted on 
guaranteeing the functioning of political parties in the Constitution with 
the aim of securing free political will (Dutch Parliamentary Documents, 
Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1979-1980, Kamerstukken, nr. 14 222, 
nr. 11, p. 4.). Th e Minister of Internal relations refused to do so. In his 
opinion the special nature of public interference with political parties was 
already suffi  ciently insured by the adoption of the fundamental right of 
association and assembly in the (new) Constitution. Th erefore a specifi c 
Constitutional guarantee for political parties was not necessary, according 
to the minister (Dutch Parliamentary Documents, Handelingen der 
Tweede Kamer, 1979-1980, Kamerstukken, nr. 14 222, nr. 11, p. 5).
Although since 1983 several important (State) Commissions 
have written reports on constitutional reform in the Netherlands, no 
fundamental amendments have been proposed to the regulation on 
political parties.7 An exception is the subject of the funding of political 
parties. Since 1999 a special Act on State funding of political parties has 
been passed (see below). In 2009 a new State Commission on the Dutch 
Constitution was set up. Although the former government initially gave the 
Commission the task of also examining whether a special constitutional 
provision on political parties is or is not necessary, in the fi nal instructions 
this question was deleted.
Recently new political parties have arisen in the Netherlands and have 
won seats in the Second Chamber. After the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), which 
in the general elections of 2002 won 26 seats in the Second Chamber, 
in 2010 the Partij van de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom - PVV) was the 
winner during the June elections. Th e PVV, with Geert Wilders as its 
leader, in the 2010 elections won 24 seats and in the last elections (2012) 
15 seats in the Lower House for the Second Chamber. Th e structure of 
this political party can be characterized as non-democratic. Th e party has 
only two members; namely Geert Wilders himself and the Foundation 
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Friends of Geert Wilders. It is not possible to become a member of the 
PVV. A supporter can only make a donation to it. Although Wilders 
does not do anything illegal, in the recent discussion one may note 
criticism of this clever use of a loophole in current Dutch legislation.8 In 
my opinion it might be considered to modify the Dutch Civil Code or 
the Electoral Act such that a political party must allow supporters of the 
party to become members. While such an amendment infringes the right 
of freedom of association of the party itself, it would at the same time 
guarantee individuals the right to become a member of the political party 
they support. Furthermore a membership organization would enable the 
creation of an internal system of checks and balances, by which members 
of the general assembly of the party can hold the leadership accountable.
In conclusion, since 1848 several attempts have been made to regulate 
political parties in the Netherlands. In the period after World War II the 
discussion focussed on the question whether these organizations should be 
regulated in the Dutch Constitution or in a special Act on political parties. 
None of these attempts have resulted in legislation. Dutch political parties 
are mainly dominated by civil law and their own statutes. 
Existing regulations on political parties
It thus may seem that few, if any, legal provisions for parties exists in the 
Netherlands. Th is proposition does however not refl ect reality. Although 
Dutch regulation on political parties may seem scarce, there are Acts 
of Parliament which impose certain rules and privileges on political 
parties (Drexhage & Nehmelman 2010). In a (negative) sense article 67, 
par. 3 of the Dutch Constitution can be seen as an important rule for 
political parties not to intervene in the mandate of individual members 
of parliament. Th is article reads that “Th e members shall not be bound by a 
mandate or instructions when casting their votes.”
Th is constitutional provision is indeed very important in constitutional 
theory; in Dutch political practice one often sees that political parties 
are still very dominant over individual Members of Parliament (MP). 
Nevertheless in the end it is the free conscience as guaranteed in art. 67, 
par 3 Dutch Constitution that will ‘protect’ the MP. 
Besides this Constitutional provision the Dutch Electoral Law also 
contains certain important provisions in which the term “political groups” 
is used. If a political party wants to put forward certain candidates for a 
general election under a certain party name on the electoral list, the Dutch 
lessons from the past: party regulation in the netherlands 83
Electoral Law requires (Article G1 (Dutch) Electoral Act). Th e party to 
have organized itself as a full legal association as mentioned in the Civil 
Code (Article 27, Book 2 Civil Code). All Dutch political parties can 
be characterized as such. Th is means that a political party is also bound 
by a considerable number of legal provisions regarding (fully legal civil) 
associations. Although a political association can also itself defi ne many 
rules in party statutes, certain rules in the Civil Code are obligatory. Th ese 
rules are, for instance, to have an executive board, a general assembly, to 
set out explicitly the purpose of the association in the statutes etcetera 
(Article 27, Book 2, Civil Code). 
It is important to stress the general provision mentioned in article 20, 
Book 2, Dutch Civil Code. Th is article enacts a general provision dissolving 
and banning a legal entity, including a political association, if its activities 
confl ict with public order. By court ruling a political association can be 
dissolved and be proscribed if it undertakes activities which are contrary 
to public order. Th e legislator has left much room for interpretation of the 
concept of public order to the judiciary. So far only one political party has 
been dissolved and proscribed; in 1997 the Dutch High Court proscribed 
the CentrumPartij’86 (CP’86), an extreme nationalistic political party 
(Hoge Raad 30 September 1997, Ars Aequi 1998, p. 113-119, annotated 
by Y. Buruma).9
Besides the general legal provisions in the Dutch Civil Code, a 
small number of public provisions have also been made. Firstly the 
abovementioned Electoral Law has certain articles which especially 
concern political parties10 A political party can, as mentioned above, put 
forward candidates for general elections if the party has organized itself as 
a full legal association as mentioned in the Civil Code. If a political party 
does so, other provisions of the Electoral Law become applicable. For 
instance the Electoral Commission can deny political parties to use certain 
names or acronyms on their candidate lists. Moreover, it is not necessary 
to participate in the general elections as a political party; a natural person 
can do so as well, although this never happens. If one wants to stand for 
election to the Second Chamber, one has to pay a deposit of € 11,250.00. 
Th is amount will be paid back if one obtains 75 per cent of the electoral 
threshold (usually around 45,000 votes) (Article H12 Electoral Act).
On 1 May 2013 a new Act of Parliament concerning the way political 
parties are fi nanced came into force (Act on Financing of Political Parties) 
(Dutch Parliamentary Documents, Kamerstukken II, 2010-2011, 32 752, 
Stb. 2013, 93. See also Koole in this volume). Dutch political parties have 
received substantial amounts of subsidy from the Dutch government since 
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1999, which was regulated in the Act on Subsidising Political Parties. Th is 
Act on state funding for political parties provides rules for the funding 
only of parties which have seats in parliament. Th e funds are earmarked 
to be used for certain aims such as scientifi c research, organizing a youth 
section of the political party etcetera. Only article 18 of this old Act is 
stipulated that amounts of € 4537,80 given to a political party from a legal 
person had to be be made publically transparent, but know sanction was 
provided in the Act. Th e new Act of Parliament (2013) not only regulates 
the public subsidies political parties may receive, but also includes stronger 
provisions and sanctions concerning the transparency of party funding. 
It stipulates, for example, that certain amounts of private money (above 
€ 4,500) must be made transparent to the public. Th is new Act was passed 
after the international organization Groups of States against Corruption 
(GRECO) of the Council of Europe strongly recommended the passing 
of new legislation on this topic. 
Finally the Dutch Media Act has certain clauses guaranteeing the 
(free) use of public broadcasting. Political parties are given a certain 
public broadcasting time to promote their political statements (Greco, 
Th ird Evaluation Round, Interim Compliance Report on the Netherlands 
“Transparency of Party Funding” 2013).
Increasing infl uence of the ECtHR and the Dutch judiciary
Although the Dutch legislator has always been very careful not to 
intervene severely in the organization of the structure of political parties, 
in the last decade the increasing infl uence of the judiciary in questions 
concerning political parties has been noticeable. Not only has the Dutch 
judiciary been confronted with diffi  cult questions on the freedom 
of political association, but the European Court on Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has also lately increasingly been involved in diffi  cult cases on 
political freedom as guaranteed in article 11 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.11 It is obvious that the judiciary will become involved 
in questions concerning political parties if the legislator only regulates 
certain basic provisions, with vague terms such as public order, concerning 
such organizations. Th e legislator leaves it to the judges to fi ll in these 
vague terms. Nevertheless one has to consider that judicial interpretation 
can have far-reaching consequences. In the end the judiciary is asked to 
give an opinion on the concept of democracy. Courts have to formulate 
their vision of democracy. Is this concept only a formal one in which the 
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will of the majority is decisive and every citizen must have the right to gain 
political power? In this concept pluralism is of great value. On the other 
hand a Court may choose a more substantive defi nition of democracy. 
Not only is the rule of the majority and the freedom to gain political 
power then decisive, but other elements of the Constitutional state, for 
instance equality, are important as well.
Case Law: Refah Partisi and SGP
Two recent cases; one from the ECtHR and one from the High Court 
of the Netherlands, are illustrative of the increasing infl uence of the 
(inter)national judiciary. One of the most important ECtHR cases on 
this issue is the Refah Partisi (Welfare party) case in which the Court 
had to decide whether article 11 ECHR had been violated by the Turkish 
State (Refah Partisi (Th e Welfare party) a.o. v. Turkey, ECtHR, Case 
No. 41344/98 (Grand Chamber)).12 Th e Supreme Court of Turkey had 
banned the Welfare Party for violating the principle of secularism in the 
Turkish Constitution. Although the popularity of the Welfare Party was 
considerable, the ban was upheld by the European Court. 
Th e Dutch judiciary has recently also been confronted with a diffi  cult 
case concerning the limiting of the political freedom of a political party. 
It all started in a civil case in which a few Dutch ‘pro women’ NGOs 
(Clara Wichmann a.o.) requested – in the interests of all Dutch women – 
that the (State of the) Netherlands take action against the SGP, a small 
fundamentalist theocratic political party, with two seats in the Second 
Chamber (Oomen, Guijt & Ploeg 2010). Th e SGP did not grant passive 
voting rights to women. Th erefore women could not be candidates for 
the SGP. However the Netherlands was a party to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
article 7 of which guaranteed amongst others that States Parties shall take 
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to 
women, on equal terms with men, the right (a) to vote in all elections and public 
referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies and … (c) 
to participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned 
with the public and political life of the country. After several lower court 
decisions the SGP lodged an administrative appeal against the withholding 
of the state subsidy to the Dutch Council of State, which ruled in favour 
of the political party. In weighing the fundamental rights at stake, the 
administrative court argued that the right to political participation is of 
more value in this situation than the violation of the principle of non-
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discrimination against women. In the same month however the Appeal 
Division of the Civil Court in Th e Hague ruled that the Dutch State 
should take measures against the SGP to end the discrimination. Th e 
Court stated that the right to equality had been violated in its essence. 
Th e High Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) followed this conclusion. 
It stated that the Dutch State should take eff ective measures to ensure 
that the SGP would grant passive voting rights to women as guaranteed 
in article 4 of the Dutch Constitution. Th e High Court stated that these 
measures should infringe as little as possible the fundamental political 
rights of the SGP (Ten Napel 2011). On 10 July 2012 the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) declared the complaint of the Dutch 
political party Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij against the Netherlands 
inadmissible (SGP v. the Netherlands, Application, ECtHR 10 July 2012, 
no. 58369/10). Th e Court held that it had to refrain from stating any view 
as to what, if anything, the respondent Government should do to put a 
stop to the present situation. It indicated that it could not dictate action 
in a decision on admissibility; it was, in any case, an issue well outside the 
scope of the present application. Th e Court concluded that the application 
was manifestly ill-founded and had to be rejected in accordance with 
Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court 
unanimously declared the SGP’s application inadmissible (Van den 
Brink & Hans-Martien ten Napel 2013).
An old idea as guarantee for political parties 
Th e Refah Partisi case and the SGP case have been criticized by many 
(legal) scholars Ten Napel & Karim Th eissen 2009, p. 363-392; Hoge 
Raad 2010, p. 492-504). Both cases illustrate that in recent years the 
judiciary has been fi lling out the concept of democracy in such a way 
that political parties have to accept that the free shaping of the political 
will also has its limitations, such as the principle of non-discrimination or 
the Turkish principle of secularism. Reviewing these cases makes one ask 
whether the time has come to include a specifi c Constitutional provision 
to guarantee the free shaping of the political will of political parties. Such 
a reform of the Constitution was, as we have seen, proposed as early as in 
1950 by the Dutch State Commission Van Schaik. Th is Constitutional 
provision would provide for a special guarantee for political parties besides 
the already existing right to freedom of association. Th e advantage would 
be that the State (legislator, administration and judiciary) would have to 
be even more careful to restrict political parties than it already is. If the 
State (for instance the judiciary) wants to infringe the free shaping of 
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the political will, it has to make it explicit why in a certain case such an 
infringement is necessary. 
Conclusion
In this contribution I have tried to give a short overview of the past 
discussions concerning the evolution and regulation of political parties 
in the Netherlands. As of 2011 legislation on Dutch political parties is 
(still) very scarce. Scholars as well as politicians have been very cautious 
about regulating these organizations. Also most State Commissions 
concluded not to opt for a special provision for political parties in the 
Dutch Constitution or in a separate Act of Parliament. An exception was 
State Commissioner Van Schaik who in his fi nal report in 1950 proposed 
to introduce a special clause in the Constitution in which the free shaping 
of the political will was secured. However the discussion after 1950 on 
regulating political parties was dominated by the statement as summarized 
in 1983 by A.M. Donner. 
I began this paper with the quotation from Donner in which he stated: 
‘Let us postpone as long as possible the offi  cial recognition of the party system 
(in the Netherlands), because in its nature Law just brings regulation, and 
he who regulates, restricts.’ Due to the dominance of A.M. Donner in 
Dutch constitutional Law in the 1955-1985 period, his statement is still 
valid. However in my opinion one must place Donner’s quotation in the 
era he lived in. Times have changed, also in the evolution of the system 
of political parties. Since 2002 new political parties have arisen in the 
Netherlands, and nowadays a political party, the PVV, with 15 seats (of 
the 150 seats) in the Second Chamber of the States-General does not have 
an internal democratic structure. In my opinion, regulating the right of an 
individual to become a member of the political party he supports should 
be seriously considered. Even though this is an infringement of the right of 
association of the political party, the importance of becoming a member 
of a political party is of such high value that it should prevail over the right 
of the political party itself. Th e internal democratic structure of a political 
party is the best guarantee of a sound system of checks and balance.
Furthermore I have argued for securing the freedom of the political will 
in the Dutch Constitution as proposed by State Commissioner van Schaik 
in 1950. Important recent judicial cases have shown that the balance 
between the freedom of association and contradictory fundamental rights 
is, in my opinion, not always well considered. A specifi c constitutional 
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provision in which the individual as well as (political) association has, 
within certain limits, the fundamental right freely to shape its own 
political will would ensure that all public authorities, particularly the 
judiciary, must explicitly come up with a balance between this and other 
fundamental rights.
Finally, I would no longer postpone the offi  cial constitutional 
recognition of the political party system in the Netherlands. On certain 
elements special regulation is much needed. Although in its nature Law 
just brings about regulation, he who regulates not only restricts but also 
guarantees. 
Notes
1 Professor of Public Institutional Law, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.
2 Article 42, section 2 of the Dutch Constitution reads as follows: Th e Ministers, 
and not the King, shall be responsible for acts of government.
3 Th is rule still applies in the Dutch Constitution, see article 67, par. 3, Dutch 
Constitution. 
4 Th is provision was called the ‘Caoutchouc-provision’ because it was not clear 
who were defi ned by it. Caoutchouc is a sort of rubber. 
5 Nowadays this rule is guaranteed in article 67, par. 3, Dutch Constitution. 
6 Van Schaik was at that time vice-Prime Minister of the Netherlands (he was 
a member van Dutch Catholic Party (KVP)). Staatscommissie ter herziening 
van de grondwet, 1950.
7 State Commission on the relation electorate and policymaking (Staats-
commissie van advies inzake de relatie kiezers-beleidsvorming (State 
Commission Biesheuvel)), Final report in 1985 and the Special Commission 
on certain constitutional issues of the Second Chamber of the State-General, 
Bijzondere Commissie Vraagpunten van de Tweede Kamer (Commissie-
Deetman).
8 Th e critics came from another Member of Parliament of Wilders’own 
PVV namely Hero Brinkman, http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/
Politiek/268001/Wilders-Positie-Hero-Brinkman-staat-niet-ter-discussie.
htm?rss=true (last seen on 4th September 2014). 
9 Dutch High Court, Hoge Raad 30 September 1997, Ars Aequi 1998, p. 113-
119, annotated by Y. Buruma.
10 Th e Electoral Law itself does not speak of political parties but political 
groups, e.g. Chapter G, Dutch Electoral Act. 
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11 Article 11 – Freedom of assembly and association 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. Th is article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of 
the police or of the administration of the State.
12 See also Bale in this volume.
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Th e Constitutionalization of 




Th e constitutions of western liberal democracies have traditionally paid 
little attention to the role of political parties. In part, this is a consequence 
of a historical sequence in which the adoption of the constitution in many 
countries predated the appearance of political parties. In addition, the long-
standing absence of political parties from national constitutions can also be 
seen as a product of particular normative conceptions of democracy, which 
have long been incompatible with the phenomenon of political parties. 
Th ese conceptions tended to be premised on the association between 
democracy and direct rather than indirect forms of political participation 
and decision-making, and generally perceived political parties as a threat to 
the – supposedly neutral – common interest (Daalder 2002). Ultimately, 
it seemed that the phenomenon of the political party remained diffi  cult to 
reconcile with democratic traditions that are based either on the notion of 
individual liberty or with those which embrace the existence of something 
like a general will.
In contemporary democracies, however, political parties have come to 
be seen as procedurally necessary and democratically desirable institutions, 
even amid increasing concern that their actual functioning may sometimes 
undermine the quality of democracy. Th e relevance of political parties 
for modern democracy has also become recognized increasingly in 
constitutional terms. Indeed, the period following World War Two has 
witnessed an ongoing process of party constitutionalization in European 
democracies, with the restoration of democracy in Italy and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in 1947 and 1949 respectively, providing the most 
notable examples. Th is practice of party constitutionalization has since been 
followed in constitutional revisions in many other polities,2 to the point 
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where the large majority of European democracies today acknowledge not 
only the existence of political parties in their constitutions in one form or 
another but also that political participation, representation, pluralism and 
competition in many democratic constitutions have come to be defi ned 
increasingly, if not almost exclusively, in terms of party. Indeed, especially 
in many of the more recently established democracies in Southern and 
Eastern Europe that emerged out of recent waves of democratization, the 
very establishment of democratic procedures was often identifi ed with the 
establishment of free competition between parties. Political parties were 
thus often attributed a pivotal role and privileged constitutional position.
Relatively little is known, however, about the process of party 
constitutionalization, about the substantive content of the constitutional 
position of political parties, about the regional or temporal variation 
between and within countries, or about the normative connotations of the 
parties’ constitutional codifi cation. As Bogdanor (2004: 718) observes, 
‘it is perhaps because the law has been so late in recognizing political 
parties that constitutional lawyers and other writers on the constitution 
have taken insuffi  cient note of the fact that parties are so central to our 
constitutional arrangements’. Th is chapter partly addresses that gap in the 
literature by providing a cross-sectional and longitudinal overview of the 
patterns of party constitutionalization across Europe and exploring both 
the empirical and normative dimensions of party constitutionalization. 
In doing so, its aim is not only to contribute to a better understanding of 
the ways in which the constitutional codifi cation of political parties varies 
between countries and over time, but also of the underlying normative 
conceptions about their role and place within the institutional architecture 
of the democratic polity.
Constitutionalizing party democracy
Th is section presents a descriptive overview of the process of party 
constitutionalization in post-war European democracies. By party 
constitutionalization we understand the incorporation of (an) explicit 
reference(s) to political parties, either as direct or indirect subjects, in 
the national constitution. Th e process is schematically represented in 
Figure 1, which depicts the chronology of party constitutionalization 
in post-war Europe. As can be seen from it, the constitutionalization of 
political parties was somewhat of a novelty in the immediate post-war 
period. By the end of the 1940s, only a handful of constitutions (Iceland, 
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Austria, Italy and Germany) contained references to political parties. 
In the subsequent two decades, only three more countries followed suit 
(France, Cyprus and Malta). Th e strongest impulse in the diff usion of 
party constitutionalization emerged from the third and fourth waves 
of democratization in Southern Europe in the mid 1970s and post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s: each of these 
new democracies enshrined the position of political parties in their new 
constitutions in the wake of the transition towards democracy. Most 
recently, Finland and Switzerland (both in 1999) and Luxembourg (in 
2008) have amended their constitutions so as explicitly to include special 
references to the role and functions of political parties.
Figure 1. Waves of post-war party constitutionalization
Th e result of this ongoing process of party constitutionalization is that 
the large majority of post-war European democracies (28 out of 33) now 
acknowledge political parties in their constitutions in one form or another. It 
is in only in four of the longer-established European democracies (Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands – see also Nehmelman in this 
volume) that political parties are not mentioned in the national constitution.3 
Th is codifi cation of parties by national constitutions corresponds with a 
more general trend, as described by the various contributors to this volume, 
by which political parties in contemporary democracies are becoming 
increasingly subject to regulations and laws that govern their behaviour, 
activities, and organization.
Figure 1 shows that Iceland presents the earliest instance of party 
constitutionalization in post-war Europe. Th is occurred in 1944, when 
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good example of the indirect constitutionalization, with article 31 stating 
that:
[…] In allocating seats according to the election results, it shall be 
ensured to the extent possible that each political party having gained 
a seat in Althingi receive the number of Members of Althingi which 
is as closely as possible in accordance with the total number of votes it 
has obtained.5
Elections rather than parties are the actual subject of constitutional 
regulation in this case, as the main purpose of this constitutional provision 
is to enshrine a principle of proportional representation for national 
parliamentary elections rather than describing the role of parties within 
the political system. Th e reference to political parties in the Icelandic 
constitution thus appears only incidental and the allusion to their presence 
seems to take their existence for granted. Nonetheless, albeit couched in 
implicit terms, the Icelandic constitution presented a constitutional novelty 
in Europe at the time, being the fi rst to create an unequivocal association 
between political parties and elections and thus eff ectively to acknowledge 
the institutional relevance of parties in the context of a modern representative 
democracy. We shall call this type of constitutional codifi cation, whereby 
political parties are acknowledged, implicitly or explicitly, as necessary 
institutions for modern representative democracy, the constitutionalization 
of parties as a functional necessity.
Similarly, the subsequent case of party constitutionalization, i.e. 
Austria in 1945, is one in which parties are equally treated primarily as 
indirect subjects. Th e Austrian constitution was adopted in the wake of 
the restoration of democracy following World War Two and eff ectively 
reinstated the pre-war 1929 federal constitution (which had fi rst been 
adopted in 1920 following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
after World War One), while at the same time rescinding the Austrofascist 
constitution of 1934. Despite containing a relatively large number of 
provisions referring to political parties, the Austrian constitution does 
little to elaborate on the signifi cance of political parties for the political 
system or the democratic decision-making process and seems to take their 
necessary existence more or less for granted (Pelinka 1971: 265). Moreover, 
the Austrian constitution barely recognizes or acknowledges political 
parties as institutions in their own right, but usually refers to them in 
their manifestation as parliamentary groups, or in their electoral capacity 
(i.e. as Wahlparteien). Th e only reference in the Austrian constitution to 
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political parties per se consists of a negative clause: persons who hold 
offi  ce in a political party cannot be members of the Constitutional Court 
(art.147.4). Th e Austrian constitution does illustrate, however, that the 
constitutionalization of parties is not exclusively a post-war phenomenon, 
as it incorporates a number of provisions from the earlier pre-war 
constitution. Moreover, the case of Austria echoes the 1919 constitution 
of Weimar Germany, in which the reference to political parties involved a 
requirement for the political neutrality of public offi  cials, stipulating that 
‘civil servants are servants of the public as a whole, not of a party’ (art. 
130). As we shall see below, similar constitutional provisions, aimed at 
safeguarding the neutrality of the institutions of the state from partisan 
interests, can be found in many contemporary democracies.
Th e constitutionalization of parties in Iceland and Austria was 
followed by Italy in 1947 and by the Federal Republic of Germany two 
years later. Th e German Basic Law, together with the similar, but less 
detailed, article on political parties which had previously appeared in 
the Italian constitution, was one the fi rst cases of what could be called a 
positive constitutional codifi cation of political parties in post-war Europe, 
attributing to political parties a constructive role in the democratic system. 
Th e Italian and German constitutions thus, as Pelizzo (2004: 130) notes, 
‘represent a novelty in the history of formal constitutional texts as they 
explicitly recognize the constitutional role and relevance of political parties 
in the functioning of democratic polities.’ Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, both constitutions establish that the constitutional relevance 
of political parties is not confi ned to the role they perform in elections. Th is 
stands in sharp contrast to the earlier cases of party constitutionalization 
in Iceland and Austria, as well as some later examples such as in Sweden, 
Norway and Finland, where the constitutional relevance of political 
parties is essentially linked to their electoral functions. Th e Italian and 
German constitutions thus recognize that political parties are not only 
necessary but also desirable institutions in modern democracies. We shall 
refer to this type of constitutional codifi cation as the constitutionalization 
of political parties as a democratic desirability.
While the Italian constitution stipulates that ‘[a]ll citizens shall have 
the right to associate freely in political parties in order to contribute by 
democratic means to the determination of national policy’ (art. 49), it is 
only in the German Basic Law that political parties, rather than citizens 
(as in Italy) or elections (Iceland and Austria), become the direct subject 
of constitutionalization. Article 21 – entitled Political Parties – regulates 
issues such as the freedom of political parties, their role in the formation of 
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the political will, intra-party democracy, and the duty of parties to account 
for their assets. Furthermore, the German constitution does not tolerate 
political parties with purposes or activities antithetical to the democratic 
constitutional order, a provision which has subsequently provided the 
foundation for a constitutional ban on the descendants of the Nazi and 
Communist Parties (Kommers 1997: 217-24). More specifi cally, article 21 
of the Basic Law, as amended in 1984, states:
(1) Th e political parties participate in the formation of the political 
will of the people. Th ey may be freely established. Th eir internal 
organization must conform to democratic principles. Th ey must 
publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their 
funds as well as assets.
(2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their 
adherents, seek to impair or destroy the free democratic basic order 
or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are 
unconstitutional. Th e Federal Constitutional Court decides on the 
question of unconstitutionality.
(3) Details are regulated by federal legislation.
Article 21 thus constitutionalizes political parties, and ‘formally 
acknowledges that they have a genuine and legitimate function to perform 
in modern democratic government.’ (Schneider 1957: 527). By assigning 
a key role to parties in the formation of the political will of the people, 
the German constitution associates one of the key principles of democracy 
with the institution of the political party and invests parties with the 
status of institutions under constitutional law. At a time when political 
parties had been constitutionally codifi ed in only a handful of European 
democracies, the German Basic Law represented the most comprehensive 
set of constitutional rules on political parties (Tsatsos 2002).
Th e practice of party constitutionalization has since been followed 
in constitutional revisions in many other countries, with many taking 
their cue from the German model. Th is is true in particular of the new 
(third and fourth wave) democracies, in which parties are usually the 
direct subject of constitutionalization and which in most cases have 
constitutionalized political parties as a democratic desirability. In most 
of the older democracies, parties tend to be constitutionalized as indirect 
subjects and are usually regarded implicitly as a functional necessity for 
democratic elections (see Table 1).
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Th e only older countries to resemble Germany and the newer democracies 
are Switzerland and Luxembourg, which have recently amended their 
constitutions so as to incorporate political parties. In the latter, a new 
article was added to the constitution in 2008, which reads that ‘Political 
parties contribute to the formation of the popular will and the expression 
of universal suff rage. Th ey express democratic pluralism.’ (art. 32bis) 
(Dumont et al. 2008: 1061).6 Th is amendment was offi  cially motivated by 
the perceived need to modernize the constitution in line with the political 
reality of representative democracy and a desire to underscore the importance 
of political parties for the healthy functioning of the democratic system.7 
In reality, however, an important part of the need constitutionally to codify 
their democratic importance seems to have been driven by the desire to 
provide a more solid legal basis for, and thereby enhance the legitimacy of, 
the direct state subsidies to political parties (Borz 2011). At the same time, 
the underlying logic behind the constitutional codifi cation of parties in this 
case may be the basic principle of do ut des (Pacini & Piccio 2012): political 
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parties benefi ting from public funding (or other resources such as media 
access) should become embedded within a regulatory framework so as to 
provide a legal basis for both their privileges and obligations.
Th e diff erences in the nature of party constitutionalization suggest that 
signifi cant diff erences exist between new and old democracies. In this light, 
it is important to observe that the pattern of party constitutionalization as 
sketched in Figure 1 corresponds closely to the waves which Elster (1995) 
has identifi ed as waves of constitution-making and which Huntington 
(1991) has observed for democratization processes (for a more elaborate 
discussion see van Biezen 2012). On this view, Iceland, Austria, Italy and 
Germany form part of the fi rst wave of post-war party constitutionalization. 
A next wave was connected with the break-up of the French and British 
colonial empires: the establishment of the French Vth Republic in 1958, 
as well as Cyprus and Malta on acquiring independence in 1960 and 1964 
respectively. A further wave of party constitutionalization corresponds to 
the third wave of democratization in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal 
and Spain) in the mid 1970s, while a in a fourth wave the post-communist 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe adopted new constitutions 
after the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Th is suggests that moments of institutional restructuring in post-war 
Europe, including the establishment or the restoration of democracy as 
well as the (re)establishment of independent nation states, was always 
accompanied by the incorporation of parties in the newly written 
constitutions. Th e constitutional codifi cation of political parties, therefore, 
is usually a product of a (re)constitutive moment, which often occurs in 
a context of institutional fl ux. Conventional amendments, on the other 
hand, such as the ones we fi nd in Norway, Finland and Luxembourg, 
constitute a rather unusual mode of party constitutionalization. Th at 
political parties, without exception, were incorporated in the very fi rst 
constitutions adopted by the newly established democratic states is 
indicative of the ways in which party democracy is understood, be it in 
normative or empirical terms, by the actors involved in the democratization 
and constitution-writing processes. It suggests, as Kopecký (1995: 516) has 
observed in the context of the post-communist democracies, that among 
the designers of these constitutions a conception of democracy prevailed, 
whether conscious or unconscious, in which political parties are the core 
foundation of a democratic polity. 
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Dimensions of party constitutionalization
Across European democracies, signifi cant variation exists in the intensity 
as well as the substance of party constitutionalization. Th e intensity with 
which constitutions have codifi ed the position of political parties can be 
measured along two dimensions: the absolute number of constitutional 
provisions about political parties, which we may call the magnitude of party 
constitutionalization, and the range of party constitutionalization, which 
refers to the scope encompassed by the diff erent constitutional stipulations 
(van Biezen & Borz 2012). In some countries, the constitution says very 
little about political parties. Latvia constitutes an example on the extreme 
end of the spectrum, with the current constitution merely stating that [e]
veryone has the right to form and join associations, political parties and 
other public organizations.’ (art. 102). Other examples of low intensity 
constitutionalization include countries such as Iceland and Luxembourg, 
cited above, where the constitutions make only a short reference to political 
parties and the scope is limited to a single feature (elections in Iceland; 
democratic principles in Luxembourg). At the other extreme, we fi nd 
countries such as Portugal and Greece, which stand out for high scores on 
both aspects, with the constitutions containing a high number of provisions 
on a large number of dimensions, including the rights and freedoms of 
political parties, their internal organizational structures, access to public 
resources such as state funding and the broadcasting media, mechanisms 
of judicial oversight of party activity and behaviour, and so on. In other 
countries such as Germany, but also Croatia and Serbia, the constitutional 
regulation of parties encompasses many categories (i.e. a high range) but 
with a relatively limited amount of detail (i.e. a low magnitude). Finally, in 
some countries (e.g. Sweden), the constitutions outline the place of parties 
in a small number of areas (in this case the electoral and parliamentary 
arena) but in relatively great detail.
Although the range and magnitude of regulation in principle may 
vary independently of each other (except that the magnitude cannot 
be lower than the range), in practice there is a strong correlation 
between the two. In addition, the diff erences in the intensity of party 
constitutionalization seem to suggest that the distinction between old and 
new democracies plays a role, with newer democracies tending towards 
a higher intensity of constitutionalization than their older counterparts. 
Th ese diff erences are corroborated by signifi cance tests: the magnitude 
of party constitutionalization in the newer democracies, which includes 
the younger Southern European democracies of Greece, Portugal and 
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Spain together with the post-1989 democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, is more than twice as high as in the older ones. In addition, the 
constitutional codifi cation of parties in the new democracies encompasses 
twice as many areas, with the average range of party constitutionalization 
more than twice as high as in their older counterparts. Th e diff erence 
between the two groups of countries on both the magnitude and range 
of constitutionalization is statistically signifi cant at the .05 level. Also 
signifi cant are the diff erences between countries with a continuous 
democratic experience, on the one hand, and those with an unstable (or 
non-existent) democratic history, on the other. Th e latter include not 
only the more recent third and fourth wave democracies in Southern 
and Eastern Europe, but also the re-established democracies of Austria, 
Germany and Italy. Th e constitutions of countries that have experienced a 
period of non-democratic rule at some point during the twentieth century 
encompass a range that is more than three times as high compared to 
the so-called continuous democracies. Equally, the magnitude of party 
constitutionalization in the former is more than three times as high as in 
the continuous democracies. Th e diff erences between the two groups of 
countries are also signifi cant at the .05 level on both dimensions (for more 
details see van Biezen & Borz 2012).
Th is suggests that a non-democratic experience is a powerful driving 
force behind the constitutional codifi cation of political parties. Indeed, 
the constitutions of the more recently established democracies in Southern 
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe as well as the democracies 
re-constituted in the immediate aftermath of WWII (i.e. Austria, Italy 
and Germany) tend to regulate parties signifi cantly more extensively than 
the older liberal democracies on nearly all domains. Th e constitutions 
of the older democracies stand out for privileging the parties in their 
electoral capacity, which is clearly a consequence of the predominant 
mode of constitutionalization by which parties are primarily conceived 
as a functional necessity for the conduct of democratic elections (cf. also 
Table 1).
Th e newness of democracy and the democratic history play a role 
not only with regard to the intensity but also the substance of party 
constitutionalization. When they refer to political parties, what do 
constitutions actually say? A content analysis reveals that provisions 
may range from symbolic and largely unenforceable stipulations about 
the contribution political parties (ought to) make to the realization of 
important democratic values and principles, such as popular sovereignty 
or political participation, for example, to detailed prescriptions about the 
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structure and functioning of the extra-parliamentary party organization, 
demanding that parties be internally democratic and structured from the 
bottom op along the lines of the classical mass party. Constitutions may 
emphasize the democratic rights and freedoms of political parties and their 
members, such as the freedoms of association, speech and assembly, while 
at the same time prescribing the activities and behaviour of the parties 
in the parliamentary, governmental and extra-parliamentary arenas. Th ey 
may proscribe certain (anti-democratic) forms of behaviour or ideological 
orientations which are adverse to the democratic constitutional order and 
may establish a system of judicial monitoring of the parties’ behaviour and 
activities.
For the content analysis of national constitutions we have a adopted 
an analytical framework of party constitutionalization which is based on 
four broader domains (cf. Frankenberg 2006): i) democratic principles, 
outlining the role of political parties in terms of the fundamental values 
upon which the polity is based, such as participation, popular sovereignty, 
equality, or pluralism; ii) rights and duties, outlining the parties’ relevant 
democratic liberties, such as the freedoms of association, assembly, and 
speech, as well as their responsibilities, including their duty to abide by 
certain rules on permissible forms of party activity and behaviour, or 
ideological and programmatic identity; iii) the institutional structure of 
the political system, including constitutional rules that apply to the extra-
parliamentary organization, parties in their electoral capacity, parties 
as parliamentary groups, and the party in public offi  ce; and iv) ‘meta-
rules’, establishing the hierarchy within the legal order and outlining the 
rules of constitutional interpretation and revision, including those which 
establish external judicial control on the lawfulness and constitutionality 
of party activity and identity. Each of these can be further divided into 
several sub-categories, such that we arrive at 11 diff erent categories within 
four broader domains (for more details see van Biezen & Borz 2012). Th e 
relative importance of these elements, as well as the normative importance 
attached to them, has fl uctuated over time and also varies between 
countries.
A small majority of countries associate political parties with essential 
democratic principles, such as political participation, pluralism, or popular 
sovereignty. Th e fi rst sentence of article 6 of the Spanish constitution, 
for example, states that ‘Political parties are the expression of political 
pluralism, they contribute to the formation and expression of the will 
of the people and are an essential instrument for political participation.’ 
With only a few exceptions (e.g. the Luxembourg constitution cited 
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earlier), this type of constitutional codifi cation tends to exist primarily 
in countries with an authoritarian or totalitarian past. Th is suggests 
that a preceding non-democratic experience is a powerful driving force, 
although not a necessary or suffi  cient condition, behind the identifi cation 
of basic democratic values with the presence of political parties. Th e legacy 
of the non-democratic past is also manifest, and even more forcefully so, 
with regard to the identifi cation of political parties with the freedoms 
of association, assembly, and speech.8 Indeed, most of the new or 
re-established democracies insist on a clear separation between political 
parties and the state by primarily associating parties with basic democratic 
liberties and underlining the private character of party organization 
and ideology. Th e prevalence of this type of provision may in part be 
a consequence of the growing importance that the constitutional bill of 
rights has now acquired as the essence of democracy (Bellamy 2007: 6). 
However, it is also likely that, in post-undemocratic regimes in particular, 
the constitutional recognition of political parties in terms of fundamental 
democratic liberties should be understood in light of the desire to identify 
and strengthen a private sphere that is free from state intervention. Hence, 
in democracies with an authoritarian or totalitarian past, a legacy of the 
non-democratic past is refl ected in the new constitutions establishing an 
explicitly private sphere of social life, guaranteed by a judicially enforceable 
bill of rights (cf. Shapiro & Stone 1994).
Typical of post-communist democracies in particular, the intention to 
maintain clear boundaries between political parties and the institutions 
of the state can also be seen from the many provisions which regulate 
the incompatibility of party membership with certain elected or public 
offi  ces, such as the judiciary, the law enforcement and security services, 
and the presidency of the republic. Th e Slovakian constitution in fact 
explicitly requires as much, by stipulating that ‘political parties and 
political movements … shall be separate from the State.’ (art. 29.4) By 
demanding the political neutrality of public offi  cers, such provisions also 
refl ect an attempt to distance the democratic system from the past regime, 
in which the Communist Parties exercised more or less complete control 
over the institutions of the state.
Seemingly paradoxically, countries which most strongly emphasize the 
parties’ constitutional freedoms are also the ones which are most likely to 
constrain party ideology or behaviour, as is revealed by the high incidence 
of constitutional provisions which aim to regulate permissible types of 
party activity and behaviour or the parties’ programmatic and ideological 
orientations.9 It is not uncommon for new and re-established democracies 
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to prohibit political parties that are averse to the fundamental values of 
the democratic constitutional order. Hence, in an attempt to safeguard 
the often still fragile new regime from extremist, insurrectionary and 
separatist parties, these constitutions usually demand that parties respect 
democratic principles, as well as the national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the state. In doing so, they follow a general pattern whereby 
post-war constitutions typically reaffi  rm human rights in general, but 
also make eff orts to restrict these rights in such a way as to make them 
unavailable to the enemies of constitutional democracy (Friedrich 1951: 
18). Banning parties or impeding their activities with a view to the very 
survival of the democratic system touches upon the question of ‘democratic 
intolerance’ (Fox & Nolte 1995): how much tolerance should democratic 
governments exhibit towards antidemocratic actors in the name of 
preserving the governments’ fundamental democratic character’? (see also 
Bale in this volume)10 Political parties appear only qualifi ed bearers of the 
democratic freedoms of association and speech: they enjoy their rights 
only to the extent that they themselves are the essential servants of the 
democratic process’ (Issacharoff  2001: 313).
Remarkable in this respect also is the fact that nearly two thirds of 
the democratic European constitutions contain provisions which regulate 
the structure and functioning of the extra-parliamentary organization. 
Many of the newer European democracies in particular appear to follow 
what Janda (2005) has called a ‘prescription model’ of party regulation, 
seeking legally to mould parties to correspond to a certain ideal type and 
privileging the – arguably outdated – mass party model over other styles 
of party politics. Various constitutions demand, for example, that the 
internal structures and organization of political parties are democratic. 
Th is requirement was fi rst made explicit in the German Basic Law 
(art. 21.1) and has since been adopted in a number of other countries, 
enshrining this condition in the constitution fi rst adopted in the wake of 
the transition to democracy (as in Spain in 1978) or incorporating it in 
the process of constitutional revision (Portugal in 1997, Croatia in 2000). 
Th e Portuguese constitution is the most explicit and requires that political 
parties be governed not only by the principles of transparency, democratic 
organization and management but also by the participation of all of their 
members (art. 51.5). In other countries, such as Greece, Italy and France or 
the post-communist democracies of Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland, the 
principle of internal party democracy may be considered to be implicitly 
present in the constitutional requirement that political parties either 
serve or respect democratic principles or methods. In Italy, for example, 
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although the prevailing interpretation of the ‘democratic method’ (art. 
49) has taken it to refer to the arena of inter-party competition, scholars 
are increasingly willing to consider that the constitution also provides a 
legitimate basis for the legal regulation of intra-party democracy.11
By requiring the parties to be internally democratic, these constitutions 
eff ectively take the ‘democratic intolerance’ argument a step further 
by requiring that the parties themselves must refl ect a commitment to 
democratic principles if together they are to form a democratic polity. 
In a narrow sense, the doctrine of militant democracy applies to the 
external activities of anti-democratic parties or their ideological profi le. 
Understood more broadly, however, it may also apply to the internal 
organization of parties, on the grounds that a lack of internal party 
democracy signals a lack of commitment to democratic values tout court. 
On this view, eff orts to guarantee that parties will not disrupt or destroy 
democratic government should therefore not be confi ned to constitutional 
control over their aims and behaviour but also over the party organization 
itself. Th e Israeli lawyer Ygal Mersel (2006) has even argued that a lack of 
internal democracy should be considered suffi  cient grounds for banning 
a party. Th e perspective advocated by the German Constitutional Court 
at the time was similar, arguing in its ruling on the constitutionality of 
the neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei that a logical relationship exists 
between the concept of a free democratic order and the democratic 
principles of party organization (Schneider 1957: 536). Th e rationale for 
imposing a duty of internal democracy on party organizations centres on 
a substantive rather than procedural conception of democracy, according 
to which key democratic values such as representation and participation 
cannot be realized in the absence of internally democratic parties (Mersel 
2006: 96).
Although state intervention in the internal aff airs and external 
activities of parties is often justifi ed with a view to protecting the very 
survival of the democratic system, it should be noted that it is considered 
controversial from the perspective of some theories of democracy (see 
also Katz in this volume). Th e arguments against are both practical 
and theoretical. It is not evident, for example, that democracy at the 
system level requires, or is indeed furthered by, parties that are internally 
democratic. As Sartori (1965: 124) famously put it, ‘democracy on a large 
scale is not the sum of many little democracies’. In other words, the need 
for specifi c democratic values to be realized within the political system as 
a whole does not necessarily imply that the same values should be realized 
within each of its constituent parts. Moreover, the outcome of internally 
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democratic procedures is likely to produce policy choices that are closer 
to the preferences of the party memberships than those of the median 
voter. Given the continuous decline in party memberships in European 
democracies (see van Biezen et al. 2012), internal democracy is thus less 
and less likely to represent ‘the will of the people’. Furthermore, from a 
conception of democracy which centres mainly on political competition 
and the maximization of voter choice, rather than popular participation, 
there are no compelling reasons to impose internally democratic structures 
upon the parties as long as the system guarantees, in Hirschman’s terms, 
suffi  ciently meaningful ‘exit’ options (e.g. membership exit or electoral 
defeat). From this perspective, it is diffi  cult to identify the interest of 
the state in controlling the internal governance of political parties. 
Such attempts, Issacharoff  (2007: 1460) argues, bring ‘the force of state 
authority deep into the heart of all political organizations’, and therefore 
raise serious concerns about the relationship between political parties and 
the state. More fundamentally, such impositions threaten to compromise 
the political integrity of the parties and their organizational independence 
of the state. Political parties can ‘play a key role in providing a mechanism 
for informed popular participation in a democracy precisely because they 
are organizationally independent of the state.’ (Issacharoff  2007: 1461) 
Th e danger is that, as the internal life and the external activities of parties 
become regulated by public law and as party rules become constitutional 
or administrative rules, the parties themselves become transformed 
into semi-state agencies or public service entities, with a corresponding 
weakening of their own internal organizational autonomy (Bartolini & 
Mair 2001).
An additional consequence of increased state intervention in party 
politics by legal rules is the enhanced position of the courts, as the primary 
locus of accountability and adjudication is shifted from the internal organs 
of the party towards the judiciary. In other words, the constitutionalization 
of parties, and indeed their regulation more generally, may contribute 
to the increased judicialization of party politics. Th e role of the courts 
in monitoring the constitutionality and lawfulness of party activity 
and behaviour appears fi rmly anchored: over 40 per cent of European 
democracies have constitutionally enshrined a form of judicial oversight 
over the parties. A more important role for the courts corresponds to a 
general post-war trend by which the notion that the courts, rather than the 
legislative or executive authorities, should be the ultimate guardians of the 
constitution and its values took hold in continental Europe (Friedrich 1951: 
20). In the various restored democracies after WII (e.g. Germany and Italy) 
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Constitutional Courts were established as a mechanism of ex post judicial 
review of legislation, a model which has since been followed by many of 
the polities established in more recent waves of democratization (Brunner 
1992). Th is makes the courts rather unique among the democratic organs of 
government today in having been accorded legitimacy by virtue of the fact 
that they are not political, and therefore presumably neutral servants of the 
law (Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002: 3). Th e judicialization of party politics 
is refl ected in the mechanisms that many of the contemporary – mostly 
post-authoritarian and post-communist – democracies have established for 
monitoring party activity and behaviour, by assigning this prerogative, as 
well as the power to dissolve or ban parties, to the Constitutional Court.
One of the (unintended) consequences of the judicialization of party 
politics is that it externalizes the channels of political accountability by 
transferring the primary locus of accountability from the party leadership 
to the courts. It may thereby create a greater distance from the ordinary 
party membership in the process, which may constitute an additional 
challenge for parties in an era in which they are already faced with 
criticisms of their representativeness and responsibility. In addition, the 
judicialization of party politics raises concerns on an normative level which 
are similar to those emerging from the diff usion of constitutional review 
and an active judiciary more generally: these processes arguably undermine 
fundamental principles of democracy by eff ectively transferring powers 
from representative to non-representative institutions (cf. Shapiro 2003: 
64-73). Although the courts may sometimes act as a powerful constraint 
on the possible undemocratic or anti-competitive behaviour of political 
parties, the legal regulation of parties evokes anxieties not only about 
the state centralization and control of political participation and public 
life, but also about the democratic legitimacy of transferring the ultimate 
decision-making authority on their behaviour and organization from the 
responsible organs of the party to a non-elected body of judges (Avnon 
1995: 285).
Models of party democracy
When we further explore the various dimensions of party 
constitutionalization and focus in particular on they ways in which 
they are associated with one another, our qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis of the national constitutions suggests that three distinct 
models of party constitutionalization can be distinguished. Each of these 
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corresponds to a particular conception of party democracy (for details 
see van Biezen & Borz 2012). Th e fi rst model (the Party in Public Offi  ce) 
comprises the various categories of constitutionalization that are related 
to the manifestations of parties in their capacity as electoral agents, 
parliamentary groups or governmental actors. Th is model is illustrative 
of a more instrumental view of political parties and can be found 
principally in longer-established and continuous liberal democracies 
such as those of Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. As we have seen 
(e.g. Table 1), in these countries parties tend to be an indirect subject 
of constitutionalization. Th e constitutional importance of the parties is 
derived primarily from their role in the electoral process, as well as their 
manifestation as parliamentary groups or their governmental capacity. 
According to this model of constitutionalization parties are not necessarily 
recognized or acknowledged as institutions or organizations in their own 
right. Nevertheless, by creating an association between political parties 
and the electoral, parliamentary and governmental domains, this mode 
of party constitutionalization eff ectively signals that political parties are 
a functional necessity for the conduct of democratic elections, and the 
formation and operation of parliaments and governments. It thus refl ects 
the inextricable and unequivocal connection that exists between political 
parties and some of the democratic structures fundamental to modern 
representative democracy, and the reality of party government 
In contrast, in the second model (Defending Democracy), parties are 
seen essentially as permanent extra-parliamentary organizations rather 
than primarily as electoral, parliamentary or governmental institutions. 
Here, the constitutionalization of political parties serves primarily to 
safeguard the continued existence of democracy. We fi nd this model in 
most of the newly established or re-established democracies. As the bulk 
of European democracies have witnessed some form of democratic rupture 
in the past, it should come as no surprise that this is the dominant mode 
of party constitutionalization in Europe. Th e German Basic Law perhaps 
embodies the best-known example, but the model also applies to all of the 
post-communist democracies. In an attempt to defend the new democratic 
regime from insurrectionary and separatist parties, these constitutions 
demand that parties respect democratic principles, as well as the national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. As a legacy of their non-
democratic past, these countries are keen to underscore the constitutional 
freedoms of the parties. At the same time, however, they tend rigorously 
to curtail the conduct of political parties, requiring that their activities, 
behaviour, ideologies and internal organizational structures are not adverse 
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to the fundamental democratic principles. From this perspective, the state 
emerges as the guardian of democracy, with corresponding prerogatives 
to intrude upon the parties’ associational freedoms and their behavioural 
autonomy. Th e courts play a special role in ensuring their lawfulness and 
constitutionality.
A third mode of constitutionalization (Parties as Public Utilities) 
conceives of political parties as a special type of public good. On this 
view, political parties are the crucial mechanisms for the realization of 
democratic values and principles, such as participation, representation, 
and the expression of the popular will. Th is explicit association between 
political parties and the realization of substantive democratic values 
implies an especially close relationship between parties and the state, as 
these values ‘reside in a realm beyond the disposition of the individual and 
call for their authoritative enforcement from above – usually by the state’ 
(Frankenberg 2006: 456). In order for parties to perform their unique 
democratic services eff ectively, therefore, they are to be supported by the 
state, which is refl ected in the constitutionally enshrined availability of 
public resources, as in Portugal for example, which constitutes one of 
the best illustrations of this model. Th e conception of party democracy 
signalled by this model of party constitutionalization is one in which parties 
are quasi-offi  cial agencies of the state because of the critical functions they 
perform in a modern democracy, and in which the democratic importance 
of political parties justifi es that they are being supported by public means 
as well as their privileged status in public law and the constitution. Th is 
model of party constitutionalization refl ects a notion of parties as public 
utilities (cf. van Biezen 2004) and a conception of party democracy in 
which the state assumes a proactive role in supporting parties fi nancially 
as indispensable institutions for the healthy functioning of democracy.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has analysed the patterns of party constitutionalization, 
demonstrating that a clear tendency exists for modern democracies to accord 
formal constitutional status to political parties. While the constitutions of 
western liberal democracies have historically paid little attention to the 
role of political parties and the constitutionalization of political parties 
constituted somewhat of a novelty in the immediate post-war period, in 
contemporary European democracies, both old and new, political parties 
are increasingly accorded formal constitutional status. Today there are 
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only a handful of European democracies that do not acknowledge the role 
of political parties in their constitution. Th e European pattern thus trails 
regions elsewhere in the world, in particular in Latin America, where the 
phenomenon of party constitutionalization is both older and more pervasive 
(Zovatto 2006; van Biezen & Kopecký 2007). Because constitutions 
defi ne the set of supreme rules of the game, the constitutional codifi cation 
of political parties implies that the constitution acquires prominence in 
political practice as the explicit legal foundation and point of reference for 
the judicial adjudication of issues about the operation of political parties. 
Th is may involve questions about the admissibility of certain forms of party 
behaviour or the compatibility of certain ideologies with the fundamental 
principles of democracy and the constitutional order. Th is is evidenced, 
for example, by the increasingly prominent role of Constitutional Courts 
in the outlawing of anti-democratic or insurrectionist parties. It can also 
be seen from the rulings by Constitutional Courts such as the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht on the constitutionality of certain forms of party 
fi nancing. Th e constitutionalization of political parties, as indeed party 
legislation more generally, thus makes an important contribution to the 
judicialization of party politics.
Constitutions refl ect the particular historical and political contexts 
within which they are designed. We have seen that the constitutionalization 
of political parties is in large part associated with waves of democratization, 
as newly established or reconstituted democracies, without exception, have 
constitutionally codifi ed the position of political parties. Furthermore, a 
clear and signifi cant correlation exists between the nature and intensity 
of party constitutionalization, on the one hand, and the newness and 
historical experience with democracy, on the other. New and re-established 
democracies are not only more likely than older ones constitutionally to 
acknowledge the relevance of political parties, they also tend towards 
more regulation in a larger number of areas, and thus towards more state 
intervention in party politics.
Th e increased intensity of party constitutionalization in post-war 
European democracies underscores that political parties are considered 
to be an important political and social reality, which are seen to make an 
essential contribution to the functioning of democracy. Th e predominant 
conception of modern democracy today is thus one that is unquestionably 
couched in terms of party. However, in most of the older democracies 
the mode of party constitutionalization tends to be indirect, emphasizing 
the parties’ roles as contestants for, or holders of, public offi  ce. Here, the 
constitutional importance of the parties is derived primarily from their 
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functional necessity for the conduct of democratic elections, and the 
formation and operation of parliaments and governments. In the majority 
of the newly created or re-established democracies, on the other hand, 
parties have acquired a more permanent constitutional relevance also 
outside periods of elections. One of the most signifi cant developments in 
this regard was the constitutional establishment of political parties as the 
constituent foundations of democracy following the re-establishment of 
democracy in the aftermath of WWII in Italy and, most notably, Germany. 
More generally, the mode of constitutionalization in most countries with 
a non-democratic history tends to be geared towards defending the new 
democratic order. As a consequence, they underscore the fundamental 
freedoms that political parties enjoy while at the same time adopting 
strict views on the permissible forms of parties’ behaviour, ideology and 
organization, and establish a large degree of external oversight of party 
activity by the courts. A third model of party constitutionalization refl ects 
a notion of parties as public utilities. On this view, political parties are 
essential vehicles for the realization of democratic values and principles. 
Accordingly, the state assumes a proactive role in supporting them as 
indispensable institutions for the healthy functioning of democracy.
Th e constitutional codifi cation of political parties has strengthened 
both their material and their ideational position within the political system. 
As one of the important consequences of their incorporation in national 
constitutions, alongside the development of extensive legal frameworks of 
party regulation, the institutional relevance of political parties has now 
been fi rmly anchored within the overall architecture of most modern 
democratic systems. Th eir constitutionally enshrined position implies 
not only that, in comparison to other organizations, parties are bound 
by tighter restrictions but also that they have been endowed with special 
privileges. Th e parties’ constitutional relevance not only justifi es state 
support, but also eff ectively gives them an offi  cial status as part of the 
state: by being given constitutional status, political parties are granted 
explicit recognition to the institutional importance of democracy (Avnon 
1995: 298).
Indeed, according to the German constitutional lawyer and former 
Constitutional Court Justice, Gerhard Leibholz, the constitutional 
codifi cation of political parties signalled a revolutionary change, from 
both an empirical and a normative point of view, which ultimately 
refl ects a fundamental transformation of the nature of democracy itself, 
from representative liberal democracy to a party state (Parteienstaat), 
which is built on parties as the central institutional mechanisms of 
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political integration. As early as in the late 1950s, Leibholz (1958: 78-93) 
argued that the constitutionalization of political parties eff ectively 
legitimizes the existence of party democracy and transforms political 
parties from societal organizations into institutions that form part of 
the offi  cial fabric of the democratic state. In the same vein, the German 
Constitutional Court has affi  rmed that political parties are more than 
mere socio-political organizations; they are also the integral and necessary 
units of the constitutional order. Th is clearly resonates with a more 
recent argument advanced by Katz and Mair (1995; 2009) that recent 
processes of party organizational transformation and adaptation refl ect 
a movement of political parties towards the state and their concomitant 
embedding within the institutional structures of the state. In this sense, 
the constitutionalization of parties appears to parallel a more general 
trend by which the relationship between the parties and the state increases 
in strength, while the links between parties and civil society become 
progressively weaker.
Th e increased incidence of party constitutionalization in modern 
democracies attests not only to changed historical contexts and diff erent 
empirical realities but also to changes in ideas and normative beliefs about 
parties and democracy. It has consolidated both the empirical reality 
of modern party government and the normative belief that parties are 
indispensible for democracy. Unlike in earlier epochs, political parties 
today have become fi xed as permanent and often privileged structures of 
political representation in representative democracies. Furthermore, the 
existence of political parties is no longer necessarily seen as incompatible 
with predominant conceptions of democracy. Instead, modern 
constitutions point to a more or less general acceptance of political parties 
as the necessary foundations of democratic politics. Finally, it suggests 
that not only have conceptions of democracy changed but also those of 
the parties themselves, in that parties are no longer primarily private 
associations (albeit ones which fulfi l important public functions) but to an 
important extent also public institutions or even semi-state agencies (Katz 
& Mair 2009), or at least organizations whose public role has become so 
important that it warrants their formal codifi cation as permanent features 
of the institutional architecture of representative democracy. It remains to 
be seen if, and to what extent, the judicialization of party politics further 
exacerbates the already pronounced tension between the parties’ enhanced 
position as public institutions and their weakening capacity as societal 
agents of democratic representation.
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Notes
1 Th is chapter is an updated version and merger of several parts of two earlier 
pieces (van Biezen 2012; van Biezen & Borz 2012).
2 Including the European Union. Th e Lisbon Treaty places political parties 
prominently in Part II (Provisions on Democratic Principles), stipulating 
that ‘Political parties at European contribute to forming European political 
awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.’ (art. 8 A.4)
3 Th e UK does not have a written constitution codifi ed in a single document 
and has therefore been excluded from this analysis.
4 Iceland is included in our analysis of post-war European constitutions because 
it forms part of the second wave of democratization and because, together 
with Austria, Italy and Germany, it can be seen to belong to the fi rst wave of 
party constitutionalization (see van Biezen 2012).
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are from Gisbert H. Flanz 
(ed.) (2004), Constitutions of the Countries of the World. New York: Oceana 
Publications.
6 Art. 137 of the Swiss constitution similarly reads: ‘Th e political parties shall 
contribute to the forming of the opinion and the will of the People.’
7 For more details see: ‘Proposition de Revision portant creation d’un article 
32bis nouveau de la Constitution’, outlining the offi  cial positions of the 
Government, the Council of State and the Committee for Constitutional 
Reform, on www.chd.lu/archives/ArchivesPortlet, Chambre des Députés, 22 
February 2007; 31 August 2007; 13 November 2007; 29 November 2007.
8 E.g. Croatia: ‘Th e formation of political parties is free’ (art. 6.1).
9 E.g. Serbia: ‘Activities of political parties aiming at forced overthrow of 
constitutional system, violation of guaranteed human or minority rights, 
inciting racial, national or religious hatred, shall be prohibited (art. 5).
10 Another often-used term in this context, coined by Loewenstein (1937) is 
‘militant democracy’ (from the German streitbare Demokratie). Th e principle 
is constitutionally enshrined in the German Basic Law.
11 Th e question whether art. 49 it should not also be understood to apply to the 
internal organizational functioning of parties has in fact long dominated the 
debates among constitutional lawyers. It is with a view to the implementation 
of this interpretation of the Italian constitution that a number of law proposals 
aimed to establish minimal requirements for intra-party democracy are 
currently under examination with the Commission of Constitutional Aff airs 
of the Chamber of Deputies (Piccio and Pacini 2012).
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Introduction
Political parties have become increasingly subject to legislation in recent 
years. Th e liberal principle of non-intervention in political parties’ 
internal matters that prevailed across the European continent from the 
very emergence of political parties as organizations seems no longer to be 
the dominant paradigm. Th e several guidelines adopted by the European 
Commission for Democracy Th rough Law (‘Venice Commission’) and 
directed to state actors, although not mandatory, off er a clear indication 
of the degree to which greater intervention in political parties’ aff airs is 
currently being sought. According to the ‘guidelines on political party 
regulation’ issued in October 2010, “basic tenets of a democratic society, 
as well as recognized human rights, allow for the development of some 
common principles applicable to any legal system for the regulation of 
political parties”.1
Not only has the regulation of political parties in Europe increased 
overall, but Europe is witnessing a proliferation of specifi c Laws on 
Political Parties or Party Laws. Yet, despite increasing state regulation 
of the life and statute of the political party, relatively little comparative 
attention has been given to the development of this phenomenon. As 
Janda observes, “there are not many systematic cross-national surveys of 
party law” (Janda, 2005, 6 and 2006b). Indeed, except for some references 
to the regulation of the establishment of political parties, works studying 
political parties and the dynamics of party systems say little about the 
most obvious and direct manner through which the life and existence of 
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a political party is regulated by legislation. Müller and Sieberer (2006, 
435) accurately note that party law has been the domain of academic 
lawyers, and “political scientists, while interested in the substance of party 
regulation in some selected fi elds, in particular with regard to election 
and party fi nance, have not devoted much attention to party law as such”.
We argue that the proliferation of Party Laws across Europe (i) is an 
important phenomenon per se; (ii) has important normative implications 
concerning the position that political parties have acquired in modern 
representative democracies; and also (iii) has the potential to aff ect the 
organizational development of political parties and party systems. 
First, it is the role of political parties as main vehicles of democracy 
(Schattschneider 1942) and their centrality with respect to political 
representation (Sartori 1976) that, alone, warrants a study of the rules 
governing party establishment and party life. Additionally, Party Laws 
contain regulations on a variety of aspects of party organization, varying 
from their defi nition, composition, structure, programme and activities 
to specifi c rules about party fi nance and external control over their 
activities. Th e proliferation of such rules has been observed in the light 
of the increasing intervention of the state in internal party matters, which 
undermines the fundamental nature of political parties as voluntary 
organizations, transforming them into ‘public utilities’ (van Biezen 2004). 
Another reason justifying the interest in the study of party regulation in 
the Party Law is that often rules specifi ed in, but not limited to, the Party 
Law aff ect the format and functioning of party systems; so, for instance, 
they determine whether or not we see few or many new political entrants 
(van Biezen and Rashkova 2012) and aff ect the nature of the competition 
and competitors (see chapter 9 in this volume on ethnic parties). Finally, as 
we will discuss in this chapter, there are diff erences and similarities in the 
regulation of parties both among states and across time. Th us, by tracing 
the variation in the constraints and benefi ts that parties are subjected to, 
we off er a useful departure base for studies interested in the examination 
of the causes and consequences of legal regulation, or their eff ects on party 
competition, electoral developments, and policy enactment. 
Th is chapter provides an overview of party regulation in the Party Laws 
of post-war European democracies. Building on previous work studying 
the constitutional regulation of political parties, a rich and original 
dataset of party laws has been collected under the Re-conceptualizing 
Party Democracy project.2 Th e chapter explores the temporal pattern of 
promulgation of Party Laws, their main regulatory focus, and shows how 
regulation through Party Laws diff ers over time and across countries. In 
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doing so, it presents an overview of the content of party laws, off ering a 
quantitative overview of the range and magnitude of party regulation, 
thus depicting trends in changes of regulation over time, insights to what 
aspects of the life of political parties are regulated most heavily and most 
often, as well as providing an analysis of whether there are signifi cant 
diff erences in the evolution of regulation between diff erent groups of 
countries. Th e fi nal section of the chapter supplements the quantitative 
examination of party regulation with a qualitative case study on the party 
law of Spain. Drawing on Karvonen’s seminal study (2007), the Spanish 
Party Law is analysed, emphasizing three distinct categories believed 
to have a substantive eff ect on the life of a party. Th ese are party bans, 
registration and membership requirements, as well as judicial, legal or 
administrative sanctions. Th ere, and notwithstanding the special concern 
of the Spanish legislator with terrorism, we fi nd, as in most European 
countries, a rather open system of party registration; a prototype of what 
a party statute should contain which, as in most democracies, tends to 
be minimal; and, last but not least, both governmental (preventive) and 
judicial (successive) control of political parties. Th e chapter concludes with 
a summary of the data presented and a discussion of potential research 
directions for the future. 
Th e proliferation of Party Laws across Europe
Before we describe the temporal pattern of regulation of political parties 
through Party Laws across Europe it is essential to provide a defi nition of 
Party Law. Indeed, as Janda remarked, “the term ‘party law’ is nebulous” 
(Janda 2006b, 2).3 Scholars have defi ned ‘party law’ as “the total body of 
law that aff ects political parties” (Müller and Sieberer 2006, 436), therefore 
indicating by this term all state rules governing, or having an eff ect on, 
political parties as organizations. Indeed, state regulation of political 
parties may originate in diff erent bodies of law, such as Electoral Laws, 
Campaign Laws, Political Finance Laws, Party Laws, as well as in Media 
Laws, Laws on Civil Association, national Constitutions, administrative 
rulings, legislative statutes, and (constitutional) court decisions (see Janda 
2005 and 2006b; van Biezen and Borz, 2012). 
As the core focus of this research is on the legal regulation specifi cally 
directed at political parties as organizations, in this chapter we defi ne 
Party Laws (PLs) as those laws which make a textual reference to political 
parties in their title (e.g. Law on Political Parties, Party Law). Laws that 
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are not limited in this regard – such as laws on political associations more 
generally, electoral laws, or laws on party fi nance – are not considered 
in this analysis, even though, as described above, they may also apply 
to political parties. Hence, legal documents which refer to, but are not 
exclusively devoted to, political parties are not included in our defi nition. 
Of the thirty-three countries included in the Re-conceptualizing 
Party Democracy project, consisting of the independent and democratic 
European states in the post-war period (1944-2010), twenty have adopted 
a Party Law: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine, and the 
United Kingdom.4 Figure 1 provides an overview of the establishment 
of the regulation of political parties through Party Laws in European 
democracies, listing for each country the year in which Party Laws were 
fi rst approved.5 
Figure 1. Th e Adoption of Party Laws in Post-War Europe
Figure 1 shows how the process of party regulation through Party 
Laws started with the establishment of the German Party Law in 1967. 
However, although Germany has been considered “the heartland of Party 
Law” (Müller and Sieberer, 2005, 435), it is important to note here that 
the so-called Deutsch Parteiengesetz was not the fi rst, either in the world 
or even in Europe (Karvonen, 2007, 451-453). Th at honour belongs, 
respectively, to the Venezuelan Ley de Partidos Políticos, Reuniones Públicas 
and Manifestaciones (1964) and the Siyasî Partiler Kanunu passed by the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly in June 1965.6 Still, it was only after 
the promulgation of the German Law on Political Parties on 24 July 
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1967 that this type of legislation began to proliferate on the continent. 
In other words, it was not the Venezuelan or the Turkish Party Law but 
the German Act which, bearer of the most comprehensive and detailed 
regulation, became a model to follow for many national laws on political 
parties, particularly in the newly created European democracies (Müller 
and Sieberer, 2006, 438; Kasapovic, 2001, 7). 
As others have observed in relation to the “party constitutionalization” 
phenomenon (van Biezen and Borz, 2012; see also van Biezen in this 
volume), in the process of Party Law promulgation it is possible to 
distinguish three diff erent phases. In this context, Germany, Finland, and 
also Austria – three countries which democratized during the fi rst half 
of the XXth century – were part of the fi rst wave of party regulation. 
Even if the latter two diff er from the fi rst one in length as well as in 
the detail of regulation of the parties’ internal organizational structure,7 
all of them respond to the necessity of regulating the public fi nance of 
political parties, granted at the same time (e.g. Austria and Finland) or 
just a couple of years before the establishment of the Party Law (1959 in 
the case of Germany) (Piccio, 2012).
A second wave of party law-making coincides with the beginning 
of Huntington’s ‘Th ird Wave’, clustering together both Portugal and 
Spain. Unlike in the previous ‘wave of party regulation’, these laws have 
a diff erent political background. Here the main aim was not so much the 
regulation of public funding of political parties, which was introduced at 
a later stage,8 but the necessity to control the creation and activity of the 
parties which started to proliferate in the new democratic environment. 
Indeed, as we will underline in the next sections of this chapter, in both 
Portugal and Spain the bulk of provisions contained in these fi rst laws 
deal with the regulation of political parties as organizations per se.
Th e third wave of post-war party regulation is strictly connected 
to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in the early 90s. In this 
sense, it exactly coincides with what some have named the “Fourth 
Wave of democratization” (McFaul, 2002). Indeed, the interconnection 
between these two waves is so straightforward that no East-European 
democracy has remained unaff ected by such regulatory process since 
the passing of the fi rst Party Law in Hungary in 1989. Moreover, in 
most cases the laws regulating political parties were introduced in the 
years immediately following the democratic transition.9 In any case, and 
with very few exceptions, all these laws, modelled on the German Party 
Law, have brought together in a single legal document each of the goals 
examined above: namely, the regulation of both party funding and party 
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organization. As shown later in Table 1, East-European countries have 
been more inclined to regulate political parties than earlier democratizers. 
One reason for this may be the lack of confi dence of the legislator in the 
process of democratic consolidation. All in all, the Party Laws adopted in 
Europe after 1989 have all been enacted in East-European countries, with 
the sole exceptions of the United Kingdom and Norway. Unlike those 
enacted in Eastern Europe, the UK and Norwegian Party Laws do not 
include provisions on party organization, but they were rather designed 
to provide a regulatory system for party registration (UK), and for the 
regulation of party fi nance (Norway).10 
Th e content of Party Laws
In the last section we outlined the evolution in the establishment of Party 
Laws across Europe. But what are Party Laws about, and which specifi c 
aspects of party organization do they regulate? Previous research has 
underlined that Party Laws serve a number of basic purposes: to determine 
what is entitled to be recognized as a political party; to regulate the forms 
of activity in which political parties may engage; and to regulate the forms 
of internal organization and political behaviour that are acceptable for 
political parties (Katz 2004, 2-3). Karvonen included the establishment of 
sanctions as a further analytical dimension of party regulation (Karvonen 
2007). 
In order to make sense of the vast scope of rules which lie in the 
Party Laws, we used the analytical framework fi rst developed in Th e 
Constitutional Regulation of Political Parties in Post-War Europe project (see 
van Biezen and Borz, 2012). As with the analysis of Constitutions, the 
content of Party Laws is examined with respect to twelve main domains 
of party regulation: (1) democratic principles; (2) rights and freedoms; 
(3) extra-parliamentary party; (4) electoral party; (5) parliamentary party; 
(6) governmental party; (7) activity and behaviour; (8) identity and 
programme; (9) party fi nance; (10) media access; (11) external oversight; 
and (12) secondary legislation. 
Democratic principles and rights and freedoms include references which 
defi ne political parties in terms of key democratic principles and values, or 
which associate parties with fundamental democratic rights and liberties. 
For example, a discussion of principles such as competition and equality 
or mention of democratic values like pluralism, participation, popular 
will, and representation is coded in those two categories. Th e Party Law 
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of Lithuania, for instance, stipulates that “political parties shall … assist 
in shaping and expressing the interests and political will of the citizens of 
the Republic of Lithuania” (Law on Political Parties and Organizations, 
art. 1) and they shall “enjoy the right to freely disseminate information 
in written, verbal, or any other way in their activities” (Ibidem, art. 18.1). 
Th e organization of parties is subdivided into four categories, each dealing 
with regulations of the party in its specifi c role – the party outside, the 
party in the electoral arena, the party in parliament, and the party in 
government. Th e extra-parliamentary category includes provisions 
regulating the internal operational structure of political parties. Among 
these are regulations devoted to the internal democracy of political 
parties, which refer to the election of party bodies, their accountability, 
the resolution of party confl ict and procedures for nomination to public 
offi  ce, to name but a few.11 Th e German Party Law, for example, stipulates 
that “Party members and delegates in the party bodies shall have equal 
voting rights” (Th e Law on Political Parties, art. 10.2). Refl ecting the 
fact that most states have party law provisions about party membership, 
one of the main components of the extra-parliamentary party category 
denotes rules on the compatibility of party membership with membership 
or activity of other elected offi  ces, the civil service, the judiciary, trade 
unions, or other public offi  ce. Th e extra-parliamentary party category 
further includes references to the organizational structure and the legal 
status and registration requirements of political parties. Electoral rules, 
campaign activity and rules on fi elding candidates are part of the second 
subcategory in the organizational structure of parties entitled the electoral 
party. Th is category generally refl ects references to the party in competition. 
Th e behaviour of parties in parliament in reference to regional and local 
legislature, the participation in parliamentary committees, staffi  ng, and 
policy formation are subjects in the parliamentary party category. Here, 
all legal references to the conduct of the party in parliament are coded. 
Lastly, we have a category dealing with the governmental party which 
includes references on how national, regional and local executive are to 
be composed. 
In the activity and identity category, the coding scheme registers 
provisions aimed at restricting or prohibiting certain forms of behaviour 
or certain ideological foundations of political parties. Many laws contain 
conditions regarding respect for human rights, the prohibition of the use 
of violence, the spreading of hatred or the use of undemocratic methods 
by political parties. Th e Spanish Party Law off ers an example of the last as 
it prohibits political parties whose actions “univocally show a track record 
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of breakdown of democracy and off ence against the constitutional values” 
(Law on Political Parties, Preamble). Some states go as far as to prohibit 
the formation of political parties on ethnic, nationalistic or religious 
grounds. Indeed, the only country within our dataset to ban parties on 
ethnic grounds is Bulgaria (for more details, see chapter 8). In some cases, 
while parties are not banned for identity reasons, stringent rules exist that 
forbid political parties accepting donations from religious institutions, 
humanitarian or similar organizations. For instance, while the Bulgarian 
Party Law stipulates that “political parties shall not receive funds from 
anonymous donations, legal persons, religious institutions and foreign 
governments” (2009, Article 24), Slovenia not only does not allow parties 
to be funded by “state and local community authorities, entities governed 
by public law, humanitarian organizations, religious communities…” 
(2007, Art. 25) but it also imposes “a fi ne of €4150 to €20850 … upon 
entities governed by public law, humanitarian organizations, religious 
communities … if they fi nance a party” (2007, Art. 29). Such stipulations 
are in the party fi nance category. Due to the large number of fi nancial 
matters pertaining to political parties, the category of party fi nance is 
subdivided into fi ve further sub-categories. Th ese are direct public funding, 
indirect public funding, private funding, regulation of expenditures, and 
reporting and disclosure. Naturally, the fi rst two include rules about the 
amount, allocation and use of public funding, while the last three focus 
on limits, transparency, and use of private funding, as well as on rules 
of disclosure of funding and expenditure overall. A large part of the 
lawfulness of party activity is to be monitored by external institutions, 
such as a supervising authority or a system of sanctions. Provisions 
relating to the type of monitoring and how parties are to be monitored 
are in the external oversight category. An example of a clause falling in this 
category is the stipulation in the Polish Party Law that “[e]xamination of 
cases for ascertainment of non-compliance of the purposes and activities 
of political parties with the Constitution shall fall within the competence 
of the Constitutional Tribunal” (Act on Political Parties, Art. 42). Lastly, 
regulations pertaining to further legislation applying to political parties 
and provisions about the use of media by political parties are in the 
secondary legislation and the media access categories, respectively. Th e latter 
consists mostly of allocation and restriction mechanisms for the use of 
public and private media during electoral and non-electoral periods. 
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Data analysis
In order to quantify the extent to which diff erent laws regulate specifi c 
domains, each Party Law was coded and analysed for references to the 
twelve dimensions of party regulation described above. How is regulation 
distributed along those categories? To give a preliminary answer to this 
question, table 1 presents a comparative overview of the magnitude of 
regulation of political parties that exists in Party Laws. 
Th e top row lists the categories across which the coding of regulation 
is done. Table 1 includes the twenty European democracies which have 
adopted a Party Law. Each cell represents the amount of regulation a 
country enacts in a specifi c category in relation to the regulation in its 
entire party law (in percent), while in parenthesis we show the ‘raw count’ 
of regulation depicting the number of instances on which a country’s 
law mentions the category in question. So for example, 24.1 per cent of 
the Czech Republic’s party law is devoted to the regulation of the extra-
parliamentary category, with 39 unique counts of mentions of the internal 
procedures, membership organization or the organizational structure of 
the party (all in the overarching extra-parliamentary category). In total, 
when we add all raw counts presented in the parenthesis horizontally, the 
magnitude of regulation in the Czech party law amounts to 162. Th is 
means that 162 unique mentions of characteristics included under our 
twelve broad categories were found within the law. To put the fi gure in 
comparative perspective, the magnitude of the United Kingdom’s party 
law adds up to a mere 69 mentions. Finland ranks even lower with a 
magnitude of 50, while Germany, the country where party regulation 
originated, reportedly exhibits the highest number of regulation instances 
adding up to 304 altogether. 
To ease the comparison between countries, the category in which a 
country regulates most heavily is shown in bold. We see that Austria and 
Bulgaria, for example, regulate most heavily in the party fi nance category, 
while Croatia, Estonia, and Germany, among others, put their regulatory 
eff orts into the extra-parliamentary category. Th e UK, Poland and Estonia, 
on the other hand, spend half or nearly half of their regulatory attempts 
in controlling the external oversight of parties. Another observation that 
comes out of the data presented in the table is that the extra-parliamentary 
category is regulated most heavily in the largest number of cases. We 
see that 10 states devote most of the regulation in their party law to 
this category. Interestingly, 8 of the 10 states which regulate the extra-
parliamentary party most heavily are post-communist democracies. 
Considering that the extra-parliamentary category contains regulation 
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about registration rules and requirements which guide the establishment, 
existence, and competition of political parties, this is not surprising, as we 
know that a lot of rules attempting to combat the often high party system 
fractionalization in those countries have been introduced in recent years. 
For example, the number of citizens who are required to register a political 
party, which is in the extra-parliamentary party category, varies greatly 
among countries. According to art. 7 (1990) and art. 10 (2009) of the 
Bulgarian Party Law, “a political party shall be established at a constituent 
assembly by the agreement of at least 50 citizens with voting rights.” In 
Croatia, the requirement is 100 adults (art. 6, 1999), while in Estonia “a 
political party shall be registered if it has at least 1,000 members (art. 6, 
1994).”
Th e second most heavily regulated category, according to the data in 
table 1, is the external oversight category – it is the most regulated category 
in seven countries from our sample. What stands out is the observation 
that the external oversight category is regulated more than party fi nance. 
Th e latter is the most regulated category in only four countries – Austria, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Norway. Th is makes sense when we look at the 
type of regulations which go into the external oversight category. It consists 
of regulations relating to the external monitoring of the lawfulness of 
party activity, party organization, party fi nance, as well as penalties and 
sanctions against prohibited matters. In the Austrian law for instance, 
we fi nd a clause asking political parties to “keep strict accounting of the 
use of the subsidies in accordance with their designation …. In addition, 
each political party receiving subsidies … reports publicly the type of 
its income and expenses” (art. 4, 1975; 2003). Estonia, one of the few 
countries which take political parties off  the registry if they fail to win 
representation in two consecutive elections, forbids political parties from 
registring under the name of extant or deleted parties in the party registry 
(art. 9, 2010).
Th e great amount of regulation of this category is hardly surprising, 
given the eff orts of the European Union to increase the transparency of 
political parties in an attempt better to combat corruption. Related to 
this is the adoption of special Party Finance Laws in many European 
states, where matters of control, transparency, and accountability of the 
fi nancing of parties are dealt with directly. Finally, we see that the two least 
regulated categories are those dealing with the parliamentary party and 
the government party. In fact, Latvia, Estonia and Romania are the only 
states which devote some attention to these categories in their party laws. 
One explanation for the lack of regulation in those two categories is that 
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rules applying to parliamentary groups and to the party in government are 
specifi ed elsewhere (for example in the rules of parliamentary procedure, 
the electoral law, or the Constitution) and thus are not part of the Party 
Law per se. 
Another point of comparison of regulation among countries is the range 
of regulation. Although not reported directly in the table shown here, one 
can tell the range by looking at how many of the twelve broad categories a 
country regulates. To continue the example of the Czech Republic, we see 
that according to our coding the Czech party law has a range of 8. Th is is 
a relatively high range in comparison to the UK and Norway which have 
a range of only 5. Th e highest range achieved by any given country in our 
sample is that of Portugal. Portugal regulates in all but two categories.12 
Overall, what our data show is that party regulation has seen a signifi cant 
increase in the last decade. Among the 16 European states which have 
more than one PL thus far, only four states – Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
and Ukraine – have seen a decrease in the amount of regulation from their 
fi rst to their current law (data on the fi rst Party Laws not shown). Th e rest 
of Europe, led by Poland’s rise from a magnitude of 34 in its fi rst party 
law to a magnitude of 225 in its current law, reports noticeable increases 
in the amount of regulation.
As discussed earlier, this chapter analyses laws whose titles include a 
textual reference to political parties. Th e fi gures on the regulation of the 
domains presented above should therefore be understood as exhaustive 
with respect to Party Laws and not with respect to party regulation more 
broadly. Hence, the fi gures on the regulation of the Party Finance category 
presented in Table 1 do not rule out the fact that there may be other 
legislative acts regulating party fi nance. Th is is for instance the case for 
Romania, Spain and the UK, whose magnitude scores on the regulation 
of party fi nance in their Party Laws are equal to zero, but where the 
regulation of party fi nance is included in specifi c Party Finance Laws.13 
Variation across countries and over time
So far we have looked at the percentage of regulation each country devotes 
to the twelve dimensions outlined in the coding scheme. While several 
patterns stand out, as the previous section contends, there may be patterns 
which remain unaccounted for.
A fi rst overview of party regulation change is shown in Figure 2 (see 
below), which ranks the 16 European democracies with more than one 
Party Law in terms of how much party regulation has changed from 
the fi rst to the last/current party law. Apart from the pronounced cross-
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national variation shown by these summary data, two smaller points of 
immediate interest can be noted. First of all, and most obviously, party 
regulation has increased in most European countries over time. Th e only 
exceptions to this general rule are four post-communist democracies: 
namely, Ukraine, Croatia, Slovenia and Lithuania. Secondly, while all 
Western European cases, as expected, have experienced an increase in the 
magnitude of party regulation, the fact that Poland and Bulgaria come 
highest in the ranking is surprising, to say the least. Although the fact that 
their fi rst party laws, passed at the very beginning of the transition process 
(i.e. 1990), had a minimal and provisional character – their main aim was 
to allow for the celebration of free and fair elections – may explain a great 
deal.
Figure 2. Magnitude change
Note: Only countries with more than one Party Law are included (N=16).
Because the fi gure above is so crude, we need to undertake an examination 
of the diff erences in regulation in a more systematic manner. For that 
purpose, we use an analysis of variance (ANOVA). In particular, we look 
for signifi cant diff erences in the overall level of regulation, as well as 
within the specifi c categories, testing for diff erences between the means 
of regulation in three groups of countries. Th e fi rst group, East/West 
democracy, depicts the relevance of post-communism. Th e second, New/
Old democracy, divides states in terms of the newness of democracy. Th e 
third group, Continuous/Discontinuos democracy, refl ects countries’ 
democratic experience. Th e last group tests whether there are signifi cant 
diff erences in the amount of regulation between the fi rst and the current 
party laws. Indeed, with the exception of Latvia, Norway, Serbia and the 
























































132 casal bértoa, piccio & rashkova
consider and track the development between their fi rst and most current 
version of the law. Th e results are summarized in table 2. 
Th e analysis shows that for the continuous and discontinuous 
democracies the diff erence in regulation is statistically signifi cant in 
all but four categories. Highest statistical signifi cance is found in the 
diff erence of regulation in the democratic principles, extra-parliamentary, 
party activity & identity, and secondary legislation categories. Th e categories 
which do not appear to have statistically signifi cant means are electoral and 
parliamentary party, media access and party fi nance. In fact, these categories 
do not show statistical signifi cance in any of the four groups compared. 
Going back to Table 1 we see that the electoral and parliamentary party 
and media access categories are scarcely regulated anywhere, while the 
party fi nance category is regulated in all but three states. Th e diff erences 
in the party activity & identity categories are also highly statistically 
signifi cant between the new and old democracies. Th is group further 
exhibits signifi cant diff erences in regulating the rights & freedoms category 
– something quite intuitive, given that new democracies want to establish 
democratic political competition and thus refer to a party’s rights more 
often. 
Another category which exhibits statistically signifi cant diff erence in 
the level of regulation in three separate sets of groups – East/West, New/
Old, Continuous/Discontinuous – is the government party category. While 
it has the lowest level of statistical signifi cance (single star), this shows 
that countries provide diff erent amounts of rules for national and local 
government, but the diff erences do not seem to change as the category 
fails to reach statistical signifi cance when the fi rst and current party laws 
are examined. What changes in a statistically meaningful manner is the 
regulation of the extra-parliamentary party, the external oversight and 
the secondary legislation categories. Th ose categories, as the discussion at 
the beginning of the chapter states, contain rules about internal party 
matters, external control of parties and their activities and additional 
legislation. Th erefore, the increase in regulation in them is consistent with 
the growing discontent with some political actions and the international 
struggle for more control and higher transparency of party matters. Th e 
growing regulation is also portrayed in the statistically signifi cant result 
for total magnitude comparing the fi rst and current party laws. What this 
signifi es is that the total amount of regulation now is signifi cantly diff erent 
from what it once was. Interestingly, the total range of regulation between 
the fi rst and the current party laws has not changed. Th is suggests that 
while the amount of regulation has increased substantially, it has done so 
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in the categories which have already been regulated. Some may interpret 
this, if regulation is taken to be something restrictive, as strengthening 
the regulatory regime by deepening the control rather than widening its 
scope.
Within the growing body of regulation, we identify that internal 
party matters, provisions restricting their activity or identity, as well as 
rules keeping them in check are among those which are regulated in most 
diff erent ways. Th ese overlap with the dimensions of party regulation 
found in Karvonen’s (2007) comparative analysis of party laws, the most 
comprehensive survey of party law to date. In particular, he deems that, 
when trying to examine the way political parties have been regulated in 
a specifi c country, there are three main aspects or “thematic dimensions” 
Table 2: ANOVA tests of signifi cant diff erences in party regulation
Category East / West 
Europe









0.46 (0.65) -0.33 (0.75) 3.52 (0.00)*** -0.88 (0.39)
Rights & freedoms -0.73 (0.47) -2.92 (0.00)*** 2.03 (0.07)* 0.14 (0.89)
Extra-parliament 
party
-1.01 (0.33) -0.63 (0.55) 6.47 (0.00)*** 1.73 (0.09)*
Electoral party 0.73 (0.47) 0.88 (0.40) 0.43 (0.68) 0.47 (0.64)
Parliament party 0.00 (1.00) 0.37 (0.72) 1.36 (0.18) 0.32 (0.75)
Government party -1.74 (0.09)* -1.72 (0.09)* 1.72 (0.09)* 0.15 (0.88)
Activity & 
behaviour
-1.59 (0.13) -5.39 (0.00)*** 5.13 (0.00)*** 0.58 (0.56)
Identity & 
programme
-1.57 (0.13) -4.14 (0.00)*** 4.95 (0.00)*** 0.28 (0.78)
Media access -0.85 (0.40) -0.73 (0.47) 0.25 (0.81) -0.27 (0.79)
Party fi nance -0.10 (0.92) 0.91 (0.39) 0.70 (0.50) 1.29 (0.21)
External oversight -1.70 (0.09)* -0.84 (0.41) 1.86 (0.08)* 3.26 (0.00)***
Secondary 
legislation
-1.95 (0.06)* -1.63 (0.12) 3.02 (0.00)*** 1.89 (0.07)*
Total range -2.12 (0.04)** -2.81 (0.02)** 4.66 (0.00)*** -0.73 (0.47)
Total magnitude -1.21 (0.24) -0.42 (0.69) 4.52 (0.00)*** 2.54 (0.02)**
N of observations 24/12 28/8 6/30 16/20
Note: Two-sample t-test with unequal variances. T-statistic reported, p-value in 
parentheses; 
*p<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01. ^Only countries with PLs included (N=20).
134 casal bértoa, piccio & rashkova
that need to be taken into consideration: namely, (1) provisions aimed 
at restricting certain types of party activity or prohibiting certain 
ideological elements [restrictions]; (2) provisions pertaining to parties 
as organizations or legal subjects [e.g. internal organization, democratic 
procedures, membership or registration]; and (3) provisions [regulating] 
the right of the state to punish parties by legal means [sanctions] (2007, 
443-444).
Borrowing this framework, the next section turns to take a deeper look 
at one country’s party law – that of Spain – which we fi nd to be paradigmatic 
in the sense that, while being among the countries with the highest level 
of regulation, it still approaches the average magnitude, touching on each 
of the abovementioned dimensions in a rather proportional manner.14
Th e Spanish Party Law
As a result of the necessity properly to develop art. 6 of the Spanish 
Constitution which requires parties, more generally, to “respect the 
Constitution and the Law” while also asking of them, more particularly, 
democratic “internal structure and functioning”, the Organic Law 6/2002 
on Political Parties came to replace the previous regulation (i.e. Law 
54/1978). Existing legislation had been strongly criticized for being both 
pre-constitutional, heir to its most immediate legislative precedent (i.e. the 
semi-democratic Royal Decree-Law 12/1977) and, most importantly, for 
being very brief (Casal Bértoa et al., 2012).
Echoing, therefore, the abovementioned constitutional mandate, 
and in consonance with the majority of Europe’s current party laws, the 
Organic Law 6/2002 requires political parties to organize and function 
with respect for the country’s Constitution and, in particular, to operate 
in a humanitarian, peaceful and democratic way (art. 9.1). In this context, 
the current regulation allows for the formation of ethnic, religious (banned 
in Bulgaria), nationalist (not allowed in Serbia) or “pro-independence” 
parties (e.g. banned in a certain number of countries such as Croatia, 
Estonia, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine),
Th e need for a general (“external”: i.e. in terms of practices, not 
principles) adhesion to democracy informs the totality of the 2002 party 
law, whose main aim – as refl ected in the Statement of Motives, the longest 
by far among all European party laws – is to guarantee the democratic 
functioning of the political system. Interestingly enough, however, such 
necessity is not so much derived from the existence of ideological forces 
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threatening with the imposition of a non-democratic political system, as 
is the case in most of the post-communist political systems (and indeed 
elsewhere);15 but from the presence of the Basque terrorist movement 
ETA, whose murdered victims exceed 800. Although some scholars 
(for concrete examples see Casal Bértoa et al., 2012, 10), together with 
Basque nationalist forces, have wanted to see an attempt by the legislator 
to ban certain political parties in Spain, the truth is that the Organic Law 
6/2002, as clearly stated in its Statement of Motives as well as declared by 
both the Spanish Supreme and Constitutional Courts (STS 12.III.2003; 
STC 49/2003), simply aims to prevent anti-democratic partisan activities, 
and politically informed terrorism in particular,16 rather than to control 
partieś  ideological orientation (Karvonen, 2007, 445; Vidal Prado, 2009, 
252-255). A clear example of the latter is that both the Communist (PCE) 
and the Falangist (FN) party, whose main goal is to establish a more-or-
less authoritarian system of government, are considered to be legal. In 
this context, Spain ś party regulation seems to converge with that of the 
rest of European democracies which, with the exception of Germany and, 
to a lesser extent, Portugal and Italy,17 adopt a more “procedural” rather 
than “material” (i.e. “militant”) concept of democracy (see Th iel, 2009). 
As both the Constitutional and Supreme Courts have put it, adopting the 
position of the scholarly majority,18 in our legal order
there is no space for a model in which positive adhesion to the 
regulations and, above all to the Constitution is imposed, which goes 
beyond respect (STC 48/2003) [On the contrary,] in our constitutional 
system there is room for all ideas and all political projects even …, 
unlike in other codes, for those ideas which are contrary to the 
constitutional system, seeking to substitute or derogate or advocate 
formulas for territorial organization other than those chosen in the 
constitution (STS 27.III.2003),
provided that they do it by democratic means.19
It is within this context that article 9.3 contains detailed provisions intended 
to describe the conducts for which a party is considered “systematically 
[to] violate the fundamental rights and freedoms” (art. 9.2a), “encourage, 
support or legitimate violence” (art. 9.2b) or “supplement and politically 
support” (art. 9.2c) the use of terrorism: namely,
136 casal bértoa, piccio & rashkova
a) giving express or tacit political support to terrorism …; b) creating 
a culture of confrontation linked to the actions of terrorists …; c) 
including regularly in its directing bodies and on its electoral lists 
persons who have been convicted for terrorist crimes and who have 
not publicly renounced terrorist methods and aims …; d) using in an 
offi  cial way symbols, slogans, or other representational elements that 
are normally identifi ed with a terrorist organization; e) conceding to a 
terrorist organization … the same rights and prerogatives that electoral 
law concedes to parties; f) collaborating habitually with groups that 
act systematically in accordance with terrorist … organizations; g) 
giving institutional support … to any of the groups mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph; h) promoting, giving cover to, or participating 
in activities … rewarding, giving cover to, paying homage to, or 
honoring violent or terrorist actions …; and i) giving cover to actions 
that socially intimidate, coerce, or disrupt public order and that are 
linked to terrorism or violence (Turano, 2003:733-734)
Furthermore, the fruit of the Spanish legislator ś extraordinary concern 
with such “anti-democratic” activities is the inclusion of a special provision 
banning all those parties seeking “to continue or succeed the activity of 
another political party declared illegal and dissolved” (art. 5.6), which, 
although particularly aimed at avoiding the re-creation of ETA’s political 
arm,20 does not avoid its application to both present and future parties, 
when necessary (STC 48/2003).
As far as the regulation of political parties as organizations is concerned, 
and like in the majority of the European Party Laws, the Organic Law 
6/2002 requires their registration in order to acquire legal personality. 
In clear contrast to other European counterparts, however, the Spanish 
law is to be considered, together with Austria’s, the most liberal in this 
respect, as it does not require the declared support of a minimum numbers 
of citizens21 which, in other cases, ranges from the merely symbolic 50, 
100 or 200 (in Bulgaria, Croatia or Slovenia, respectively) to the more 
demanding 10,000 (in Serbia, Slovakia or Ukraine) or 25,000 (in 
Romania). Notwithstanding its suspension or dissolution for the reasons 
we will examine later on, such registration will have indefi nite validity 
(art. 4). In other words, and contrary to what can be observed in other 
countries, Spanish political parties may continue to exist without agreeing 
to participate in elections (e.g. Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Ukraine) and/or achieving certain electoral results (e.g. Finland, Serbia 
or Romania), or without having a minimum number of members (e.g. 
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Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Serbia).22 Given the above-
cited liberal inspiration, the Spanish Law does not require the payment of 
any registration fee,23 but just the notarization of the so-called formation 
agreement which must include, together with the (personal) identifi cation 
of the promoters24 and/or members of the provisional management 
bodies, the articles of association (i.e. statutes) as well as the address and 
(“original”) name of the party to be formed (art. 3.1). In common with 
most of the regulations on the subject, the Spanish law does not contain 
any specifi c prerequisites in terms of organic composition (an exception 
was made for the General Assembly – see below), deliberative rules, 
necessary quorums and/or majorities, duration of mandates, members’ 
(equal) rights and duties,25 creation/dissolution of party structures, etc.; 
but it leaves its regulation, implicitly or explicitly, to the statutes of each 
particular party. Finally, and as in most West European democracies, only 
judicially incapacitated individuals or those who, having full capacity to 
act, have not attained 18 years of age are not entitled to be members of a 
party (art. 8.1).26
In clear consonance with the already stressed “democratic concern” of 
the Spanish legislator, the 2002 Law on Political Parties establishes the 
urgent need for partisan organizationś  internal “structure and operation” 
to adhere to democratic principles (art. 7.1). One of the main practical 
consequences of this is the obligatory use of free and secret voting when 
fi lling the party’s management positions. Another example of the above-
cited concern is the legal embodiment of the principle of accountability, 
according to which party leaders are subject to the democratic control of 
the members (art. 7.5).27 A fi nal refl ection of what has been exposed is the 
consecration of the subsidiary principle of “simple majority of those present 
or represented” (italics are ours) in the adoption of all types of agreements 
by the party’s highest governing body, that is, the General Assembly of all 
the party members – or their representatives (art. 7.2 and 7.4).
Interestingly enough, but as with many other European countries, the 
Spanish Law on Political Parties refrains from including any regulatory 
stipulations either on the fi nance of these organizations or on the 
compatibility between membership of a political party and the exercise of 
certain professions (e.g. judiciary, law enforcement, civil service, etc.) or 
the membership of other types of organizations (e.g. trade unions, national 
broadcasting companies, public or semi-public enterprises or even other 
political parties). Th ese two issues (i.e. party fi nance and membership 
compatibilities) are certainly left to separate pieces of legislation (i.e. 
Organic Law 8/2007 on the Funding of Political Parties, Organic Law 
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6/1985 on the Judiciary, Organic Law 9/2011 on the Rights and Duties of 
the Members of the Armed Forces, etc.).28
As with most European democracies, the Spanish party law puts 
the management of the Register of Political Parties in the hands of a 
governmental institution (the Ministry of the Interior, in this case), which 
is in charge of examining the fulfi llment by the party of the above-cited 
registration requirements and, fi nally, deciding about its inclusion in the 
Register as a mean of acknowledging its legal personality (arts. 3-6).29 
In the same vein, it also leaves the decision on the suspension of party 
activities or its dissolution to the judiciary: namely, a criminal court, in 
the case of illegal association, and a Special Chamber of the Supreme 
Court30 in the event of democratic breakdowns, in terms of either internal 
operation or external activity (art. 10). After being dissolved as illegal, 
the party will be struck from the Register, its activities prohibited and its 
property liquidated (Casal Bértoa et al., 2012).
Another major sanction included in the Spanish law is the provisional 
suspension of the party’s activities as a precautionary measure in the 
event of criminal or dissolution proceedings (art. 10.3). Other types of 
punishments such as electoral disqualifi cation, loss of parliamentary seats 
or annulment of electoral results are not comprised within the Spanish 
juridical ordination, in clear consonance with what happens in the rest 
of the European states. Interestingly enough, the Spanish law does not 
envisage the imposition of administrative fi nes or the reduction/suspension 
of state funds, two popular (pecuniary) sanctions in most European states. 
Th e reason for such omission is, however, straightforward: unlike most 
of the other European party laws, the Spanish act does not contain any 
rules on the funding of political parties, leaving its regulation (art. 13) to 
a special law mentioned in the preamble (i.e. Organic Law 3/1987 of 2 
July).31
Conclusion
Th is chapter has off ered a longitudinal and comparative analysis of 
the Party Laws of post-war European democracies collected under the 
European Research Council project Re-conceptualizing Party Democracy. 
We have seen that the time of the adoption of the fi rst Party Law varies 
from 1967 for Germany, which is the pioneer in the regulation of political 
parties, to 2009 for Serbia. Th e chapter introduced the coding scheme 
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used to code the laws and provided an overview of the extent of party 
regulation in twelve distinct categories. 
Th us, for example, using our database and the analysis provided here, 
one can see how the regulation of party fi nance or media access in Party 
Laws, to take just two arbitrary categories, varies among the diff erent 
European states. We fi nd that rules about party fi nance are most extensive 
in Bulgaria, while countries such as Romania, Spain and the United 
Kingdom do not regulate this category at all as they have adopted special 
Party Finance Laws. 
Another interesting fi nding is that the two most heavily regulated 
categories are those which deal with registration and establishment rules 
(extra-parliamentary party) and with outside monitoring of the lawfulness 
of party activity, as well as penalties and sanctions for prohibited matters 
(external oversight). Furthermore, in an analysis of variance these two 
categories appear to be statistically signifi cant in two categories of 
groups  – continuous/discontinuous democracies and fi rst and current 
party laws. Th e second group comparison shows especially the fact that 
the amount of regulation in these categories diff ers signifi cantly between 
laws. Th is is also refl ected in the signifi cant coeffi  cient for the variation in 
total magnitude between the fi rst and current laws. 
Th e fi nding that party organization and party matters are among the 
most regulated characteristics pertaining to political parties was further 
investigated with a case study of the Spanish Party Law. Following 
Karvonen’s (2007) ‘thematic dimensions’, the law was examined with 
particular attention to the restrictions, organization, and sanctions 
references. In consonance with most European laws, the Spanish act 
requires political parties to adhere to democratic principles, respect 
human rights (refraining from using violence) and comply with the 
constitutional and legal order. Infl uenced by a rather liberal spirit, the 
Spanish law does not provide for specifi c requirements in terms of party 
formation or maintenance, also leaving the regulation of parties’ internal 
organization to their particular statutes. As in the majority of laws in our 
dataset, party legislation in Spain assigns the control of party creation and 
dissolution (Spain’s major legal sanction) to governmental and judicial 
institutions. In sum, notwithstanding its particular concern with partisan 
terrorist organizations, the Spanish Law on Political parties (infl uenced, 
in turn, by Germany’s legislation) constitutes a paradigm of European 
party regulation. 
Overall, this chapter has observed how the extent of party regulation 
through Party Laws in Europe has signifi cantly been increasing over time. 
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Th is pattern seems to reveal an interesting transformation in the very 
conception of political parties: from political parties conceived as private 
associations, being exempted from specifi c regulatory constraints, to 
parties as ‘public utilities’, becoming legitimate objects of state regulation 
(van Biezen, 2004). Hence, while little comparative attention has been 
paid to this phenomenon, we contend that the process of party regulation 
through Party Laws has interesting implications in terms of the place of 
political parties in modern democracies. Moreover, the results that this 
chapter has revealed point to interesting possibilities for future research on 
the eff ect of the regulatory frameworks on the organizational development 
of individual political parties as well as on the development of diff erent 
party systems across the European continent.
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Appendix: Contemporary Party Laws in Europe32 
Countries Year of 
Promulgation
Party Law Year of latest 
amendment
Austria 1975 404. Federal Law of 2nd July 
1975 on the assignments, 
fi nancing and the pre-election 
campaign of political parties 
(Law on Parties). Entered into 
force 24.07.1975
2008
Bulgaria 1990 Political Parties Act
State Gazette No. 
29/10.04.1990
2009
Croatia 1993 Political Parties Act





2006 Act No. 342/2006 Coll. 
amending Act No. 424 of 
October 2, 1991 on Associating 
in Political Parties and political 
movements and successive 
amendments
n/a
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Countries Year of 
Promulgation
Party Law Year of latest 
amendment
Estonia 1994 Political Parties Act
Adopted May 11th 1994 (RTI 
1994 , 40,654)
Entered into force June 16th 
1994 (RTI 1994, 40, 654)
2010
Finland 1969 Act on Political Parties (Law 
10/1969)
Promulgated: 10 January 1969
1992
Germany 1967 Law on Political Parties
Promulgated: 24th July 1967
2004
Hungary 1989 Act XXXIII of 1989 on the 
Operation and Financial 
Management of Political Parties
2003
Latvia 2006 Law on Political Parties (7th 
July 2006)
n/a
Lithuania 1990 Law on Political Parties and 
Political Organizations
2004
Norway 2005 Act 2005-06-17 no. 102: Act 
on certain aspects relating to 
the political parties or Th e 
Political Parties Act (Entry into 
force 2006-01-01, 2005-07-01)
n/a
Poland 1997 Act of 27 June 1997 on 
Political Parties
2010
Portugal 2003 Law governing Political Parties, 
Organizational Law no. 2/2003 
of 22 August 2003
2008
Romania 2003 Law no. 14/2003 on political 
parties (17/01/2003)
n/a
Serbia 2009 Law on Political parties 
(12/05/2009)
n/a
Slovakia 2005 Act No.85 as of February 4, 
2005 on political parties and 
political movements
n/a




Spain 2002 Law on Political Parties (12756 
Organic Law 6/2002)
n/a
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Countries Year of 
Promulgation
Party Law Year of latest 
amendment





1998 Th e Registration of Political 




* Author names are listed in alphabetical order.
1 ‘Guidelines on political party regulation’, by OSCE/ODIHR and Venice 
Commission, 25 October 2010 (Study no. 595/2010), p. 6. 
2 Re-conceptualizing Party Democracy is a project directed by Prof. Ingrid 
van Biezen and funded by the European Research Council (ERC). More 
information can be found at www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl. 
3 Elsewhere Janda argued: “[t]he term ‘party law’ has diff erent meanings to 
diff erent people, even among party scholars” (Janda, 2005, 3).
4 A list with the legal reference to the laws included in our sample is presented 
in Appendix. 
5 More recently (i.e. March 2011), Cyprus promulgated a “Law on Political 
Parties”, even if it mainly contains political funding regulations. For this 
reason, but also due to its recent adoption, we do not include it in the analysis.
6 It should be noted, however, that the Turkish Party Law was passed on the 
basis of art. 57 of the 1961 Constitution which, in turn, was “inspired by art. 
21 of the [1949] Constitution of the Federal German Republic” (Dodd, 1969, 
130).
7 Both the Austrian and Finish laws are characterized by their lower degree of 
regulation as compared to the German Law on Political Parties, in particular 
as far as the internal organization of political parties is concerned.
8 State subsidies funding the activity of political parties were introduced in 
Portugal only in 1977 and eight years later in Spain. Moreover, both countries 
shared a legalistic culture where party funding is regulated in a diff erent piece 
of legislation.
9 In this particular aspect, the only exceptions are Latvia and, to a lesser extent, 
Serbia, where Party Laws were, respectively, approved only twelve and nine 
years after the beginning of democracy.
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10 Th e same applies to the recently established Party Law of Cyprus, whose 
main regulatory focus is upon party fi nance regulation (see ft. 5).
11 For a comparative analysis of the legal regulation of internal party democracy 
in Europe see van Biezen and Piccio, 2013. 
12 For an in-depth diachronic (content) analysis of the Portuguese case see Casal 
Bértoa (forthcoming).
13 For the case of Romania, Spain, and the UK, party fi nance is regulated, 
respectively, in the Law on the Financing of Political Parties and Election 
Campaigns, in the Organic Law on the Funding of Political Parties, and in 
the Political Parties and Election Act. Other countries included in our sample 
that adopted a Party Finance Law, specifying party fi nance regulations in 
detail, are Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Slovakia, Serbia, and 
Portugal (Piccio, 2012). 
14 Data available from the authors.
15 See fn. 18.
16 Out of 12 European party laws banning the use of violence by political 
parties, a reference to terrorist activities or organizations can be found only 
in the Spanish 2002 “Organic Law”. Th is, however, does not preclude the 
general character, in both formal and material terms, of the latter (STC 
48/2003). 
17 While in Germany political parties are generally banned on ideological 
grounds (e.g. both the Neo-Nazi and the Communist Party were banned by 
the Constitutional Court as early as 1952 and 1956, respectively); in both 
Portugal and Italy, only the “fascist” parties are prohibited.
18 According to the position set up De Otto y Pardo already in 1985 [don’t 
understand], which considered that allowing for the possibility of modifying 
the Constitution as a whole (art. 168), the constitutional legislator clearly 
opposed any ideological control on parties (see also Aragón Reyes, 1990; 
Blanco Valdés, 1990; Rodríguez-Zapata, 2003). More recently, some 
scholars – a minority – have pointed “towards the possibility of confi guring 
the requirement of respect of the constitution as the requirement for a certain 
degree of adhesion to its basic principles which goes beyond merely formal 
compliance” (Santamaría Pastor, 2001:100; see also Montilla Martos, 2004; 
Tajadura Tejada, 2004).
19 Th e Spanish case law diff ers here from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), which, in both the Refah Partisi v. Turkey (13/02/2003) and Herri 
Batasuna & Batasuna v. Spain (30/06/2009) cases, has adopted a “militant” 
concept of democracy (Biezen and Molenaar, 2012).
20 From the day of the entry into force of the Law on Political Parties (i.e. 29 
June 2002) until the moment of writing this article, the Spanish Supreme 
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Court has banned up to 14 political formations (or the candidatures 
connected with them) linked with the above-cited terrorist group: namely, 
Batasuna, EH and Herri Batasuna (STS 27.III.2003), AuB (STS 3.V.2003), 
HZ (STS 21.V.2004), AG (STS 26.III.2005), ASB (ATS 22.V.2007), AS 
(STS 5.V.2007), ANV (22.IX.2008), EHAK (22.IX.2008), Askatasuna 
(ATS 8.III.2009), D3M (STS 8.II.2009), Sortu (ATS 23.III.2011) and Bildu 
(STS 1.V.2011). Interestingly enough, the Constitutional Court revoked the 
illegalization of the last for considering that the resolution of the Supreme 
Court had violated its right to political participation, guaranteed in art. 23 of 
the Spanish Supreme Act (STC 62/2011).
21 Th e absence of such requirement is common also to the British, German, 
Hungarian and Estonian Laws. However, while in the fi rst three a minimum 
of electoral activity is required, in the last parties must have at least 1,000 
members.
22 Th e minimum number of members a party must have in order not be dissolved 
ranges from the symbolic 200 in Latvia to the more “discriminative” 25,000 
in Romania, with no fewers than 700 people for each of the 18 state counties, 
plus Bucharest.
23 Out of the 20 European Party Laws here analysed, only four (i.e. Finland, 
Latvia, Slovakia and Ukraine) require the payment of an administrative fee.
24 It should be noted here that it is impossible, except in cases of rehabilitation, 
for individuals with a criminal record (either for illegal association or certain 
serious crimes) to found political parties. Th is responds, once again, to the 
legislator’s particular concern with Herri Batasuna’s heirs.
25 In any case, members are guaranteed the following rights (art. 8.3): of 
participation, of suff rage (both active and passive), of information (e.g. of 
decisions, activities, fi nancial situation, etc.) and of complaint (against illegal 
or anti-statutory agreements). In consideration for this, members are obliged 
to share the aims of the party, co-operating in their achievement, pay the 
fees/contributions duly imposed and accept/comply with the agreements 
legally adopted (art. 8.4). 
26 In clear contrast, most post-communist countries (as well as Portugal) require 
party members also to be citizens.
27 Surprisingly enough, only two other countries recognize this principle in 
their Party Laws: namely, Germany and Lithuania.
28 Other countries leaving the regulation of party fi nance to a specifi c law are 
Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and the UK. On the other 
hand, only the Bulgarian, Estonian, Serbian and Ukrainian Party Laws 
contain specifi c provisions in terms of party membership incompatibilities.
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29 Only three countries leave the Party Register in the hands of a judicial, rather 
than governmental, authority: namely, Poland (Warsaw ś District Court), 
Portugal (Constitutional Court) and Romania (Bucharest Tribunal).
30 Other countries, following the German model, prefer to legitimate the 
Constitutional Court only (e.g. Croatia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia 
or Slovenia). Within the Spanish scholarship, Fernández Segado (2004:200) 
and Tajadura (2004), among others, have called for a similar solution.
31 Th is is also the reason why, contrary to most of the European party laws (up 
to 14), the Spanish law does not provide for the operation of an external/
independent “monitoring” authority, even if it is mentioned (in passing) in 
both the preamble and the (fi nal) article 13.
32 Laws on-line available at www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl. 
33 Although the UK in 2000 enacted the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendum Act (PPERA), we included the 1998 Registration of Political 
Parties Act in our sample. Indeed, the 2000 UK PPERA, and its subsequent 
amendment (the 2009 Political Parties and Elections Act) are both 
exceptionally long documents (totalling 260 and 93 pages respectively) which 
deal almost exclusively with aspects relatingd to the fi nancing of political 
parties rather than their operations and activities. In order therefore not to 
bias the results of the content analysis of Party Laws in the direction of party 
fi nance, we deal with the 2000 and 2009 UK Acts as Party Finance Laws 
rather than Party Laws.
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chapter 6
Explaining Legislative Confl ict over the 




In 2003 the European Union passed its fi rst-ever regulation on the 
recognition and fi nancing of extra-parliamentary EU political parties 
(in this law formally defi ned as ‘political parties at European level’, and 
known also as the so-called Europarties).1 By enacting such a law, the 
(non-state) EU joined the majority of democratic states which provide 
political parties with public subsidies (Austin and Tjernstrom, 2003, 
van Biezen and Kopecky 2007). However, the fact remains that political 
parties at EU level are not central actors in the EU political system. Prior 
to the adoption of this regulation, they were often described as very 
loose organizations lacking both resources for political action and real 
infl uence (Hix and Lord 1997). Given this, it is then even more important 
to question why the EU decided to introduce public subsidies for such 
parties, and, as will be shown in this paper, why some MSs and some 
national political parties strongly opposed this step.
Th e central research problem of this paper is to analyse why the topic 
of regulating EU political parties in law has become so controversial and 
I will attempt to identify possible sources for this controversy. I will argue 
that the confl ict would result from the tension, fi rst, between various 
national traditions and specifi c legislative solutions relating to parties’ 
legal status and their fi nancing and, second, between diff erent views on 
the present and future of political integration in the EU. By studying 
this problem, not only do we learn about EU legislative politics and the 
Europarties, but we also contribute to the vast literature on party law 
and especially on party fi nancing, since the results of this paper provide 
1 Th is paper was submitted in July 2012.
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us with an additional source of knowledge on the models, traditions and 
habits of regulating political parties at the national level.
Th is article will be organized in three parts. First, after a review of 
the literature, it will propose an organizing perspective leading to the 
identifi cation of the sources and dimensions of the confl ict over the 
adoption of party law in the EU. In the second part, it will present the 
legislative procedures that led to the adoption of a law that was fi nally 
entitled Regulation 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties 
at European level and the rules regarding their funding, hereinafter referred 
to as the Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003). In the fi nal part, 
the fi ndings of this research will be discussed by analysing the role of 
and divisions in the European Commission and, subsequently, in the 
European Parliament (EP). It will also discuss the amendments to the 
regulation carried out in 2007 and 2011. Finally, it must be noted that 
this paper is not devoted to an analysis of Regulation 2004/2003 as fi nally 
adopted (see Johansson & Raunio 2005), although its content will become 
clear through the investigation of the legislative works preceding its 
adoption. In researching this topic, I have analysed the materials coming 
from the EP (debates, reports, roll-call votes), the internal documents of 
the Council of the European Union, personal communications and press 
releases. Additionally, various datasets that provide detailed comparisons 
between national rules of political fi nancing have been used (e.g. IDEA 
International dataset Austin and Tjernstrom, 2003, Council of Europe 
2004, Party Law in Modern Europe database).
An organizing perspective
Th e key issue with which we must start is to identify an organizing 
perspective that will help to answer the main research questions of this 
paper. Th e fi rst thing to note is that the subject of party fi nancing is a 
part of comparative politics and, more precisely, of the party fi nancing 
literature. However, given that the EU is a unique case both because its 
institutional environment diff ers sharply from that of the national states 
and, second, because EU parties are in very many aspects diff erent from 
national political parties, we also need to search for analytical insights in 
the EU studies. Th ese two bodies of literature will be briefl y discussed 
below, and subsequently an organizing perspective for this paper will be 
presented.
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Insights from comparative politics
Given that this paper seeks to analyse the dimensions of political confl ict 
in relation to the adoption of party regulation in the European Union, 
the fi rst question that must be addressed concerns the extent to which we 
can identify a dominant trend in relation to regulating political parties in 
law. From an empirical point of view, there seem to be three clearly visible 
and obvious trends (van Biezen and Kopecky 2007; Lehmann 2003). 
First, the constitution in the majority of democratic states includes some 
rules on political parties. Second, it has become quite commonplace to 
fi nance political parties from public funds. Th ird, particular attention is 
paid to the rules on transparency in party funding. Scholars announce the 
overall convergence of funding patterns (Nassmacher 2009). However, 
among those countries that provide political parties with public subsidies, 
the variety of national provisions is quite large (see Appendix B for 
illustration), ranging from the rules on donations to the very principle 
of how large the state subsidies should be. Furthermore, legal provisions 
on political parties relate not only to party funding, but generally to all 
possible measures regulating parties in law: their status as legal persons, 
their activities, their internal organization and procedures, the rights of 
members, and many others. Overall, the extent or, to put it diff erently, the 
intensity of legal regulation (concerning, for example, the extent to which 
law regulates internal party organization) is often diff erent. Conceptually, 
this variety is constrained by means of the models of regulating political 
parties, primarily based on the cross-national diff erences in political and 
legal cultures. Th e key explanatory factor is the vision of a political party 
and its role within society. Here countries diff er, and this results in the 
diff erences in national laws regulating political parties. Th is variety can 
be reduced to two models: the prescription and the permission model (for 
a review see Janda 2005). Th e fi rst imposes very little on parties, assuming 
that how they organize, what their programme is should be left to the 
parties and their members. Th e prescription model, on the other hand, 
imposes on parties many more rules stipulated in a more detailed way, 
especially regarding their internal organization, for example, the selection 
of candidates or the rights of the members.
Insights from EU studies
To simplify the matter in question, in most cases party law in national 
states is adopted by parties themselves while acting in parliament, 
subject to review by the Constitutional Court (Janda 2005). However, 
in the EU we need to approach this problem in the special, very complex 
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circumstances of EU legislative politics (Hix 2005, Peterson et al. 2008). 
Th e most important factor to note is that there are many more political 
actors to analyse: MSs, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. However, contrary to the situation in national political 
systems, Europarties do not have much control over the fi nal law that 
governs them, because the link between extra- and parliamentary parties 
at EU level in any sense is not comparable to that in national party politics 
(Hix and Lord 1997). In other words, party law is not adopted by the 
(Euro)parties themselves. 
Moving now to the patterns of political confl ict in the EU (for a review 
see Steenbergen & Marks 2004), for many years the standard explanation 
was based on the so-called sovereignty-integration dimension, in which 
the opposition or acceptance of further political integration was a key 
source of political confl ict. In the 1990s, some other aspects were added to 
this fi rst dimension, in particular, the left-right confl ict. From comparative 
politics literature we know that it is the size of the party, rather than its 
ideological profi le, that explains the confl ict over the adoption of political 
fi nancing rules (Scarrow 2004). On the other hand, from the literature on 
EU political parties we learn that the whole idea of EU political parties 
and their strengthening means a step towards further political integration. 
For this reason, it seems that the sovereignty-integration dimension will 
be a key explanatory factor of the patterns of political confl ict over the 
adoption of political fi nancing law in the EU. 
When we now try to think about the mechanism of this confl ict, the 
fi rst precondition for it is that political actors will indeed have diff erent 
preferences. Based on the comparative politics literature reviewed above, 
it is clear that MSs diff er between themselves in how they regulate (if they 
do) parties in law. However, the fact that they diff er is not suffi  cient. At 
the same time MSs and other political actors at the EU level would need 
to transfer their national preferences to the discussion on party fi nancing 
at the EU level. 
Th is example touches a more general question whether political actors 
use their own national experiences in formulating proposals for legislative 
solutions at the EU level. From a theoretical point of view, an affi  rmative 
answer to such question is quite obvious in the historical and sociological 
versions of new institutionalism. Th ese two bodies of literature make a 
direct claim concerning preference formation (see Hall & Taylor 1996; 
Peters 1999). Without going into details, the question the sociological 
institutionalists focus on is about the sources from which institutional 
creators took their ideas to create a new institution. Th e hypothesis states 
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that they ‘borrow’ those ideas from the existing world of institutional 
templates and models, a mechanism that is called institutional borrowing. 
Its equivalent is also present in the theory of constitutionalism as 
constitutional borrowing, in which states ‘borrow’ constitutional and 
legislative solutions from one another (Osiatynski 2003). And if this 
borrowing mechanism indeed takes place at the EU level too, which party 
tradition (or some combinations of traditions) prevails?
However, going more deeply into the problem would require asking 
whether the diff erences exist not only between the MSs, but also within 
them. Some prominent scholars argue that domestic confl ict may be a 
key to explaining why some governments support and other oppose 
integration (Moravcsik 1998). In our case, we must pose a question 
regarding the extent to which the distinct national traditions and models 
on party regulation are shared by political forces in a given MS. In this 
paper, this can be tested by analysing whether the political parties and 
individual politicians from the same country will have similar ideas 
relating to the mode of fi nancing of EU political parties and the specifi c 
legislative solutions.
Integrating insight from comparative politics and EU studies
Th e analysis so far allows us to identify two major dimensions of confl ict 
in the process of regulating parties in law at the EU level. Th e fi rst relates 
to the wider problem of the future of political integration in Europe. Th e 
very idea of strengthening Europarties has always been associated with the 
advancement of political integration in the direction of a ‘federal Europe’. 
Needless to say, adopting a system of public fi nancing of the Europarties 
will make them stronger. Th at is why the views in favour of EU integration 
are expected to be linked to the very aim and nature of party regulation and 
so a confl ict on the European integration scale (sovereignty-integration) is 
very likely. For example, Eurosceptics are expected to be against any form 
of legal recognition and public fi nancing of EU political parties, because 
that will mean for them a step towards a federal Europe. In other words, it 
is not possible to detach the discussion on the nature of party regulation in 
the EU from the very character, goals and activities of Europarties. Hence 
the fi rst hypothesis: the confl ict over the strengthening of Europarties through 
the adoption of the party fi nancing regulation will be based on views toward 
the present and future of European integration.
On the other hand, the fact that the subject matter of this confl ict is the 
regulation of political parties in law suggests a second dimension around 
the prescriptive and permissive models of regulating political parties or, in 
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the most detailed account, between specifi c legislative solutions. For this 
to be possible, we must assume that these diff erent national traditions will 
be transferred to the EU level, thus becoming a source of political confl ict. 
For example, given the variety of national legislative solutions concerning 
the regulation of donations, we would expect that this aspect of political 
fi nancing will be aired in the discussions on party fi nancing at the EU 
level, possibly becoming a source of political confl ict. Hence the second 
hypothesis: the proposals concerning the legal regulation of political parties 
at EU level will have their source in and will be borrowed from national 
experiences (the borrowing hypothesis).
Th e problem with these hypotheses is that they (and two dimensions 
of political confl ict linked to them) may be intertwined. However, it 
seems that we may expect that the fi rst dimension will be more visible 
as far as the goal of the whole party regulation is concerned (whether 
to regulate parties in law in the fi rst place), whereas the second will be 
more important with regard to specifi c legislative solutions, e.g. donations, 
reporting, transparency, etc.  
Introducing the process of adoption of the political fi nancing 
regulation at the EU level
Following their creation in the 1970s, Europarties were neither recognized 
by law nor subsidized directly by the then European Economic Community. 
Th eir practical functioning was based on the material, personal and 
fi nancial contributions of either their political groups in the EP or their 
member parties. In the early 1990s, the three largest Europarties joined 
forces to lobby for their formal legal recognition, and the process leading 
to the adoption of laws governing European political parties started. It is 
useful to note that it can be divided into two distinct periods. 
In the fi rst period (after the Maastricht and up to the Nice inter-
governmental conference, 1990-2001), the matter on the agenda was 
whether to constitutionalize European political parties. In practical terms, 
the question was whether to insert a reference to the European political 
parties in the basic EU constitutional document (Treaty establishing 
European Communities, hereafter TEC), and, if yes, what wording to 
use. Th is story seems to be rather well described in the existing studies 
(Johansson & Raunio 2005, Day & Shaw 2005). After intense lobbying 
by the Europarties and the European Parliament, and with the support 
of some heads of MSs, the Maastricht intergovernmental conference 
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(1990-91) took a decision to insert a special Treaty article devoted to 
Europarties (art. 138a, later renumbered as art. 191, and now art. 10 
(4) of the Treaty on the European Union). In this reference, the Treaty 
attributes an important role to Europarties in “forming a European 
awareness and expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union”. 
However, the vague formulation of this article came to be understood only 
as a symbolic reference, rather than a legal basis for further, more specifi c 
laws (Bieber 1999). Since that time, even though various amendments 
to this unclear wording have been proposed, the very idea and concept 
of European political parties divided the MSs, and for a long time they 
could not reach agreement on whether and how to proceed (see below for 
details). However, the key incentive came from the Special Report of the 
European Court of Auditors (2000), which considered the then existing 
practice of fi nancing Europarties from the EP political groups’ budgets 
to be inadmissible, since the funds allocated to political groups could not 
be used to fi nance any extra-parliamentary activities. Th is stimulus led to 
the amendment of the above-mentioned art. 191 of the Treaty so that the 
Council, acting through the co-decision procedure with the Parliament as 
co-legislator, was obliged to lay down the regulations governing political 
parties at European level, and in particular the rules regarding their 
funding.
In order to satisfy the concerns of some MSs, however, declaration no. 
11, a constitutive element of the Treaty of Nice of 2001, stated, inter alia, 
that
Th e provisions of Article 191 do not imply any transfer of powers 
to the European Community and do not aff ect the application of 
the relevant national constitutional rules. Th e funding for political 
parties at European level provided out of the budget of the European 
Communities may not be used to fund, either directly or indirectly, 
political parties at national level.
Th is declaration and its content explain the main lines of divisions: a 
threat of a further transfer of political powers to the European Union and 
the risk of Europarties’ interference in national politics.
Once the decision to constitutionalize Europarties was fi nally taken, 
the debate moved to some specifi c concerns over the fi nancing regulation, 
and the second period began. In this period, the divisions between MSs 
had less to do with their approaches towards European integration in 
general – in this context whether to constitutionalize Europarties – but 
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more to do with how to do it: in other words, how to construct a special 
act devoted to their legal status, fi nancing and potentially their other 
activities. Th is is the precise topic of the next paragraph.
 Th e legislative work on the status and fi nancing of European 
political parties
Th e confl ict that arose with reference to the subsequent legislative 
proposals had mainly to do with three areas. First, it is often argued that 
the criteria relating to the allocation system are primarily responsible for 
the eventual benefi ts to the existing parties (Pierre et al. 2000). Likewise, 
at the EU level the fi rst major source of confl ict concerned the fi xing of 
the minimum number of MSs a Europarty operates in so that it qualifi es 
to receive EU funding. In other words, in order to be recognized and 
registered as a Europarty, should it have members (national political 
parties) from two, fi ve or even more EU Member states? In this paper I 
will refer to this condition as the representativeness criterion. Th e second 
area of confl ict related to the question of party sponsorship and donations 
and, more precisely, what type of donations should be banned. Finally, 
there was a major diff erence regarding the extent to which a European 
law should prescribe party organization and impose on parties the need 
to respect EU democratic principles and fundamental rights. It does not 
mean, however, that all the specifi c legislative solutions were contested. 
For example, from the beginning agreement was reached that special 
attention should be given to the transparency of party fi nancing and that 
there must be a balance between the fi nancing of the Europarties by the 
EU and their own resources.
Early legislative proposals
Th e fi rst concrete proposals regarding how the future European party law 
should be designed saw the light of day as early as in 1996, when the EP 
adopted the Report on the constitutional status of the European political 
parties (European Parliament 1996). Th is report, drafted by a PES Group 
Member Dimitris Tsatsos, and warmly received by large Europarties, set 
the agenda and remained a point of reference for all subsequent proposals 
(see below). Th e fi rst condition for recognition was that a Europarty had 
to unite national political parties from at least 1/3 of the MSs and be 
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active at EU level, that is, participate in European elections and create or 
join a political group in the EP, among other tasks.
Th e report further formulated three conditions relating to party 
organization. Th e fi rst of them imposed a formal obligation to adopt and 
make available statutes and a party programme. Th e second was to ensure 
that the party “be more, in terms of goals and organization, than a mere 
electioneering organization or an organization that merely supports a 
political group and parliamentary work”. Th e third required a party to 
be organized “in a way that is likely to refl ect the political will of citizens 
of the Union” based on a democratic internal mode of work, since “the 
internal structure of European political parties must comply with their 
constitutional mission”.
Prior to the Nice Treaty (2001), due to the lack of a clear legal basis the 
Commission was reluctant to initiate procedures proposed by the Tsatsos 
report, and only after the report of the Court of Auditors quoted above, 
did the Commission present its draft regulation (European Parliament 
2001b). As Commissioner Schreyer explained during a debate in the EP
When defi ning European parties we wanted to leave room for 
manoeuvre and make it possible for the concept to evolve. At 
the same time, however, we wanted to put in place minimum 
democratic standards and minimum requirements for European 
representativeness and guarantee a maximum degree of transparency 
in respect of fi nancing. On the defi nition of European parties, allow 
me to say quite clearly that European parties in no way have to toe 
a particular European political line, but the values of democracy, 
the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights must be respected 
(European Parliament 2001b).
Overall, the Commission’s 2001 proposal was more modest in setting the 
conditions than was the Tsatsos report. Furthermore, the project was less 
comprehensive, and the Commission refrained from touching such matters 
as mandatory disclosure of all revenue (e.g. members’ contributions or 
donations) or the possibility of the Europarties acquiring legal personality. 
Most importantly, however, in practice it continued the representativeness 
criterion proposed by the Tsatos report, based on two alternative ways of 
applying for funding. A Europarty had to be represented by either MEPs 
in the EP, and/or members of the national or regional parliaments, in 
all cases coming from at least fi ve MSs; or a Europarty or its member 
parties had to have received at least fi ve per cent of the votes cast in the 
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last EP election in at least fi ve MSs. Neither the Tsatsos report nor the 
Commission’s 2001 draft project devoted any attention to the question 
of banned donations, although the Commission’s project stated that the 
control and supervision of expenses were to be carried out by means of an 
independent audit, which would present its fi ndings to the EP and to the 
European Court of Auditors.
Responding to the Commission’s project in May 2001, the EP, in 
the report drafted by a German EPP Member Ursula Schleicher, tabled 
some amendments aimed at securing greater transparency of Europarty’s 
fi nances, especially, banning anonymous donations and those from public 
sector companies (European Parliament 2001c). It also wanted to rule 
out the possibility of creating Europarties that would be only a cover for 
obtaining funding, but not active in practice. It therefore proposed that 
apart from the statute, the political programme was also to be registered, 
and that funding was granted only to “established alliances of political 
parties”. Overall, the early proposals refl ected or oscillated around the 
prescription model. 
Th e debate in the Council
Although the Commission agreed to the vast majority of the Parliament’s 
amendments, the Council could not reach agreement. It seems that there 
was a clash of diff erent national visions of how to regulate political parties. 
In general, Denmark, the UK and Sweden expressed general scrutiny 
reservations towards the entire proposal. In this way, they proposed 
deleting the condition that a Europarty shall respect fundamental 
democratic principles and EU fundamental rights, which most other 
countries opposed (Council of the European Union 2001a).
Regarding the threshold for fi nancing (1/3, at that time fi ve EU 
MSs), most EU countries considered it too rigorous and the Belgian EU 
presidency proposed lowering it to 1/4. However, the UK, Sweden and 
Austria demanded it be lowered even further, to just two MSs. At that time, 
pressed by coalition partners from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), 
the Austrian delegation to the Council wanted to ensure that smaller 
party families would not be excluded from the possibility of registering a 
Europarty because of such high representativeness criteria (Day & Shaw 
2005). Th e most radical position was presented by the Danes who wanted 
to resign completely from any representative criteria, requiring only that a 
Europarty has “established or intend to establish or join a political group 
explaining legislative conflict  159
in the European Parliament” (see below) (Council of the European Union 
2001a). Finally, concerning donations and party sponsorship, the Belgian 
EU presidency proposed the prohibition of donations over a certain 
threshold (to be decided) from any legal or natural person. However, the 
MSs were divided both relating to the principle of this proposal and on the 
level of any threshold (Council of the European Union 2001c). Th e most 
visible confl ict arose between France and Germany. In this way, when the 
Germans wanted to increase the amount of admissible party donations, the 
French were proposing to limit them or make the procedure more rigorous 
(Council of the European Union 2001b). How can it be accounted for? 
Th e French tradition of regulating political parties largely diff ers from 
the German one. One could multiply the diff erences, but from various 
datasets (see Appendix B) it becomes clear that in France, contrary to 
Germany, there is a ceiling on contributions to political parties, a ban 
on corporate donation, a ban on donations from government contractors 
and a ban on trade union donations, among others. In short, in France 
the matter of party sponsorship is treated much more strictly. In this way, 
France wanted to apply a similar model also in the case of the European 
legislation, which led to the confl ict with a concurrent German model.
Taken together, these three dimensions of confl ict led to a failure of 
the draft regulation. On the one hand, Denmark, the UK and Sweden 
were not ready to compromise, but on the other hand, the Europarties 
and their allies did not want to adopt the law at any price. In a letter 
to the Council dated 26 October 2001 they objected to lowering the 
representative criterion below 1/3, which they found to be an absolute 
minimum assuring that only truly transnational Europarties received 
funding (European Political Parties 2001).
Th e future discussion was strongly infl uenced by the fact that the 
amendments to the Treaty on the European Communities made by the 
Nice Treaty (which came in force on 1 February 2003) gave the opportunity 
of applying a diff erent legal basis for the adoption of secondary laws 
governing Europarties, providing for the co-decision procedure, with the 
Council deciding by Qualifi ed Majority Voting rather than unanimously, 
as was the case before.
Th e Commission’s 2003 proposal
In a new attempt, the Commission drew conclusions from the failure of 
the previous draft, and this time proposed much more pragmatic solutions 
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(European Commission 2003a). Th e aim was to adopt a regulation devoted 
only to Europarties’ fi nancing and to lay down a minimum of rules 
acceptable to all MSs devised in response to reservations expressed during 
previous discussions in the Council. Most importantly, the very defi nition 
of the term ‘European political party’ was extended. In the newest version, 
not only would it be an “alliance of political parties” (as in all previous 
drafts) but also “political party”, that is, “an association of citizens 
pursuing political objectives, and either recognised by or established in 
accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State”. To register 
its statute, such a European political party would have to be present in at 
least three MSs. On behalf of the Commission, Commissioner Loyola de 
Palacio explained that
Our basic proposal has sought to avoid political requirements that are 
too restrictive for European political parties for two main reasons: 
fi rstly, we want an open and plural system in which all shades of 
opinion can be represented in the European debate; secondly, if 
things were done otherwise, the debate in Council and in Parliament 
would be drawn out unnecessarily, perhaps even beyond the 2004 
European elections (European Parliament 2003a).
In the Council, again the major line of confl ict concerned the numerical 
conditions necessary to register a Europarty. In the fi rst compromise text, 
the previous condition of 1/3 of the MSs was revived. However, the Italian 
delegation opposed this in writing, demanding that the threshold of three 
MSs envisaged at the end of the 2001 negotiations be reintroduced. In 
response, the next compromise proposal was to set this condition at at 
least 1/5 of the MSs, and in the end 1/4 (Council of the European Union 
2003c).
During its part session on 19 June 2003, the EP gave its opinion at 
fi rst reading and adopted a set of amendments which corresponded to 
those agreed by the Council (see below). Subsequently, on 5 September 
2003, the Council accepted all of the EP’s amendments and adopted the 
Regulation, with Italy, Denmark and Austria voting against, due to the 
disagreement described above. Th e votes of these countries (17 together) 
were not suffi  cient to block the adoption of this Regulation (they would 
have needed at least 25 votes). In order to have a comparative view of 
how confl ictive this process was, the key point is to observe that between 
1994 and 1998 79 per cent of decisions in the Council were taken by 
unanimous vote, and that three or more MSs voted against a proposal in 
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only 2 per cent of cases (Mattila 2004). Between 1998 and 2004, in the 
General Aff airs Councils, Denmark, Italy and Austria voted against only 
once, precisely in the case of Regulation 2004/2003. It therefore proves 
that the entire matter of regulating political parties led to fi erce confl ict 
and the inability to fi nd a compromise between all the MSs.
A very important point to make is why the UK withdrew its previous 
opposition to this Regulation. Offi  cially, the United Kingdom made its 
agreement on further statutes on political parties conditional on following 
the declaration attached to the Treaty of Nice, namely that Europarties 
will not interfere in national politics (MacShane 2003). Looking however 
from the informal point of view, we should remember that at that time 
the Party of European Socialists (PES) was led by Robin Cook, former 
UK Foreign Minister. According to two senior politicians in the PES 
(interviews: 2007), Robin Cook asked his successor in offi  ce, Jack Straw, 
to do him a personal favour so that the UK supported this regulation and 
Straw did so. Th is is quite an interesting example of Europarties’ lobbying 
of governments.
An interesting case concerns Italy. In 2001, under the left wing 
government of Giuliano Amato, it did not offi  cially voice any reservations 
concerning the representativeness criterion. However, Italy did so in 2003, 
with a new government of the centre-right with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia 
as the largest single party, but with two further coalition partners, the 
National Alliance and the Northern League, holding rather reserved 
attitudes towards European political integration and not being present 
in transnational party activities. Day and Shaw (2003) believe that their 
opposition was behind Italy’s proposals to limit as far as possible the 
numerical conditions for the recognition of Europarties. Finally, the case 
of Denmark can be explained by her traditionally very reserved stance 
towards the tightening of EU political integration, but also bearing in 
mind that in Denmark practically speaking there is no party law, and 
only parliamentary parties receive funding (Council of Europe 2004). Th e 
notion of political party in Denmark strongly emphasizes its participatory 
character and its private nature. Such comments are very commonly 
voiced by all Danish MEPs who participated in the debates (see below), 
and from the reports of the debates in the Council it became clear that they 
also stood behind the attitude of the Danish government on this matter. 
In most situations, it acted against any detailed regulation concerning 
parties’ legal personality, against the need to safeguard EU democratic 
principles and fundamental rights, as well as, contrary to the text of the 
proposals, arguing for the need to share the subsidies between Europarties 
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on a more proportional basis, rather than take into account mostly the 
number of MEPs as the pro-rata basis for the division of funds. Th eir 
vision of Europarties strongly emphasized that they should be associations 
of citizens, rather than federations of political parties, that they should 
not be limited in their right to set up their political programme or internal 
organization, and, fi nally, that the criterion of transnational representatives 
should be totally removed (Council of the European Union 2001a, 2001c, 
2003a, 2003b). Most of the Danish amendments were rejected; therefore, 
the Danish delegation fi nally voted against this Regulation.
 Th e role of the European Commission
While the European Commission is perceived as a non-partisan 
representative of the European interest, this does not mean that it is left 
out of political, partisan infl uence. Its role is particularly important given 
that it has the sole right of legislative initiative, and the way it formulates 
legislative proposals clearly places it on one or the other side of the political 
spectrum.
As shown before, the Commission during the debates in the EP 
always exhibited a rather positive approach towards the introduction of 
EU subsidies for Europarties, though this does not mean that it always 
fully supported the Parliament’s view. For example, some politicians of 
Europarties (EPP and PES senior offi  cials, interviews: 2006) complained 
that the Commission could have pressed further and proposed to prepare 
a fully-fl edged statute of European political parties. Th ey mean that such 
statute should regulate not only the questions of party fi nancing, but all 
other aspects of their legal status (e.g. legal personality). However, many 
times the Commission representatives (as Loyola de Palacio quoted above) 
argued that their aim was to off er fl exibility to allow diff erent concepts, 
defi nitions and status for European political parties in each MS, and at 
the same time to ensure no oligarchy or prevention of new parties entering 
the system.
Although normally the Commission tries to exhibit a united stance, 
this time internal divisions between the commissioners came to light. Two 
British commissioners, Chris Patten and Neil Kinnock, were reported as 
standing against the proposals since the college of commissioners did not 
agree to their demands to lower the representativeness criteria (Fletcher 
2001). Th e British Conservative party strongly opposed the proposal 
for public fi nancing of European political parties, both as a matter of 
principle (that any party should not be fi nanced from public funds), but 
also in opposition to a scheme perceived as privileging pro-European 
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parties, what they called ‘fund for federalism’ (Baldwin 2001). Most 
importantly, however, the British Tories, contrary to two other major 
British parties, at the time were not members of any European political 
party, so the representativeness criteria would exclude them from any 
funding. Th e newspapers noted that sources close to Chris Patten said he 
did not believe that the Commission’s intention was to exclude the Tories 
for political reasons, but objected because it might look that way. Neil 
Kinnock objected for “reasons of democracy and political common sense” 
(Fletcher 2001). Overall, the former Secretary General of the Party of 
European Socialists, Anthony Beumer (interview: 2007), believes that the 
two British Commissioners, and especially Neil Kinnock, questioned this 
proposal based on their national tradition where the parties traditionally 
are not publicly funded.
 Th e debates in the European Parliament
Th e European Parliament (and concretely its four biggest political 
groups) always stood as the staunch supporter of the strengthening 
of Europarties that it associated with the idea of the tightening of EU 
political integration. Full support for the idea has always been expressed 
by the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) without the British 
Conservatives however, the PES Group (now S&D Group), the majority 
of the Group of the European Liberal, Democrats and Reformers (ELDR, 
now ALDE), and the majority of the Group of the Greens (Greens/
EFA). Th e opponents were mainly found in the Confederal Group of 
the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), the Group 
of Europe of Democracy and Diversity (EDD, now Europe of Freedom 
and Democracy), the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN, 
now transformed into European Conservatives and Reformists Group) 
and the majority of Independent Members (NI) (European Parliament, 
1996, 2000a, 2003a). It is clear then that the supporters always had a large 
majority, and in the voting on the adoption of the Regulation 345 MEPs 
voted in favour, with 102 against and 34 abstaining. Th e left-right divide 
was not predictive of voting patterns, and the MEPs’ vote choice was 
based on their support of or opposition to further EU political integration 
(Ringe 2010).
Th e outcome of this vote is not surprising. Indeed, the commonplace 
argument advanced in the literature on the voting patterns in the EP is to 
claim that MEPs of the PES (now S&D), the EPP and the ELDR (now 
ALDE) have indistinguishable attitudes in favour of tightening political 
integration against the small groups such as the EDD (Th omassen et al. 
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2004). However, the crucial point here is that an important part of their 
pro-European attitudes is precisely the idea of European political parties. 
One of the reasons why the three largest political families created their 
EU-level party federations in mid-70s was their belief that the existence 
of Europarties will push political integration forward. From this point 
of view, support for the Regulation strengthening Europarties was not 
just a matter of dispute between the pro-European and anti-European 
parties, but also between the oldest and largest Europarties (strongly pro-
European) and those MEPs who were critical of the idea of Europarties 
precisely due to their Euroscepticism. So while our fi rst hypothesis is 
confi rmed, it cannot be explained without making a point relating to the 
size of the parties. I will return to this issue in the last section of this paper.
However, was this debate only a matter of dispute between the advocates 
of European integration and their opponents or did it also concern the 
general attitude towards party fi nancing? In the light of above analysis, we 
know that the question of donations and their limits was one of the most 
divisive issues. From an analysis carried out by Ringe we learn that MEPs 
from MSs that specify ceilings on party donations were slightly more likely 
to support the Regulation, as it contains the provisions stipulating such 
ceiling (Ringe 2010). Th is fi nding would thus be one of the arguments 
in favour of the borrowing hypothesis. Moving to the qualitative analysis 
concerning the type of arguments used, individual MEPs many times 
referred to their national experiences. For example, a Danish MEP from 
the ELDR protested against the adoption of the Regulation due to his total 
opposition to the whole idea of fi nancing political parties from “citizens’ 
purses” – in Denmark, as explained, the law does not regulate the matter 
of fi nancing political parties, and only political groups in the parliament 
are subsidized. Many MEPs, especially the regionalists from Greens/EFA 
and the communists from GUE/NGL criticized the general idea of a 
political party as a transmission belt between the citizens and the state, in 
a sense referring to the end-of-the-parties thesis. As noted above, based on 
their national experience the British Conservatives disapprove of the idea 
of public fi nancing of political parties in general, and of public fi nancing 
of European political parties accordingly. It could then be summarized 
that the general debate in the EP was held in relation not only to the 
proposed Regulation, but also to political parties in general.
On another level of discussion, the project of strengthening political 
parties at EU level has always been regarded as an idea of the supporters 
of tightening EU integration. As Independent Belgian MEP Vanhecke 
observed, it has always been a “project of people who are hoping to create 
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the European federal superstate” (European Parliament 2000a). Although 
this statement may be a bit exaggerated, it is true that the four biggest 
groups (EPP, PES, ELDR and the majority of the Greens) are known for 
their ardent integrationist views and for their warm support for the idea 
of European political parties. Furthermore, they have had the longest and 
most fruitful experience of transnational cooperation in the EU (Hix and 
Lord 1997). Th ey would benefi t from EU funding immediately, which 
might have been seen by the smaller political groups as yet another factor 
institutionalizing the domination of the grand parties (Beumer 2007). 
Eurosceptic Jans Peter Bonde pointed out in this context that for regional 
parties it could be impossible to set up a federation of political parties 
due to the above high representativeness criteria – being unable to gather 
representatives from 1/3 or 1/4 of the MSs. Furthermore, he added that 
Eurosceptics might never want to set up such a political party at EU level 
as a matter of principle, but they do represent the views of EU citizens, 
and that is why their interests should be also taken into account (European 
Parliament, 2001a). He therefore considered that “it is clear that those 
who preach servility to the EU’s institutions are to be rewarded while 
those of us who still believe that constructive criticism is essential to real 
democracy are to be punished” (Agence Europe 19 June 2003). Finally, 
as has always been the case, very often the same personalities were active 
both in the political groups (as MEPs) and in Europarties. Most notably, 
Wilfred Martens in the 1994-1999 period used to be at the same time 
the president of the EPP outside the Parliament and the chairman of the 
EPP political group inside the Parliament. Th erefore, the three biggest 
groups also had a direct personal motivation to advance the process of the 
institutionalization of Europarties.
Using extra parliamentary means, 25 MEPs, mostly from the French 
Front National, the Italian Lega Nord and the Belgian Vlaams Belang, 
applied to the Court of First Instance for the annulment of the Regulation 
on the grounds that it was unlawful, it infringed the principles of equality, 
transparency, political pluralism and subsidiarity. Th e Court, however, 
did not deal with their appeal relating to the content, but dismissed their 
claim as inadmissible, as the applicants did not have locus standi (Court 
of First Instance 2005).
Getting back to the analysis of the fi nal vote over Regulation 2004/2003, 
if we analyse the relationship between voting pattern and nationality, 
we see that in the case of the MEPs from the MSs which rejected the 
Regulation in the Council, only the Danish MEPs almost unanimously 
voted against the Regulation, regardless of their group membership or 
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whether at that time their parties were in government or in opposition. 
Th erefore, taking into account the arguments used by the Danes both in 
the Council negotiations and in the debates in the Parliament, it might 
be said that there is wide agreement in Denmark about the advantages 
of their model of party law and consequent dissatisfaction with other 
models, such as the one applied in the Regulation. However, in the case of 
Italy and Austria, two other countries which opposed the adoption of the 
Regulation, the Italian and Austrian MEPs nevertheless supported it. Out 
of 48 Italian MEPs, only 4 Independents elected from the Lista Emma 
Bonino and Clemente Mastella from the EPP-ED voted against. None of 
the Lega Nord MEPs took part in this vote, but their opposition to this 
regulation is indisputable, given the application they brought before the 
Court of First Instance (above). However, all four MEPs of the National 
Alliance voted in favour. Out of 16 Austrian MEPs voting on that day, 
only three voted against (two from the FPÖ and one independent).
Th e table below presents the results of the roll-call vote on the adoption 
of Regulation 2004/2003 categorized by nationality. It reveals that the 
Table 1. Th e results of the roll-call vote on the adoption of the Regulation 
2004/2003 divided by nationality
MS Yes No Abstentions Agreement 
Index
Luxembourg 3 0 0 1
Denmark 0 10 1 0.95
Spain 48 2 0 0.94
Ireland 10 1 0 0.86
Germany 79 4 4 0.86
Italy 43 4 1 0.84
Portugal 14 1 1 0.81
Netherlands 27 4 0 0.8
Austria 13 3 0 0.71
Belgium 14 5 1 0.55
Greece 15 3 4 0.52
Finland 7 5 1 0.3
UK 31 37 1 0.3
France 34 19 14 0.26
Sweden 5 4 6 0.1
Source: own calculation based on the roll call vote in the EP (European Parliament 2003b)
Th e agreement index based on the method used by Hix, Noury and Roland (2007)
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three most divided group of MEPs were the British (the Labour Party in 
favour and the other British MEPs against), the French (9 MEPs of the 
EDD Group were against, as well as the French members of the UEN 
and the independents, mostly from the Front National) and the Swedish 
(without any observable partisan divisions). 
Subsequent developments
Th e process of the strengthening of Europarties has not fi nished with 
the adoption of the Regulation. Th e Regulation was primarily devoted 
to fi nancing issues, leaving a number of other aspects of the legal status 
of political parties intact. From the very beginning, it was planned that 
revisions would be needed after the fi rst experiences with the practical 
application of the Regulation. Th e Europarties were not calling for an 
increase in the amount of subsidies, but to make the rules governing their 
activities and fi nances less cumbersome. For example, given the rules set up 
by the EU Financial Regulation, Europarties had to spend all the subsidies 
they received in one budgetary year, which made long-term fi nancial 
planning diffi  cult. Such issues were the subject of the 2007 amendment 
to the Regulation. Additionally, this amendment provided a basis for the 
establishment of European political foundations affi  liated to Europarties, 
aiming to complement their work. However, the most pressing problems 
pointed out by the representatives of the Europarties related to their status 
as Non-Profi t-Making Associations based on Belgian law. Th e Regulation 
indicates that Europarties may freely choose a MSs in which they wish to 
have their seat. Given that most Europarties have their seats in Brussels, 
they must abide by the Belgian law. Accordingly, the only possibility for 
Europarties to obtain legal personality is to establish themselves as non-
profi t-making associations. In the opinion of the representatives of the 
main Europarties (interviews: 2006, 2007, 2011), such status gives a bad 
impression to the citizens about the real nature of Europarties and, secondly, 
leads to the situation in which they struggle to function in two diff erent 
but complementary legal orders: one set up by the Regulation and another 
one specifi ed by Belgian law. In January 2011, the EP discussed further 
steps to strengthen the legal position of Europarties. Th e Giannakou 
report adopted in March 2011 (European Parliament 2011) emphasized 
the need for Europarties to respect “the highest standards of internal 
democracy”, inviting parties to involve ordinary citizens in their activities. 
It also proposed that EU parties should have the right to participate in 
national referendum campaigns linked to European integration. In June 
2012, the European Commission was planning to present a draft of a 
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new Regulation, one of whose most important novelties will be precisely 
European legal status for the Europarties. 
However, it seems that the most important development, which 
facilitated subsequent amendment in 2007, and the one that was discussed 
in 2002, is that despite their fears the great opponents of the original 
Regulation 2004/2003, coming primarily from Eurosceptic circles, 
established their own Europarties. Since the entry into force of the 
Regulation, six new extra parliamentary political parties have emerged at 
the European level. Among these was the European Alliance for Freedom, 
uniting the Eurosceptics from such parties as the United Kingdom 
Independent Party (UKIP) and the FPÖ. Th e European Christian Political 
Movement was established as the fi rst Europarty without a political group 
in the EP. However, probably the most interesting development took place 
in 2012. In that year, for the fi rst time even the extreme-right parties 
such as the French and Belgian Fronts Nationals and the British National 
Party would receive EU subsidies for their newly created Europarty 
named the European Alliance of National Movements. Th e majority in 
the EP immediately reacted, demanding that EU law should exclude the 
possibility of funding racist and xenophobic parties, which was in turn 
received among the Eurosceptics as an attempt to remove them from the 
political scene (European Voice 2012). Overall, it seems that, although 
at a slightly lower temperature, future debates on the regulation of EU 
parties in law will combine very diffi  cult and politicized questions (such 
as how to prevent the extreme right from benefi ting from EU money) 
and some technical questions regarding the management and fi nancial 
operations of Europarties. 
 Conclusions
To summarize the process of regulating European political parties in law, 
it is worth quoting Jean-Claude Juncker (quoted in Th omson & Hosli 
2006:3), who described the EU’s decision-making in the following way:
We decide on something, leave it lying around and wait and see 
what happens…If no one kicks up a fuss, because most people don’t 
understand what has been decided, we continue step by step until 
there is no turning back. 
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It seems that the process described above fi ts very well into Juncker’s 
description. Th rough persistent, incremental steps, the process of 
regulating EU parties in law was a success. Th e results of the above analysis 
thus off er a number of crucial points in understanding party politics in 
the European Union, both from the perspective of EU studies as well as 
from perspective of comparative politics.
Our main hypothesis has been confi rmed positively: in the matter 
discussed in this paper, and perhaps beyond, politicians use their national 
experiences as a source of inspiration to devise legislative solutions at EU 
level. Such mechanism was visible in relation to the MSs as well as regarding 
Members of the European Parliament. Th e arguments used in the entire 
debate had their sources, fi rst, in given beliefs about the future of EU 
integration (since the process of party institutionalization was perceived as 
a step towards a more integrated EU), and, second, concerning the model 
of regulating political parties. Such a mix of infl uences resulted in the 
initial set of preference concerning MSs, individual MEPs and political 
groups in the European Parliament.
Th e above analysis has also shown that the confl ict over the adoption 
of party law in the European Parliament did not divide the left and the 
right. It was rather a confl ict between the large and small parties. In the 
same way, many examples of political fi nance reform in the nation state, 
for example in Germany in 1980s, highlight very similar lines of confl ict 
(Scarrow 2004). In the EU, however, it happens that the big Europarties 
are at the same time very pro-European, whereas the small ones (or those 
political forces that did not establish a Europarty) exhibit negative or at 
least reserved views towards European integration. 
While attempting to determine from which national tradition of 
regulating political parties subsequent proposals derived, it still seems 
worth arguing that the fi rst European Parliament report (the Tsatsos 
report) refl ected the prescriptive model, particularly by stipulating the 
conditions for party organization, the adoption and publication of their 
statutes and programmes, and in a practical aspect – the need to adopt a 
democratic programme and democratic mode of functioning. Th e Leinen 
and Dimitrakopolous report seems to operate in the same tradition, due 
to its emphasis on the procedure concerning loss of the status of European 
political party in cases where a party does not respect “democratic 
principles and fundamental rights”. Th ose arguments were also present in 
the Commission’s argument (European Parliament 2001c).
However, since the Tsatsos 1996 report, the subsequent drafts 
and proposals, looking for a wide compromise, softened their content, 
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abandoning the detailed regulation of party structure, elements of its 
programme, etc. Th e draft was becoming less and less strict, to arrive 
in the fi nal version only as a model for fi nancing political parties. It 
seems that it is rather diffi  cult to judge which model – prescriptive or 
permissive – prevails, since in the Regulation itself we have to do mostly 
with the fi nancing scheme. We have still to wait, then, for when it will be 
possible to speak of party law at the EU level.
Appendix A: Grants from the European Parliament to political 
parties at European level 2004-2012
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Source: European Parliament (2012). In the years 2004-2007, the grant from the 
European Parliament amounted to 75 per cent of each Europarty’s total budget. From 
2008 onwards, according to the amended Regulation 2004/2003, it has amounted to 
85 per cent of each Europarty’s total budget. Th e national member parties added the 
remaining 25 (and later 15) per cent of each Europarty’s total budget. With regard to 
European political foundations, in 2008 the grants for operation from the EP covered the 
period between September and December 2008, whereas the preceding period was covered 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Funding of Political Parties in EU Member States
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Introduction
Th e Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Political Reformed Party, 
hereafter, SGP), which was founded in 1918, is the oldest political party 
still functioning in the Netherlands. Since 1922 it has been represented 
continuously in the Lower House (Tweede Kamer) of the Dutch Parliament, 
with fi rst one, then two or three seats (out of a total of 100 and, since 
1956, 150 seats). It can be characterized as an Orthodox Protestant party, 
based on the Bible and the doctrinal so-called Th ree Forms of Unity.
According to Articles 7 and 10 of the SGP’s Statement of Principles 
‘[t]he Word of God holds that, on the basis of the order of creation, man 
and woman have each been given their own and distinct mission and 
place.... Every eff ort at emancipation that negates the God-given mission 
and place of men and women is considered revolutionary and has to be 
combated forcefully.’ More specifi cally, Article 10 of the same Statement 
makes it clear that ‘[t]he notion of [the existence of] a right to vote for 
women which results from a revolutionary striving for emancipation is 
incompatible with woman’s calling’.1
In 2005, legal proceedings were initiated against the SGP after the 
party had evoked anger from some feminist and other organizations 
because it did not nominate women on its election lists. Th e Council 
of State, the highest administrative court in the Netherlands, ruled in 
2007 that the state could not exclude the party from receiving the regular 
political party subsidy. Th ree years later, however, the highest civil court 
in the Netherlands, the Supreme Court, ruled that the state was obliged 
to take (other) measures that would force the party to end the exclusion of 
women from its election lists.2 In 2010, the party submitted an application 
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to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In its decision on 10 
July 2012, the Court declared the application to be manifestly ill-founded, 
and therefore inadmissible.3
Th is chapter will deal with the various legal proceedings in which 
the SGP has been involved both within the Netherlands and before the 
ECtHR. What considerations led to such diff erent outcomes? And what 
have the implications been for party regulation? Th e internationally 
vibrant topic of party regulation has until recently been something of a 
taboo in the Netherlands. Traditionally, the idea was that political parties 
were essentially private associations in whose internal aff airs the state 
ought not to interfere. However, the case of the SGP has led to a political 
and public debate on whether this view can be maintained. Section two 
will look at the national legal proceedings, section three at the European 
level. Section four will argue that the implications for the debate on 
party regulation have not been as signifi cant as anticipated, and that the 
diff erent considerations in the SGP case can be better understood against 
the backdrop of the so-called new institutionalism, whereby not just the 




As was set out above, the legal proceedings against the SGP began in 
2005 when both the SGP and the Dutch state were summoned before the 
civil sector of the District Court by the feminist Test Case Foundation 
Clara Wichmann and a number of other non-governmental organizations 
(Davies 2006).4 According to these organizations, the diff erential 
treatment of men and women with respect to passive suff rage by the SGP 
violated not just their own goals as listed in their articles of association, 
but also the general interest of society in the elimination of discrimination 
as demanded by both the Dutch Constitution and a range of treaty 
obligations.
On 7 September 2005 the District Court declared the case against 
the SGP itself inadmissible. In their claim against the state, however, the 
claimant organizations were more successful: the Court ruled that by 
subsidizing the party pursuant to the Political Parties Subsidies Act, the 
Dutch state had violated Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 
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1979 by the United Nations General Assembly. Th e Court therefore 
forbade the state to grant any further subsidies to the SGP (Davies 2006).
Administrative proceedings
Th e state discontinued the provision of subsidies to the SGP on 20 
December 2005. Th e SGP challenged this decision by the Dutch 
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in new proceedings in 
the administrative law sector of the District Court, but on 30 November 
2006 the court rejected the SGP’s appeal. On 22 December 2006 the 
party then lodged a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction 
Division of the Council of State, the highest administrative court in the 
Netherlands.
Almost a year later, on 5 December 2007, the Council of State 
quashed the lower court’s ruling that the subsidies to the SGP had to be 
stopped.5 Although according to Article 7 (c) of CEDAW the right of 
women to participate on an equal footing with men in non-governmental 
organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life 
of the country had to be ensured, this did not imply the right of women to 
participate in each and every such organization and association. Moreover, 
women who sympathized with the ideas of the SGP but nevertheless 
wanted to be candidates could relatively easily start a party of their own.
Th e SGP’s rights to freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of 
assembly and association and freedom of expression, and hence central 
tenets of the Dutch democracy, were at stake because the measure against 
the SGP put the party at a disadvantage compared to other political 
parties. In its reasoning on whether the principle of gender equality, as 
enshrined in Article 7 of CEDAW, necessitated the state to end subsidies 
to the SGP, the Council of State noted that a democracy such as the 
Netherlands also needs a broad representation of all philosophical and 
religious streams of thought within society. Th erefore, groups with 
views on the biblical vocations of men and women in public life that are 
rejected by the great majority of the population, including most fellow 
Christians, still ought to be given the opportunity to bring their ideas 
to the fore. It would undermine the basic principles of a democracy if 
the state disadvantaged certain groups because of their convictions; this 
would hamper the legitimacy of the outcome of the debate. As long as a 
party abides by criminal law, according to the Political Parties Subsidies 
Act the state should also remain impartial and relate in an even-handed 
manner towards all divergent political ideas. Th erefore, according to the 
Council, the government ought not to interfere with the SGP’s ideas and 
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practices, and not disadvantage the party by withholding subsidies. Th is 
was also demanded by the case law of the ECtHR, which emphasized 
that a state should show restraint in interfering in the various freedoms of 
political parties because of their crucial role in achieving a pluralistic and 
democratic society, unless they constituted a danger to the democratic 
constitutional order (see Ten Napel 2009). According to the Council of 
State, this was not the case with the SGP.
Further civil proceedings
Meanwhile, the civil proceedings continued; the state and the SGP both 
lodged appeals against the District Court’s ruling. In 2008, the Court of 
Appeal ruled, after balancing the principle of non-discrimination against 
the freedoms of the party, that the non-discrimination principle had to 
prevail in this case and that the state was under an obligation to take 
measures against the SGP.6 Th e Court left the nature of these measures 
open, but as a result of the Council of State’s ruling it was clear that these 
could not involve withholding subsidies from the party.
More specifi cally, the Court of Appeal stressed that the freedom of 
religion as protected by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) was not an absolute right. In the case of the SGP, 
moreover, not even the core of this right would be touched upon if passive 
female suff rage were made compulsory. Neither would Article 11 on the 
freedom of association be infringed, as the party could organize itself in 
all other respects in accordance with its statutes. Finally, with respect to 
Article 10, the Court of Appeal once again failed to see how the party’s 
freedom of expression would be restricted because of such a measure. Th e 
Convention, on the contrary, did not allow any exceptions with respect to 
the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of gender.
Like the Council of State, the Court of Appeal found it relevant 
that the case arose with respect to a political party. It interpreted this 
diff erently, however. Th e fact that political parties fulfi l a crucial role 
in constitutional democracies did not keep the Court of Appeal from 
interfering in the internal aff airs of the SGP, but made the violation of the 
non-discrimination principle even worse than it would have been in the 
case of a fully private association. 
Th e state and the SGP appealed again to the Supreme Court, the 
highest judicial institution for civil cases in the Netherlands. On 9 April 
2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s conclusion.7 Th e 
Court declared the voting rights of citizens to be the essential core of 
democracy. Th erefore, it was not acceptable for a political party to act 
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contrary to a clause that grants all citizens equal active and passive voting 
rights, even when this practice is rooted in a party’s religious principles. 
Th is led the Supreme Court to the conclusion that the government needed 
to take eff ective measures against the SGP’s disputed practice. Or, in the 
words of the Supreme Court itself:
‘4.5.3. Th e basic rights of freedom of religion and freedom of 
association – and of course also freedom of expression, which, for the 
matter now in issue, has little if any independent signifi cance next to 
the basic rights just mentioned – guarantee that citizens may unite in 
a political party on the basis of a religious or philosophical conviction 
and may express their conviction and the political principles and 
programmes based thereon within the framework of that party.
In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, however, those 
principles and programmes may only be given practical eff ect within 
the limits posed by laws and treaties.
4.5.4. Th e general representative bodies represent the entire 
population without making distinctions among the citizens of whom 
it is made up. Th ey form the heart of the democracy and a guarantee 
for the democratic content of the State. Th e rights to vote and to 
stand for election are essential to guarantee the democratic content of 
these bodies. Both Article 4 of the Constitution and Article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights taken together 
with its Article 2 and, as far as women are concerned, Article 7 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women guarantee to everyone, without any distinction based 
on gender, the right to elect members of these bodies as well as to be 
elected to them. Th e said provisions mention the right to vote and the 
right to stand for election in the same breath, thus expressing that in 
a democracy they are each other’s necessary pendant, since the voters 
must be able to determine for themselves who among them should 
be eligible.
4.5.5. Seen thus, since the possibility to exercise the right to stand 
for election goes to the core of the State’s democratic functioning, 
it is unacceptable that a political formation in composing its lists of 
candidates violates a basic right that guarantees the elective rights of 
all citizens, regardless of whether such action reposes on a principle 
rooted for that formation in its religious or philosophical convictions. 
To that extent, the prohibition of discrimination set forth in Article 
4 of the Constitution, Article 25 taken together with Article 2 of 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, in the 
particular context of the present case, Article 7 of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
outweighs the other basic rights in issue.
It follows from the above that the SGP’s violation of the basic right, 
guaranteed by the Constitution and the said treaties, to be allowed to 
stand for election on an equal footing with men is not justifi ed by the 
fact that its view of woman’s calling and place in society is directly 
rooted in its religious conviction. Admittedly the SGP cannot be 
denied its conviction and the civil courts are not even competent 
to express an opinion on the question whether that conviction is of 
greater or lesser importance in the faith of the members of the party, 
and admittedly a democratic legal order requires tolerance in relation 
to opinion rooted in religious or philosophical convictions. All that, 
however, does not prevent the courts from fi nding the way in which 
the SGP puts its convictions into practice in nominating candidates 
for general representative bodies unacceptable.’8
As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
in so far as it concluded that the Dutch state was under an obligation 
to adopt an eff ective measure to ensure that the SGP introduced passive 
female suff rage. At the same time, this measure should not infringe the 
party’s rights any more than strictly necessary. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court did not want to decide for the state which particular measure would 
be best suited to achieve this double result.
Th e proceedings before the ECtHR
Th e SGP subsequently launched an application to the ECtHR under 
Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention. However, the ECtHR 
unanimously adjudged the complaint to be inadmissible as manifestly 
ill-founded.9 Th e Court briefl y expressed its doubts concerning the 
SGP being a victim, as the Dutch government had deliberately not yet 
taken any concrete measures against the party, but did not elaborate on 
this.10 Th e reason was that, according to the ECtHR, the application was 
inadmissible for another reason.
Th e Court simply assumed that there had been an ‘interference’ with 
the party’s rights, and that this interference had been ‘prescribed by law’ 
and pursued the ‘legitimate aim’ of protecting ‘the rights of others’.11 
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Next, the Court referred to the Preamble to the Convention, in which 
the importance of democracy was clearly emphasized. It then went on as 
follows:
’70. As the Court has stated many times in its case-law, not only is 
democracy a fundamental feature of the European public order but 
the Convention was designed to promote and maintain the ideals and 
values of a democratic society. Democracy, the Court has stressed, 
is the only political model contemplated in the Convention and the 
only one compatible with it. By virtue of the wording of the second 
paragraph of Article 11, and likewise of Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the 
Convention, the only necessity capable of justifying an interference 
with any of the rights enshrined in those Articles is one that may 
claim to spring from a “democratic society” ….
71. Th e Court has also held that a political party may, under the 
Convention, pursue its political aims on two conditions: fi rstly, the 
means used to those ends must be legal and democratic; secondly, the 
changes proposed must themselves be compatible with fundamental 
democratic principles.... Provided that it satisfi es these conditions, a 
political party animated by the moral values imposed by a religion 
cannot be regarded as intrinsically inimical to the fundamental 
principles of democracy, as set forth in the Convention....
72. Turning to the present matter, the Court reiterates that the 
advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in 
the member States of the Council of Europe. Th is means that very 
weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a diff erence of 
treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with 
the Convention....
73. Moreover, the Court has held that nowadays the advancement 
of the equality of the sexes in the member States of the Council of 
Europe prevents the State from lending its support to views of the 
man’s role as primordial and the woman’s as secondary....
75. No woman has expressed the wish to stand for election as 
a candidate for the applicant party. However, the Court does not 
consider that decisive.…
77. Th e Supreme Court, in paragraphs 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 of its judgment, 
concluded from Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women and from Articles 2 
and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
taken together that the SGP’s position is unacceptable regardless of 
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the deeply-held religious conviction on which it is based.... For its 
part, and having regard to the Preamble to the Convention and the 
case-law ..., the Court takes the view that in terms of the Convention 
the same conclusion fl ows naturally from Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
taken together with Article 14.
78. Th at said, the Court must refrain from stating any view as to 
what, if anything, the respondent Government should do to put a 
stop to the present situation.’12
In an earlier, classic judgment, the Court had already stated that without 
‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness … there can be no democratic 
society’.13 Furthermore, the Court attaches much weight to political parties’ 
freedom of association, also because of the ‘essential’ or ‘primordial’ role 
of political parties within a democracy.14 Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that diversity is completely unlimited: a democracy does not have to allow 
parties that threaten the plural democracy itself and want to replace it. In 
those cases, it can even be necessary, according to the ECtHR, to dissolve a 
party.15 In the SGP’s case, however, only one element of the party’s ideology 
was at stake, raising the question whether or not this was compatible with 
fundamental democratic principles, notably gender equality in politicis. 
Furthermore, in the SGP case the equality principle collides with other 
fundamental rights such as the party’s freedom of association and freedom 
of religion. Although it can therefore hardly come as a surprise that the 
ECtHR in the SGP decision attached so much weight to gender equality, 
it is less than obvious that state measures against the SGP had also to be 
regarded as justifi ed.
Implications for party regulation?
After the rulings of the District Court in the civil proceedings, on 24 
June 2006 the SGP amended its Principles to the extent that it would 
henceforth be possible for women to become members of the party. As 
the ECtHR had already noted, the Dutch Government had deliberately 
waited before taking any concrete measures against the party until after 
the judgment of the ECtHR, a decision that was backed by parliament.16 It 
is an interesting question whether this was the right thing to do, given the 
subsidiarity principle that applies in the relationship between the ECtHR 
and national authorities. One explanation for this, however, is that the 
then Rutte I cabinet was a minority cabinet that needed the support of the 
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SGP to get legislation through the Senate. Meanwhile, in the summer of 
2013 the party was changed from within, because a female member was 
nominated as a candidate for a municipal council.17 In a sense this ended 
the Dutch debate on party regulation before it had actually truly begun.
According to legal scholars Schutgens and Sillen (2010), for example, 
what would perhaps have been most suitable was the addition of a 
provision to the Elections Act that prevents political parties’ statutes from 
being discriminatory (see, however, B.P. Vermeulen and A.J. Overbeeke 
2011: 147ff ).18 De jure exclusion of women by parties such as the SGP 
would then be ruled out, assuming that the parties wished to continue to 
participate in elections, even though it would remain possible in practice 
not to nominate women candidates. However at present not even this 
measure is being debated, let alone the possibly more eff ective measure of 
a legal obligation to nominate women candidates to election lists, a kind of 
quota requirement inspired by the Belgian example (Rodriguez Ruiz and 
Rubio-Marin 2008). In fact, even if made compulsory, the introduction 
of gender quotas in the Netherlands would not guarantee success, as it 
would be possible, for example, for the SGP formally to nominate women 
who would then give up their seats after being elected (Schutgens and 
Sillen 2010). It should be noted, however, that the measure suggested by 
Schutgens and Sillen – the introduction of a provision that obliges parties 
to admit both male and female candidates for elections  – could also 
eventually result in the disqualifi cation of a list submitted for elections 
and should therefore be considered a severe measure as well. Indeed, as 
Eva Brems has stated, ‘it is a very serious measure, since it is the main 
purpose of a political party to compete in elections’ (Brems 2006: 144). 
Th e seriousness of the measure is increased by the fact that, in this case, the 
disqualifi cation of a list submitted for elections would take place largely 
because of the lack of internal party democracy. As Richard S. Katz has 
argued, ensuring appropriate forms of internal party organization and 
political behaviour is probably the most controversial purpose of state law 
concerning political parties (as cited in: Janda 2005: 3).
Th e main aim of this chapter has been to explain the SGP case, and 
indeed its potential signifi cance to party regulation, to an (international) 
audience of non-lawyers. Th e central purpose has not been to present 
our own views on the attempts to balance fundamental rights that were 
undertaken by the various courts in the SGP case, as we have done 
both on an individual basis and together on other occasions. Th e fi rst 
article asked how it was possible that two national high courts could, 
within a reasonably brief period, reach partly opposing conclusions, 
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and what explained the then recent ruling by the Dutch Supreme 
Court. It sought to answer these questions with the help of a normative 
framework for balancing confl icting human rights, and problematized 
the legal-political choice in favor of the concept of positive liberty that 
the Supreme Court appeared to have made. In the article’s conclusion, a 
form of constitutionalism for divided societies was suggested as a possible 
middle ground between positive and negative freedom, procedural and 
substantive democracy, and formal and substantive equality (Ten Napel 
2011). A second article examined the case of the SGP particularly from 
the viewpoint of democratic theory. It concluded that, generally speaking, 
a light version of the substantial democracy conception, of which 
the Council of State’s ruling is representative, is to be preferred over a 
proceduralist conception, by which both the Supreme Court’s ruling and 
the ECtHR’s admissibility decision in the SGP case are characterized. Th e 
diff erence is not so much that one conception of democracy or the other 
makes more moral choices. Rather, as can be learned from the SGP case, 
in a light version of the substantial democracy conception, a broader range 
of constitutional values is taken into account, whereas in a proceduralist 
conception, often one or two specifi c principles are singled out. From that 
perspective, a light version of the substantial democracy conception better 
guarantees the freedom and paradoxically the autonomy of both citizens 
and their associations. Th erefore, it seems more suitable for a proper 
constitutional democracy (Van den Brink and Ten Napel (2013a). 
It is worthwhile here, however, to point to the fact that, just as in the 
fi eld of political science, among civil and constitutional lawyers diff erent 
theoretical approaches can be discerned. Th ese diff erent approaches can 
lead to diff erences in outcome of the case law, over time or space. Th us, 
existing normative frameworks for balancing fundamental rights do not 
lead to an unequivocal result in the SGP case. Th e application of purely 
legal criteria is simply not suffi  cient to tip the scales to one side or the 
other. Consequently, the choice between confl icting fundamental rights 
in a case such as this becomes ‘political’. It would be too simple to accuse 
the various courts of taking a party-political side. Nevertheless, court 
rulings can have important legal-political implications.
In the case of the SGP, what appears to be particularly relevant is 
the importance attached to the role of institutions. Th e so-called neo-
institutionalism is gaining ground within the legal discipline as well. 
According to the underlying social pluralism theory we must recognize 
the variety of institutions that fulfi ll all kinds of roles in society and 
human life, including families, schools, organizations for charity or 
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for the dissemination of (political) ideas, churches and other religious 
institutions, and of course the state. Th ese institutions provide all kinds of 
goods that we need as human beings: food and shelter, love and company, 
mutual help and care, safety and security, livelihood, education, religious 
practice. Furthermore, each institution seems to be equipped with a 
particular authority structure, which suggests that we must prevent them 
from interfering in one another’s internal business. Th is means that the 
state, or the political sphere, is not the sovereign and all-encompassing 
Leviathan, but only one sphere among others, albeit the only one with 
a monopoly on violence. Th e state is not plenipotentiary, and must be 
restricted to a limited area of legitimate interference (the public sphere). 
Th e other aspects of society must be left to the institutions, which are 
supposed to execute their proper authority and deliver their goods (Van 
den Brink and Ten Napel 2013b: 363-364).
Th e more ‘the institutional turn’ is taken, the more there will be a 
tendency, as one author recently put it, to ‘treat ... religious entities as 
largely sovereign institutions, immunizing them from the application of 
civil rights laws and other statutes’ (Horwitz 2013: 10). It is not too far-
fetched to conclude that the Council of State is more representative of this 
approach than the Supreme Court or, for that matter, the ECtHR. Both 
latter courts emphasize rather the principles of individual autonomy and 
self-determination.
It is also possible to look at the debate on party regulation from this 
angle, and then conclude that the fact that the SGP case has thus far 
not led to a (re)launch of the debate on party regulation can at least in 
part be explained by this neo-institutionalism. Paradoxically, this neo-
institutionalism is very much in line with Dutch traditions of tolerance 
and openness, according to which it is appropriate to regard the freedoms 
of conscience and religion, assembly and association, and expression as 
essential to democracy. In particular, the approach of the Council of State 
gives members of a religious community a maximum amount of freedom 
within the boundaries of the law to organize themselves, to defi ne and 
practise their own preferences, according to their own principles. 
As a result, the question is whether the Netherlands, in a comparative 
perspective, is indeed gradually moving away from the British approach 
of defi ning political parties as free associations of individuals, with a 
minimum of state regulation and oversight, towards the German model 
of political parties as specifi c associations with rather well-defi ned legal 
responsibilities, duties and prerogatives. Th is was suggested in the Report 
on the participation of political parties in elections by the Venice Commission 
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(2006, para. 6; cf. Ten Napel 2011: 69). Although tendencies in this 
direction can be seen in, for example, the ruling of the Supreme Court, it 
is too early to tell whether this development will continue or not, certainly 
as far as the legislature is concerned. From a constitutional law point of 
view this is not necessarily to be regretted, as ‘[i]t is vital for the nation 
that there be checks on the government, because government is not always 
right – and may be seriously wrong. Th e needed creative alternatives exist 
in a thriving civil society, a culture with institutions that can dissent from 
the society’s – and governments’ – popular views. A thriving civil society 
is one with strong and independent organizations that can protect and 
promote views that are unpopular, but may turn out to be right. To keep a 
necessary check on government, society needs alternative moral voices and 
those voices will only exist if their institutional framework is protected’ 
(Carlson-Th ies 2010: 18).
Notes
1 Translation taken from: ECtHR 10 July 2012, Case No. 58369/10 
(admissibility decision), Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherlands, 
para. 9.
2 Th e rulings of the Council of State and the Supreme Court are available (in 
Dutch) at www.rechtspraak.nl, under LJ-numbers BB9493, and BK4549 and 
BK4547, respectively.
3 Supra note 1.
4 In a sense, however, the history of the legal battle against the SGP actually 
dates back to the fi rst half of the 1990s. See Ten Napel (2002).
5 Supra note 2.
6 Th e Court of Appeal judgment is available at www.rechtspraak.nl, under 
LJ-number BC0619.
7 Supra note 2.
8 Translation taken from: ECtHR 10 July 2012, Case No. 58369/10 
(admissibility decision), supra note 1, para. 49.
9 Supra note 1.
10 Ibid., para. 67.
11 Ibid., para. 68.
12 Ibid., paras. 70-78.
13 Handyside v the United Kingdom Case no 5493/72 (ECtHR 7 December 
1976), para 49.
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14 Case nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (Grand Chamber) 
(ECtHR 13 February 2003) Refah Partisi (Th e Welfare Party), para 87; United 
Communist Party of Turkey ao v Turkey Case no 133/1996/752/951 (Grand 
Chamber) (ECtHR 30 January 1998), para 25.
15 Refah Partisi (Th e Welfare Party) (supra note 14), para 99.
16 Supra note 1, paras. 56-58.
17 ‘History was made as a woman could lead the orthodox Christian local party, 
www.dutchnews.nl, 21 August 2013; ‘Th e brethren in black suits get their 
fi rst female local leader’, ibid., 27 August 2013.
18 Vermeulen and Overbeeke argue that the Constitution would need to be 
changed fi rst before such a revision of the Elections Act could take eff ect.
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chapter 8
Will it All End in Tears? What Really 
Happens when Democracies Use Law to Ban 
Political Parties
Tim Bale
Queen Mary University of London
Th e legal prohibition of political parties is ‘a practice that exists with 
surprising regularity across the range of democratic societies’ (Issacharoff , 
2007: 1406) but one which continues to provoke controversy in both the 
real and the academic world, not only in diff erent parts of Europe but 
also outside it (see Bourne and Casal, 2014, Bourne, 2012a and 2012b, 
Bogaards et al., 2010; also Reilly and Nordlund, 2008 and Mersel, 2006). 
Indeed, it often connects those sometimes separate spheres. At the end of 
2007, for instance, a column in the Spanish newspaper El País (Gallego-
Díaz, 2007) drew parallels between the banning of parties in Spain and 
Turkey; it also made explicit reference to the scholarly concept of ‘militant 
democracy’ – a term which captures the eff orts on the part of some states 
to prevent elections being used by politicians who will then abolish them 
once they take power. Th e year before, as the EU had to make up its mind 
on how to deal with Hamas after it won a landslide in elections in Gaza, 
the Jerusalem Post treated its readers to a tour round some of the member 
and candidate states that can and have banned political parties, all in 
order to make the point that ‘Europe has taken a much more forgiving 
position toward violent and terrorist organizations that form parties here 
than they do on their own continent’ (Keinon, 2006). Looking at the 
problems of ‘dealing with the Hamas within’, to borrow from the Post’s 
arresting headline, is also interesting because it brings together scholars 
working in diff erent disciplines, most obviously law and political science, 
who not only cross boundaries but also combine empirical enquiry and 
normative concerns (see – for a selection of recent examples – Sawyer, 
2003, Sajó, 2004a, Brems, 2006, Minkenberg, 2006, Mersel, 2006, 
Capoccia, 2007, Issacharoff , 2007, Rosenblum, 2007, Cram, 2008, Th iel, 
2009a and Bourne, forthcoming).
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Th e banning of political parties in democratic states is commonly 
opposed, by politicians, pundits, lawyers and political scientists. Th eir 
opposition is sometimes philosophical: they may be supporters both 
of free speech and free association; they may take what is sometimes 
referred to as a ‘procedural’ rather than ‘substantive’ view of democracy.1 
But bans are also criticized on more practical grounds (see, for instance, 
the debates, past and present, outlined in Olsson, 2003 or the more 
contemporary concerns about banning certain parties in democratic 
Iraq cited by Randall, 2008: 251; see also Th iel, 2009b: 406). Both 
those whose objections are philosophical and those whose objections are 
practical suggest that bans may well prove pointless, counterproductive, 
or endanger hard-won achievements.
Not everyone, of course, agrees – including the present author. In an 
earlier study (Bale, 2007), I attempted to question the common wisdom, 
framed using Hirschman’s perversity, futility and jeopardy theses (see 
Hirschman, 1991), by taking the trouble to look at what another scholar 
calls ‘the actual experiences of functioning democracies confronted with 
[allegedly] antidemocratic challenges from within’ (Issacharoff , 2007: 
1415). A comparative empirical investigation of the consequences of recent 
bans on ‘extremist’ parties in three self-styled European democracies 
(Turkey, Spain and Belgium), selected in order to contrast what Pedahzur 
(2001, 2002) labels ‘militant’, ‘defending’ and ‘immunized’ democracies, 
found that those consequences were nowhere near as dire as predicted.2 
Firstly, bans in those countries saw no accentuation of the potentially 
existential threat apparently posed by the parties aff ected, whether that 
threat be religious, racist, or violent.3 Secondly, those parties did not 
simply carry on as before. Th irdly, bans did not seem to undermine positive 
democratic development and achievements that took place prior to them 
coming into force. Th is suggested that closing down parties – while by 
no means always the only or the right thing to do – is not necessarily a 
mistake, at least on practical rather than on normative grounds.4
Like all studies which involve analysing recent developments, however, 
the study ran the risk of being proved wrong by time and chance. Th e 
bans it spoke about, after all, had occurred within just one decade of 
writing. Mao Zedong,a big fan of banning parties (other than his own of 
course) was once asked what he thought of the French Revolution – an 
event which at the time had occurred a hundred and fi fty years previously 
– and famously (though possibly apocryphally) replied was that it was ‘too 
soon to say’. On that reasoning, it may be premature, therefore, to revisit 
a study only a decade later in order to see whether the judgements made 
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therein still hold good. Yet things have moved on apace in two of the three 
countries concerned (Turkey and Spain), while the lack of development in 
the other (Belgium) could be just as signifi cant. Th is chapter looks at each 
country in turn before coming to an overall conclusion. Do those cases, 
then, still defy the philosophical and practical predictions that legal bans 
on parties will make no diff erence, that they will make things worse, or 
that they will put existing achievements at risk? Or, now that we have had 
more time to make up our minds, does it look instead like they will end 
in tears?
Turkey
‘Mainstream’ parties are often accused of using bans to deprive or even 
destroy small but still irritating opponents on the fringes of the party 
system – militant nationalists, ideological extremists, etc. Th e news 
coming out of Turkey in the spring of 2008 therefore came as quite a 
shock. Th e decision to initiate a case against the Kurdish nationalist 
Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – DTP), accused 
of having links to the outlawed paramilitary group, the PKK (Partiya 
Karkeren Kurdistan), was not the headline-grabber. Indeed, given Turkey’s 
history of banning such parties, notwithstanding objections from the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), that particular move was 
par for the course (see Issacharoff , 2007: 1440-1). In fact, there were 
consequences, which we shall examine later. But what really attracted the 
attention of the world’s media at the time was the unanimous decision, 
on 31 March, of the eleven-member Constitutional Court to hear a suit 
fi led by the Chief Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals to close down 
the AKP. AK, a religious party, had governed Turkey since winning 34 
per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections in 2002 – a share that, in 
Turkey’s disproportional electoral system, gave it 363 seats out of 550. Th e 
court also declared it would consider the Chief Prosecutor’s request to 
bar seventy-one people from politics for fi ve years – a group that included 
not only Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the serving Prime Minister, but also 
Abdullah Gül, the serving President of the Republic, both of whom had 
been key players in the founding of AKP following the prohibition of two 
of its predecessors, Refah (Welfare) and Fazilet (Virtue) which had their 
origins in the Islamist Milli Görüş movement
Th e grounds for the ban were laid out in a 162 page indictment put 
together by the Chief Prosecutor, who, in contrast to the rules governing 
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many other jurisdictions, can bring such a case entirely on his own 
initiative (see Özbudun, 2010: 138). Th e indictment alleged that, because 
of the AK government, what was offi  cially a secular democracy had come 
to be seen throughout the world (and notably by the US) as ‘a moderate 
Islamic republic’. Worse still, it said, the determinedly ‘anti-secular’ party 
was now attempting to take the Republic down a road that would end in 
its becoming an Islamic state on the lines of Iran. Interestingly enough, it 
also pointed out that ‘Th e AKP was founded by a group that drew lessons 
from the closure of earlier Islamic parties and uses democracy to reach its 
goal, which is installing Shari‘a in Turkey.’5 
Th e legal basis for the charge was Turkey’s constitution, which (in 
Article 68) makes it possible to ban any party whose ‘statutes, programs, 
and actions’ run counter to the country’s territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty, or to ‘human rights, the principles of equality and the rule 
of law,’ or to the principles of the democratic and laic Republic’; this is 
then given eff ect by the 1983 Law on Political Parties, which, like the 
constitution itself, has been subject to forceful critique by those who 
argue it aff ords too much discretion to those determined at all costs to 
prevent any dilution of Turkey’s assertively – even aggressively – secular 
and unitary state (see Özbudun, 2010). Under these rules, or those they 
came after, a host of parties have been banned.6 Most were prohibited 
on the grounds that their support for minority (Kurdish) nationalism 
promoted the break-up of Turkey. Some, though, were broken up on 
the grounds that their Islamist ideals, if implemented, would undermine 
Turkey’s commitment to secularism and even put democracy itself at risk, 
much in the way that fascist and communist parties in the 1930s and 
1940s were elected to power but then did away with elections. Th is is 
a pre-emptive rationale that informs bans elsewhere and that has been 
backed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), not least in 
its decision (initially in 2001 and fi nally in 2003) to uphold the Turkish 
Constitutional Court’s banning of one of AK’s predecessors, Refah (see 
Bale, 2007, Issacharoff , 2007, Cram, 2008, Özbudun, 2010).
Th e ban on Refah, and in particular its upholding by the European 
Court, has been subjected to severe criticism on legal and human 
rights grounds, not least because it put more weight on remarks made 
by individual members of the party (which supposedly revealed its true 
intentions) than it did on the party’s offi  cial position and its behaviour 
in offi  ce; the Court also came close not only to equating secularism with 
human rights but also to presuming that shari’a is essentially incompatible 
with democracy which, if true, would rule out the possibility of the latter 
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in almost all Middle Eastern countries that have recently freed themselves 
from dictatorship (see Boyle, 2004 for the most detailed critique). However, 
a number of international scholars, whether they were academic lawyers 
or political scientists and irrespective of the fact that, as such, they were 
sometimes unaware of each other’s work, opined that the bans handed 
out to AK’s predecessors, however contestable their legal justifi cation, 
may have benign rather than malign consequences: Issacharoff , in the 
course of an impressive international survey, even went so far as to suggest 
that ‘under the circumstances, it is diffi  cult to imagine a better outcome’ 
(Issacharoff , 2007: 1447), while Randall, in a wide-ranging piece on party 
regulation, also sees Turkey as ‘a success story’(Randall, 2008: 246). 
Moreover, most Turkish specialists, while making the point, quite rightly, 
that the bans on Refah and Fazilet, were by no means the only drivers of 
change which led the reformists (yenilikçiler) of the Milli Görüş towards 
a more moderate, democratic brand of religiously-inspired politics (see 
Gumuscu and Sert, 2009: 961 and n. 29-32; see also Cizre, 2008 and 
Çinar, 2006), acknowledge that they played a crucial part in the shift 
towards what the AKP calls ‘conservative democracy’ (see Çağliyan-
İçener, 2009 and Adoğan, 2006), even if it might be more accurately 
labelled ‘conservative globalism’ (Öniş, 2009) or even ‘post-Islamism’(see 
Duran, 2010). Has this positive interpretation been contradicted by more 
recent events?
When it comes to perversity, one could, when taking the long view, 
now argue that the banning of Refah in 1998 has had precisely the 
opposite eff ect to that which was intended. Instead of lessening the threat 
of political Islam by obliging its adherents to moderate, it has simply led 
to them pretending moderation in order to create a party that has ensured 
they are in a better position than ever to undermine the secular nature 
of the Turkish state. Th is was, after all, one of the implications of the 
Chief Prosecutor’s indictment. However, to be convincing, those making 
an argument along such lines would have to show that political Islam had 
indeed achieved a sneaky and fi nal victory over secularism. While, as we 
shall see, AK has acted in ways that have given adherents of the latter cause 
for concern, it has hardly, as we shall also see, had things all its own way.
Th e immediate trigger for the case being brought was AK’s decision 
in Feburary 2008 to amend the Turkish Constitution to allow women 
in higher education to wear a headscarf – a measure which would mean 
that observant Muslim women would at last be able to attend university 
within Turkey, rather than, like the daughters of the Prime Minister and 
the President, having to do so overseas. Th e party’s secular opponents, 
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who have long claimed – not wholly without reason (see Wiltse, 2008 and 
Bayram, 2009) – that the headscarf issue is the thin end of an Islamist wedge 
managed to block the governments plans: in early June 2008 Turkey’s 
Constitutional Court declared they violated the country’s constitutional 
commitment to secularism. But this was insuffi  cient to assuage simmering 
resentment on the part of the secularists at the parliamentary selection of 
the President. In the spring of 2007, AK had found its candidate for the 
presidency Abdullah Gül (whose wife, Hayrünnisa, famously wears the 
headscarf) blocked and had decided to call an early election as a show 
of strength. At the election AK won 341 seats in the 550 seat parliament 
increasing its vote share by over 12 per cent but leaving it some twenty-six 
seats shy of a two-thirds majority. It nevertheless succeeded (albeit on the 
third round of voting and by a simple majority) in getting Gül (formerly 
Turkey’s Foreign Minister) elected and sworn in August 2007, even if the 
ceremony was boycotted by the army, which had, back in April, issued an 
‘e-memorandum’ which many interpreted as threatening a coup d’ état if 
AKP pushed its luck. 
Survey research suggests that much of the vote for the AKP in 2007 was 
driven not by religious zeal shari’a for or a desire to dismantle the Kemalist 
state but by a combination of enthusiasm for the party’s apparently 
successful stewardship of the economy and the distinctly unimpressive 
alternative off ered by the main opposition, the CHP, which seemed intent 
on defending the interests of its core support – the secularist, urban, middle-
class elite (Çarkoğlu, 2007, Öniş, 2009, and Kalaycıoğlu, 2010; see also 
Dagi, 2008: 29-30).7 AK’s leadership, however, seemed to many observers 
to interpret its victory almost as a mandate for regime change.8 An initial 
post-election plan to build a consensus around a new Constitution drafted 
by academics was quickly derailed by the government’s decision to push 
for just two amendments that would allow the wearing of headscarves. 
Just as seriously, the AKP wasted no time in exercising the executive’s right 
to make appointments to all sorts of bodies that were hitherto the preserve 
of secularists, continuing a trend that began with its election to offi  ce 
in 2002.9 It was the President of the Board of Higher Education, Yusuf 
Ziya Ozcan, chosen by President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, who 
backed the government’s campaign on the headscarf and who stood to 
gain greater control of universities as outgoing rectors were replaced. Gül, 
like the President of the USA, also gets to nominate judges to the highest 
court in the land as his predecessors’ secularist choices begin to retire 
– the very judges who decide on constitutional issues, including party 
bans. Moreover, although the AKP government has not yet succeeded in 
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getting the state to relinquish its control of mosques and sundry religiously 
endowed businesses and associations, it seems intent to exploit its tenure to 
move religiously inclined nominees into both high and low level posts, for 
example in the judiciary. Th e promotion of religious schools (Imam-Hatip) 
and an increase in the resources of the state’s Directorate of Religious 
Aff airs (Diyanet) have also worried secularists. Many liberals are no less 
alarmed by increased restrictions (often locally initiated) on alcohol sales 
and by the reduction in the number of women in top positions, not least 
in the AKP government itself (see Çağaptay and Perincek, 2010).
Opponents of such developments claim also point to the links between 
the AKP – a champion of privatization and in charge of public procurement 
– and the Islamist (but also neoliberal) business organization, MÜSİAD 
(see Şen, 2010: 71-76).10 Th ey point, as well, to the rising infl uence of 
the Islamist and nationalist Fethullah Gülen Movement (see Criss, 2010: 
50-52) in both domestic and foreign aff airs, where Turkey, without 
abandoning NATO, has clearly moved to improve relations with Arab 
countries and Iran while cooling considerably toward Israel (even before 
that country’s botched boarding operation against Turkish vessels heading 
for Gaza in May 2010 and its subsequent refusal to apologize for the loss 
of life). Th e AKP’s critics also claim that the government is exploitng its 
apparent success in exposing and tackling what is popularly known as the 
Ergenekon (a shadowy conspiracy linked to the military) to its advantage 
by hinting that those who criticize the AKP are somehow implicated in 
Turkey’s Derin Devlet, the ‘deep state’ that supposedly ‘really’ runs the 
country (see, for a balanced view, Jenkins, 2009). Some also claim to have 
identifi ed a politically motivated attempt by the government to bankrupt 
the Doğan media group, which in recent years has become something of 
a thorn in its fl esh.
Th e AKP, then, might like to portray itself to the outside world as a 
responsible, conservative reformist party doing its democratic best in the 
face of what it calls ‘totalitarian secularism’. It might even claim that it is 
no more integralist than its Christian Democratic counterparts (see Nasr, 
2005; see also Hale, 2005). But its political opponents argue that such 
claims ring hollow when the reality of the regime’s actions, and indeed 
its populist rhetoric, is examined more closely. Academic observers are 
naturally less inclined to buy wholesale into the idea that the AKP’s leaders 
are ‘theocrats in neckties,’ not least because many of them have a pedigree 
as reformers which predates their founding of a party which, it has been 
persuasively argued, represents a genuine break with its predecessors 
and one motivated not simply by political expediency but by profound 
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political and social change that has created space and demand for a party 
committed not to shari’a but to governing competence, free markets, and 
‘conservative democracy’ (see Dagi, 2008, Gumuscu and Sert, 2009 and 
Dönmez, 2010). On the other hand, the party’s actions in offi  ce have 
clearly provoked considerable concern about ‘creeping Islamization’ both 
among Turkish and foreign observers (see for example, Yeşilada and 
Rubin, 2010, Çağaptay, 2009).
Some of these – particularly those who argue (not unreasonably 
it should be emphasized) that there is a fundamental and possibly 
ineradicable incompatibility between Islamism and liberal democracy 
– were never particularly inclined to give AKP the benefi t of the doubt 
(Tibi, 2008 and 2009).11 Yet even some of those who are prepared to do so 
admit that the party ‘has yet to clarify its position on the role of religion in 
social life’ (Gumuscu and Sert, 2009: 958) and ‘is open to criticism on the 
grounds that it has a narrow majoritarian and instrumental understanding 
of democracy and has ignored the sensitivities of the secular segments 
of society’ during a fraught post-election period which has exposed ‘the 
limits of liberal Islam and the underlying tensions between [its] globalist 
and conservative elements’ (Öniş, 2009: 35, 37; see also Yavuz, 2009). 
And even those who are most inclined to believe in the transformation 
of the AKP wonder whether the party’s need to borrow Western liberal 
rhetoric to defend itself against militant secularism has actually prevented 
it from fi nding a genuinely novel, Islamic, and therefore stable, synthesis 
(see Duran, 2010; see also Jenkins, 2008 for an excellent overview).
On balance, however, no objective observer could conclude that bans 
on its Islamist predecessors have perversely backfi red by leading to the 
creation of a party, AKP, that is clearly interested in, or has yet succeeded 
in overthrowing Turkey’s secular republic by stealth in order to bring into 
being some sort of Islamic republic. Indeed, more recent events – involving 
crackdowns on protesters and social media, the harassment of journalists, 
and the justifi cation of such actions on the part of the prime minister 
by his pointing to the fact that his party is still capable of winning big 
majorities in various second order elections – smack less of a regime on the 
road to theocracy and more of the sort of depressing tactics the world is 
all-too-used to seeing from secular politicians tempted by more ‘managed’ 
forms of democracy.
But if the charge of perversity can be dismissed on the grounds that it 
was the threat to secular democracy that provoked Turkey’s bans, actual 
or putative, what about futility? One could, after all, argue that attempts 
to ban AK itself implies that previous bans have been pointless, not simply 
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(or even mainly because) some of the banned entities have survived in 
other guises, but because such bans have done nothing to resolve the 
continuing tension between political Islam and militant secularism. Th is, 
however, is to place too much of a burden on one legal instrument. Th e 
confl ict between AK and its supporters and Turkish secularists, be they 
in the military, the bureaucracy or simply in civil society and the general 
population, is a profound political cleavage which no single measure can 
hope to ‘cure’. 
What about jeopardy – the idea that bans endanger previous 
achievements? If anything, one eff ect of the threat to ban was, fi rstly, to 
encourage AKP publically to place even more stress on liberal values like 
human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in order to defend its actions 
in the court of international opinion.12 Secondly, and not unrelatedly, the 
threat of a ban temporarily resuscitated the AK’s enthusiasm for Europe 
(see Çinar, 2006: 480-1) which, since the general election of 2007, had 
appeared to be cooling, notwithstanding (or possibly because of) the 
opening of so far pretty fruitless accession negotiations in 2005. Both 
Prime Minister and President clearly decided that cosying up once again 
to the EU would be their best hope of deterring the Turkish Courts from 
an unfavourable judgement, EU diplomats having made it very clear since 
the case was accepted that a ban on AK would constitute a serious obstacle 
to good relations. On the other hand, this is to assume that people both 
inside and outside Turkey really set much store by the thinly veiled 
warnings issued by, among others, High Representative Javier Solana and 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn who was quoted in the media as 
saying that ‘In EU member states, the kinds of political issues referred to 
in this case are debated in the parliament and decided through the ballot 
box, not in court rooms.’13
Th e unconscious irony of Rehn’s words, given that Europe is no 
more immune than anywhere else from the (often politically-driven) 
‘judicialization of mega-politics’ (Hirschl, 2008), may have escaped some, 
even if the superiority complex which they betray is far from subtle. But 
suggestions that the EU would have trouble dealing with a state which 
bans parties was slightly diffi  cult to credit given that (as the Jerusalem 
Post acidly observed when writing about how Europe was ‘dealing with 
‘the Hamas within’) its own members are no slackers when it comes to 
proscription or other measures designed to hobble parties deemed to be 
threats to democracy. Nor is it true, as Turkey’s Foreign Minister (echoing 
Rhen) asserted in an interview aimed at both an international as well as 
a domestic audience (Babacan, 2008), that states strictly limit bans (or 
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actions which try to achieve similar results by apparently lesser measures) 
to parties that advocate or employ violence. As one recent study notes, 
there are at least three additional rationales (including the prevention 
of incitement to hatred, of an existential change to the character of the 
state, and of outside interference) – not surprisingly so, given we live in 
an ever more complicated and ever more democratic world where fascism 
is no longer the only or even the most imminent danger (see Rosenblum, 
2007). And, as a comprehensive survey of both international conventions 
and national codes (Brems, 2006) shows, these other rationales are built 
into and thereby acknowledged by both domestic and international law.
In the event, Turkey’s Constitutional Court did not end up banning 
the AKP when it announced its decision in July 2008. Although it 
believed that that the party was ‘a focal point’ for anti-secular activities, 
this appeared to be off set for a suffi  cient number of the justices by the 
lack of either incitement to violence or clear and present danger; equally 
signifi cant was AK’s support for the legislative and constitutional reforms 
urged on the country by the EU (see Vidal Prado, 2009: 307). Instead 
of banning, the Court made use of ‘wiggle room’ which allowed it to 
‘discipline’ the government without bringing it down and making an 
already serious situation even worse. Two amendments to the constitution 
in 2001 left open the possibility that a party could be fi ned rather than 
closed down (Article 69, paragraph 7) and required any ruling on such 
matters would henceforth require a three-fi fths majority (seven out of 
eleven) instead of a (six out of eleven) simple majority (Özbudun, 2010: 
136-7). Th e new decision-rule saved the AKP in 2008, it was widely 
attested, precisely because of the availability of the alternative sanction 
(agreed by ten of the eleven judges). Handing down a fi ne equivalent to 
half the party’s state funding for that year (an amount approaching US$20 
million), the Head of the Court, Haşim Kılıç, made it clear, that the AKP 
should regard the judgement as ‘a serious warning’ and professed the hope 
that it would ‘get the message’.
Th is is likely to be the absolute limit of any leeway granted to the 
Court (and therefore to the political parties on whom it sits in judgement) 
in the foreseeable future: providing any more room for manoeuvre would 
in all likelihood involve amending the so-called ‘unamendable’ articles 
of the Constitution, such as its staunch commitment to secularism – a 
move that would require two-thirds of MPs and therefore the support of 
opposition parties. AK’s hopes that it would gain a big enough majority 
at the general election of June 2011 to allow it to submit its proposals to a 
referendum without consulting its opponents were dashed when, although 
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it increased its share of the vote to 49.8 per cent, it actually lost seats – an 
irony given its continued support for a system whose 10 per cent threshold 
clearly favours big, national parties and discriminates against smaller 
formations, ensuring, for example, that even the biggest Kurdish party 
is best off  sponsoring supposedly independent candidates in individual 
constituencies in order to make it into parliament. AK’s ambitions for 
a new constitution however, have not faded and its eff orts continued to 
alarm secularists, who noted that, of the package of ‘minor’ amendments 
approved in a referendum in September 2010, progress on implementation 
was greatest on those measures (like changes to judicial appointments) 
which arguably favour AK. Th ey can, of course, be seen as illustrative of 
a less worrying and not uncommon tendency (see Hirschl, 2008: 109-10) 
among those elected politicians who have suff ered at the hands of courts 
to take steps – sometimes involving institutional changes – to minimize 
the risk of it happening again. 
In Turkey, of course, it already has. After the AKP was ‘spared’ in July 
2008, the world turned its attention away from the country. As a result, 
it largely ignored the Constitutional Court’s decision in the other case 
brought by the Chief Prosecutor, namely his call for the closure of the 
Kurdish nationalist DTP, which continued to call for more autonomy, as 
well as doing nothing to undermine the assumption that it was eff ectively 
the political wing of the outlawed PKK. In December 2009, the Court, 
citing articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and the Party Law, ordered 
DTP be shut down on the grounds that it threatened the state’s integrity 
and was linked to terrorist violence – links which probably explain the 
muted reaction to the news from the EU, whose revolving presidency (like 
the AKP) did little more than express its concern. Th e DTPs assets were 
seized, two of its parliamentarians removed from parliament, and nearly 
forty of its members barred from political activity for fi ve years.
Th at opponents of the ban in Turkey insisted this was bound to set 
back a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish problem, while the party’s 
remaining MPs promptly followed form and joined a successor party, Barış 
ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP), already set up a ‘lifeboat’ for them, inevitably 
throws up questions, if not of perversity, then of jeopardy and futility. 
In the elections of June 2011, the BDP (eff ectively the eighth party of its 
kind) and the independents it sponsored made it into parliament only to 
fi nd that several of them were denied their seats after being imprisoned for 
links with the PKK while another, Hatip Dicle, was barred on the grounds 
of a previous conviction for spreading terrorist propaganda – an off ence 
not so very diff erent, some argued, from the one which saw the Prime 
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Minister Erdoğan banned from parliament back in 2002 until a change 
was made to the law (with cross-party support) to rectify the situation. In 
Dicle’s case no such change was forthcoming, despite widespread concern 
that the country’s Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) had acted arbitrarily 
in his and other cases. As a result, 169 MPs – most of them from the 
main secularist opposition party who were protesting about two of their 
would-be colleagues being barred on the grounds of alleged involvement 
in a putative military coup – refused to take their oath of offi  ce.
Sympathy for the plight of the BDP, however, is qualifi ed in many 
quarters by the suspicion that many of those elected on its slates are 
indeed linked to the PKK, which ended a ceasefi re in the summer of 2011 
and returned to a strategy of violent provocation of the army and an AK 
government – a government which had looked determined to pursue a 
more liberal policy toward the Kurds. Th at the return to violence and 
the barring and refusal of the BDP coincided suggested to some that the 
BDP’s actions were all of a piece with the PKK cooling on the idea of a 
political rather than a warfi ghting strategy, although others argued that 
it was the proscription of elected candidates that caused (or at the very 
least reinforced) the decision to return to violence. Ironically, the civilian 
deaths that occurred as a consequence so outraged the general public in 
Kurdish areas that some prominent BDP politicians felt obliged to come 
out against them. Moreover, at the beginning of October 2011, those BDP 
MPs not subject to a ban (ie the vast majority of them) decided to take up 
their seats, primarily in order to be able to join in all-party talks on a new 
constitution.
In the Kurdish case, then, the arguments are more fi nely balanced 
than they are in the case of the AKP and the banned religious parties it 
took over from. While the decision to ban the BDP’s predecessors, and to 
disbar some of its elected candidates from actually taking up their seats, 
may not have made things worse, it can hardly be said to have made them 
better. Moreover, the fact that the BDP would still appear not to have 
put clear blue water between itself and the PKK suggests that previous 
bans can, with some reason, be said to have been futile. Th e possibility 
of progress towards an all-party agreement on a new constitution – a 
document which may well make it less easy to ban parties in the future – 
means it would be premature to say that the proscription of yet another 
Kurdish formation (or at least some of its MPs) has ended in tears. But if, 
in the end, tears are shed they are likely to be triggered not so much as the 
result of the bans but as a consequence of the ongoing failure to solve (or 
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at least manage) the tension between the Kurds’ desire for independence 
and Turkey’s determination to preserve its borders intact.
Spain
Some of the same issues, of course, have been thrown up in Spain, 
although in that case the argument against futility (and jeopardy and 
perversity) would appear to be stronger – and to have grown stronger 
as time moves on. Th e supposedly ‘permanent’ ceasefi re declared by the 
Basque terrorist group ETA in March 2006 lasted only just over a year – 
a year during which socialist politicians were prepared (in the end to no 
avail) to risk opposition accusations that they were secretly negotiating 
with ETA’s political wing, Batasuna, whose prohibition in 2003 they had 
supported and whose successors they had, as a government, similarly shut 
down (see Ferreres Comella, 2004 and Vidal Prado, 2009). Although the 
ceasefi re formally fi nished on 6 June 2007, it had eff ectively ended in 
December 2006 when an explosion at Madrid airport ‘accidentally’ killed 
two people. ETA mounted numerous attacks thereafter, some of them 
deadly. Given that in the period immediately before the ban on Batasuna, 
ETA had generally tried (not always successfully) to avoid fatalities, 
opponents of the ban could claim jeopardy – put bluntly, to suggest that 
things have got worse. Th ey also argued that one of the reasons that ETA 
called off  its ceasefi re was the Government’s stubborn refusal during secret 
negotiations, fi rstly, to allow Batasuna to take part in all-party talks in the 
Basque Country on a political solution to the confl ict and, secondly, to 
take steps to facilitate its re-legalization in time for the municipal elections 
of 2007 and the general election of 2008 – supposedly more proof, if 
proof were needed, that the Spanish state’s uncompromising stance made 
a settlement of the Basque question much more diffi  cult than it really 
needs to be (see Guittet, 2008: 284; see also Woodworth, 2007).
Th ese criticisms, however, are fl awed. With regard to the apparent 
increase in fatalities, ETA’s willingness (and capacity) to take lives always 
fl uctuated but actually declined in recent years, though not of course 
simply as a result of the ban on Batasuna (see de la Calle and Sánchez-
Cuenca, 2009: 214). With regard to frustration at the ban being responsible 
for ending the ceasefi re, this ignores the fact that, when the bomb went 
off  at Madrid airport, it clearly took not just the government but some 
of its ETA and Batasuna interlocutors by surprise. Indeed, the latter 
scrambled, in the days and weeks that followed, to keep the peace process 
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on track – all in vain because it became clear that (younger) hardliners 
within the terrorist organization had (temporarily at least) triumphed 
over the moderates or simply taken matters into their own hands, forcing 
their internal opponents either to disown them and admit disunity or 
(as they eventually did) hang together and, however reluctantly, call off  
the ceasefi re. It was clear, then, that at the time of the airport attack, 
Batasuna’s leadership was still hopeful that it might allowed to contest the 
municipal elections; indeed, they were probably well aware that, if history 
was anything to go by, their fortunes were likely to be much improved if 
they could stand during a lull in the bombings and shootings. Th e end of 
the ceasefi re, then, had more to do with disputes over strategy within ETA 
than it did with the ban on Batasuna per se.
Such oscillation between violence and negotiations will be familiar 
to anyone tracking the behaviour of the IRA in the initial phase of the 
Irish peace process even though its ‘political wing’, Sinn Féin, was not 
banned (see Richards, 2008). Th e Irish example, of course, is now even 
more relevant than ever since, in late October 2011, ETA (following a few 
months of ceasefi re) fi nally declared a defi nitive (and according to most 
observers genuine) end to its armed struggle, following a peace conference 
in Donostia-San Sebastián attended by, among others, former Irish Prime 
Minister Bertie Ahern, Tony Blair’s former Chief-of-Staff , Jonathan 
Powell, and Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams. Although decommissioning of 
weapons and disbandment of the organization itself were still apparently 
some way off , and polls suggested scepticism among many Spaniards, 
this development, above all, suggests that the ban on Batasuna did not, 
as many predicted, prove counterproductive. Whether that ban actually 
contributed to peace is, of course much harder to assess. It would be easy 
to fall into the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy and assume that because a 
permanent peace followed the ban, that the latter led to the former. But 
that is a temptation that must be avoided.
In the light of this, how, then, should we consider futility? Has the 
ban really made no diff erence? Even if we forget the possibly specious 
argument that it has, in fact, led to peace, there are ways of assessing the 
question, the most obvious being the extent to which the banned party 
has been able simply to continue its political-electoral activities by, for 
example, creating ‘lifeboat’ or ‘spare’ parties which carry on its work as 
if nothing had happened. Early critics of the ban, for example, pointed 
to the way in which a tiny party formed just prior to the ban, EHAK-
PCTV (Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista – Partido Comunista de 
las Tierras Vascas), openly appealed, in the 2005 elections for the Basque 
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parliament, to voters who would otherwise have voted for the Aukera 
Guztiak list that was proscribed as simply a front for Batasuna – an appeal 
that saw them come from nowhere to win 12.3 per cent of the vote and 
nine (out of 75) seats. Following the election, critics of the ban pointed to 
evidence of links between that party and Batasuna, especially after one of 
EHAK’s MPs was discovered at a September 2007 meeting of Batasuna 
leaders broken up by police, as well as to the seizure of documents which 
appeared to show payments from EHAK to members of Batasuna. On 
the other hand, the fact that it took the authorities until February 2008 
to prevent it participating at the forthcoming general election is testimony 
to the fact that EHAK was very careful until then to avoid publicly giving 
aid or comfort to a terrorist organization, in other words to avoid doing 
anything the ban was designed to prevent. 
Possibly because of this reluctance, Batasuna – ETA made several 
attempts to put together other formations that would facilitate its 
involvement in elections and municipal and regional government. Th e 
most obvious of these – so obvious in fact that it may have been more 
a symbolic gesture than a genuine attempt – was the planned launch of 
Abertzale Sozialisten Batasuna – Unión de Socialistas Patriotas in March 
2007, less than two months before the 27 May municipal elections. Given 
its use of the Bastasuna brand and those who were involved, some of 
whom were facing criminal charges, its swift proscription prior to the 
elections in question came as no surprise. In fact, the Supreme Court 
(whose ruling was then upheld by the Constitutional Court) banned all 
246 lists (containing thousands of candidates) presented by ASB, but also 
133 lists presented by another outfi t, the EAE-ANV (Eusko Abertzale 
Ekintza – Acción Nacionalista Vasca). EAE-ANV, like ASB, with which it 
stood in an electoral alliance called Abertzale Sozialistak, was deemed to 
be a ‘fraudulent successor’ of Batasuna; the fact that it had been around (if 
not particularly active) for decades made no diff erence since it had clearly 
been ‘infi ltrated’ or colonized by Batasuna.
Only those EAE-ANV lists that contained three or more candidates 
deemed to be ‘infi ltrators’ were proscribed in 2007 but even this denied 
them a presence in over half of all Basque local contests as well as the 
regional elections in Navarra, an autonomous community that many 
Basques see as an integral part of their homeland. Th e so called ‘votantes 
huérfanos’ of the banned formations either stayed at home or provided 
an unexpected windfall for other parties, such as the Nafarroa Bai 
electoral alliance in Navarra, which scored 24 per cent on its fi rst outing. 
Nevertheless, the remaining lists of the EAE-ANV netted the party over 
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70,000 and 20,000 votes in local elections in the Basque Country and 
Navarra respectively – results which gave it eff ective control of 33 councils 
in the former and 9 in the latter. EAE-ANV was, however, eff ectively 
prevented by the Supreme Court from standing in the 2008 general 
election (see below) – a decision which, once again, probably saw votes 
transferred to Nafarroa Bai, which won one seat.
Th is action in particular illustrates that, even for those who support 
them, bans continue to throw up dilemmas or even injustices. One of the 
most obvious of these relates to the prevention of individuals standing for 
election simply because they appear on the same party list as others who 
in the past stood (quite legally at the time) either for Batasuna or one of its 
predecessors. Worse still, they might be prevented from standing if anyone 
on their list previously appeared on a list along with candidates belonging 
to Batasuna or its predecessors – all of which means that it is perfectly 
possible that lists have been banned even though none of the individuals 
on them have ever stood for Batasuna or its predecessors. Although one 
might argue that the candidates concerned could always have stood on a 
diff erent list (that is, for parties that clearly reject violence), this is a serious 
and perhaps undue restriction on individuals’ political rights. 
Given that the stakes are so high, and that Spanish courts have 
continually proved themselves willing to back bans on Batasuna and its 
supposed successors, it is hardly surprising that the ECtHR has become 
involved in the Spanish as well as the Turkish case. In December 2007 
the Court declared that it was prepared to hear Batasuna’s claim that 
the Spanish government had violated its right to freedom of expression 
(article 10) and its right to freedom of association (article 11). Even though 
it ruled out a claim under article 13 (that the plaintiff  had no eff ective 
remedy before a national authority) – thereby agreeing that the Spanish 
legal process was watertight – this represented encouraging news for 
opponents of the ban since only a tiny minority of claims even make it so 
far as a hearing.
By no means all legal scholars believed that the Strasbourg Court would 
fi nd in favour of Spain (see Cram, 2008: 90-5), although some observers 
suspected that the state’s case may well have been strengthened by the fact 
that, in February 2008, Spanish judges had rejected urgent requests by the 
government and prosecutors simply to impose a blanket ban on EHAK 
and ANV in advance of the general election to be held the following 
month. Instead, they chose the lesser (but immediately eff ective) option 
of cutting off  the parties’ funding and preventing them from presenting 
candidates, declaring, interestingly, that the latter was designed to prevent 
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parties claiming some kind of parliamentary immunity in the face of a 
future application to ban them completely. Th is – allowing the party to 
continue but preventing it contesting elections – mimics the ‘smarter’ 
sanctions employed for some time by Israel (which like Spain now permits 
the banning of parties supporting terrorism), arguably to good eff ect 
(Issacharoff , 2007: 1447-51 and Navot, 2008). Whether, however, it had 
any impact on the ECtHR is a matter for speculation, but in June 2009 
the Court upheld the dissolution of Batasuna; it also upheld the Spanish 
legal system’s right to prevent successor parties running candidates in 
elections (running all the way up from local to European) in an attempt 
to render the initial ban useless, although it stressed that it would have to 
be able to show strong links between those candidates and the dissolved 
party (see Černič, 2010, for a critique). 
Although Spanish courts’ decisions preventing certain lists and 
candidates from being put before the electorate led to demonstrations 
in the Basque country (and even to a clandestine meeting called to 
organize another party by Batasuna members who were promptly arrested 
by police), it gained a good deal of support in the rest of Spain. Yet the 
precautionary principle on which it was based, however reasonable and 
pragmatic, again raises thorny questions since, in eff ect, the ‘defendants’ 
are presumed guilty until proven innocent. Also problematic is the extent 
to which being seen to pursue the same objective as that pursued by 
the men of violence may by itself be enough to create a link between a 
candidate or a party and such men: the danger of ‘guilt by association’ 
(one, in fact, raised in the Spanish case by a UN Special Rapporteur) is 
blatantly obvious (see Černič, 2010: 11). Th e common response to such 
concerns, namely that ETA hardly gives the benefi t of the doubt to its 
victims (one of whom, a former Socialist councillor was gunned down 
in front of his wife and fi ve-year old daughter less than forty-eight hours 
before polling day in March 2008) is understandable, but not perhaps 
wholly convincing. More persuasive perhaps is the argument – one fl oated 
in debates about the prohibition of Nazi-inspired parties in Germany (see 
Niesen, 2002: 34-5) – that the intimidation resulting from such attacks 
creates a climate of fear in which alternatives to the party which instils 
such fear, fail to emerge or at least to thrive to the extent that one might 
expect in a fully-fl edged democracy. 
At the regional elections of 2009, Batasuna – already under pressure 
from Aralar (the secessionist but non-violent party founded by some of 
its disillusioned partisans in 2000) – again tried to get together a new 
party that would run lists on which its activists would stand. However, 
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D3M (Democracia Tres Millones or Demokrazia Hiru Milioi), was banned, 
obliging Batasuna to call on its supporters to vote for it anyway – votes 
which have to be totted up even if they count for nothing. Th e response 
from nationalists was not unimpressive: had D3M been running it would 
almost certainly have gained over 100,000 votes or around 8.5 per cent. 
On the other hand, this still represented a signifi cant drop compared to 
the 12.3 per cent which went to EHAK-PCTV when the same seats were 
fought in 2005. Of course, not all of those who chose to cast a ballot 
that counted went straight over to Aralar (or indeed more mainstream 
nationalists) but many of them did (see de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 
2009: 218-222).
In February 2011, however, in anticipation of municipal and regional 
elections, a new party, explicitly rejecting violence and promising an 
exclusively political campaign for Basque independence, Sortu, was 
founded. In late March 2011, though, it was denied the chance to stand 
candidates by a majority decision of the Supreme Court on the familiar 
grounds that it was, eff ectively, a ruse by which Batasuna activists could 
participate in the upcoming elections. In response, yet another electoral 
coalition, Bildu, was announced. Composed of the Eusko Alkartasuna 
party (originally a splinter party from the mainstream PNV) and the 
smaller (and more left-leaning) Alternatiba, as well as some supposedly 
non-affi  liated ‘independents’, it was formed just before the election 
campaign began. It too was banned by the Supreme Court in early May; 
but a few days later the Constitutional Court (on a 6-5 majority vote) 
overturned the decision, arguing that, although there were concerns about 
two or three of the independents having Batasuna connections, they were 
not suffi  cient to permit the banning of two parties with an unblemished 
record of non-violence. Th is decision outraged the conservative Partido 
Popular but was greeted with relative equanimity by the PSOE minority 
government in Madrid – not surprisingly perhaps in view of the fact 
that the Supreme Court’s initial decision looked like costing it the vital 
parliamentary support of the mainstream Basque Nationalists, the PNV.
Th e Constitutional Court’s decision allowed Bildu to contest the 
elections, at which it performed impressively, winning, for example, 25 per 
cent of the vote in the city of San Sebastián and 13 per cent in the Navarre 
regional contest. In late September 2011, Bildu’s main components, 
Eusko Alkartasuna and Alternatiba, announced that they would be 
getting together with Aralar to form a coalition (called Amaiur) in order 
to contest the general election of 2011. It won seven seats in parliament 
that November, fi elding candidates in the Basque Country and Navarra. 
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To argue, however, that all this means the ban on Batasuna was futile 
would be inaccurate. Th e new electoral coalition, while still separatist and 
left-wing, seems genuinely committed (or at the very least reconciled) to 
peace and no longer prepared to act as a front for, or to try to excuse, 
ETA violence, even it its stands on prisoners off ends some Spaniards. In 
any case, there is now no violence (apart from the violence of the past) 
to excuse. If that continues to be the case, then there is no longer any 
justifi cation for a ban.
Belgium
In Belgium, things do not seem to have got any worse. When it comes to 
elections, Vlaams Belang, the successor to the banned Vlaams Blok has, 
if anything, lost rather than gained support. In the municipal elections 
of October 2006, VB improved its performance in many places in 
Flanders but, despite a slightly increased share of the vote in its ‘home-
city’, Antwerp, where it took 33.5 per cent, it actually suff ered a reverse – 
this despite VB’s claim (heavily disputed) that it could now count on the 
support of large numbers of Antwerp’s 20,000 strong Orthodox Jewish 
community, now supposedly prepared to forgive its past links with the 
Nazi occupation in common cause against the cities growing Muslim 
population.14 At the June 2007 general elections, the party won 17 out of 
150 seats in the Chamber of Representatives (down one seat albeit on a 
marginally increased vote share of 18.9 per cent) and 5 out of 40 seats in 
the Senate (the same as in 2003). VB also performed relatively poorly in 
the EP elections of 2009, its 15.9 per cent of the vote representing a drop 
of over seven points compared to its share in 2004. And at the general 
election of June 2010, VB was clearly outperformed by its separatist (non-
far-right) rival N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie), taking just 12.3 per cent 
of the vote and losing fi ve and two seats in the lower and upper house 
respectively. In 2014 it performed even more poorly, winning only 3 seats 
(out of 150) in the lower house in the federal election and just 1 seat (out 
of Belgium’s 21) in the European Parliament. Th is could even be a party 
on its way out.
Of course, strictly speaking, even if Vlaams Belang had instead made 
big electoral strides this would not constitute an argument against a ban 
on its predecessor: after all, bans are designed to rid the public sphere of 
parties whose infringement of basic human rights or whose advocacy of 
such infringement poses a real threat to democracy or public safety; they 
214 bale
are not designed – or at least should not be designed – to drain sympathy 
from parties we simply do not like or disagree with. Likewise they are not 
intended to prevent such parties gaining publicity. Some would see the 
invitation extended to two of VB’s then leading fi gures, Filip Dewinter 
and Frank Vanhecke, to address the Washington-based Robert A. Taft 
Club as evidence that the ban had backfi red by conferring upon the 
party an aura of martyrdom and respectability. But if America’s so called 
‘paleoconservatives’ thought it worth fl ying over representatives of what 
they claimed was ‘the most successful true right wing party in Europe’ to 
talk to them about ‘the threat that multiculturalism, radical Islam, and 
mass immigration bring to the fundamental European and American 
values of free speech, tolerance, and representative government in Europe’, 
then that (as well as the hope that VB’s success ‘can be duplicated by 
a genuinely right wing movement’ in the US) is their business.15 It is 
unlikely that it harmed anybody back home in Belgium.
But if perversity and jeopardy can be relatively easily dismissed, what 
about futility? Has the eff ective banning of Vlams Blok been pointless? 
Th is, it seems, is a greyer area than we fi rst thought: while it remains 
broadly true that the name-change to Vlaams Belang allowed the Flemish 
populists to drop some of their baggage, our initial fi ndings arguably 
overstated the moderation involved. Inasmuch as VB’s overt ethnocentrism 
and racism have receded, their replacement by an equally aggressive (and 
socially divisive) Islamophobia has continued apace. Outside of Belgium, 
too, the transmogrifi cation of the Blok into the Belang has made little 
diff erence to how it is perceived, for instance, in the international media 
where it continues to be routinely referred to as ‘extreme-’ or ‘far-right’. 
Th is is partly inertia but partly because of the causes (sometimes the lost 
causes) that the VB champions and the company it keeps.
In March 2008, the party’s president, Bruno Valkeniers, caused 
a storm by appearing to suggest in a TV appearance that he hankered 
after apartheid-era South Africa. Meanwhile, Filip Dewinter was busy 
launching a charter to ‘fi ght the Islamization of West-European cities’, 
focusing in particular on a moratorium on mosque building. Given that 
the latter is a controversial issue exploited by radical right wing populist 
parties all over Europe, it is interesting that the Austrian FPÖ was the 
only high-profi le member of that party family to attend a meeting on 
the topic in Antwerp organized by the VB, suggesting perhaps that the 
latter, at least at that stage, remained rather too unreconstructed for 
some of its supposedly like-minded counterparts in other countries Th e 
absence of Geert Wilders of the Dutch PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid) – 
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Freedom Party) no slouch himself when it comes to criticizing Islam – was 
particularly noticeable. Th e fact that other parties of that ilk also stayed 
away also seemed to point to an ongoing distinction between radical right 
wing populist parties as a whole and those parties who joined the Identity 
Sovereignty and Tradition (ITS) group in the European Parliament 
– a group that split after just ten months of existence (from January to 
November 2007) when it could no longer contain the possibly predictable 
tensions between ultra-nationalists from East European gypsy-bashing 
parties and West European parties (such as the French Front National) 
which, at that point anyway, continued to fl irt with fascism and even 
holocaust denial. Th e latter, incidentally, is something that VB itself would 
recoil from, having made a huge eff ort to portray itself as a friend of Israel 
in recent years, although its stance is somewhat qualifi ed by its campaign 
for an amnesty for those who collaborated with the Nazis in wartime 
Belgium. Its outreach to Israel, however, is very much of a piece with its 
obsessive concern with the threat supposedly posed by Islam – a threat that 
is used as justifi cation for the oft-made observation by party leaders that 
Flemish cities are starting to resemble Morocco or Mecca, proven, they 
say, by offi  cial lists of residents of certain suburbs apparently showing over 
ninety per cent of have African and Arabic names, or by school canteens 
serving halal meat and no pork. Concern apparently runs so deep that the 
party leadership expressed solidarity with the campaign against building 
a ‘mosque’ at Ground Zero in New York, with Filip DeWinter continually 
referring in remarks on the matter to the US President as Barack Hussein 
Obama.
Following elections to the European Parliament in 2009, VB declared 
itself interested in some form of cooperation, especially with the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Sweden Democrats (both of whom have 
joined the VB in declaring their heartfelt support for Israel against 
Islamist terror), as well as the Danish People’s Party, the Italian Northern 
League, and the Slovak National Party, all of whom decided to distance 
themselves from more extremist outfi ts like Jobbik (Hungary) and Ataka 
(Bulgaria). Such cooperation, however, was to begin with largely limited 
to initiatives like the campaign against Turkish membership of the EU, 
the latter issue being quite high up in the mix for VB, with the Party 
courting controversy in the spring of 2011 by releasing a poster (modelled 
on a similar one from Switzerland) showing a white sheep standing on 
a collage of European fl ags kicking out a red sheep embossed with the 
fl ags of Turkey and Morocco. Later that year, however, the European 
Parliament recognized the ‘far-right-lite’ European Alliance for Freedom, 
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in which VB joined with the newly ‘detoxifi ed’ French FN, the FPÖ, 
the Dutch PVV and the Northern League. VB will, however, play a very 
small role in any such group after 2014 since it performed so poorly in 
European elections that year. 
In short, the VB might not be successful but it continues to hold and 
express views that border on the extreme. As such, our initial conclusion 
that the Belgian ban avoided futility might require some qualifi cation. 
Th is has led some of the same groups (including Kif Kif and the 
Movement against Racism, Anti-semitism and Xenophobia) that brought 
the action which saw Vlaams Blok disband to consider doing the same to 
Vlaams Belang by getting the courts to deprive it of state funding on the 
grounds that it opposes rights granted under the European Convention. 
Th ey know that the federal government is already under international 
pressure to fulfi l what many states, regard as the obligation to prohibit 
racist organizations embodied in article four of the 1966 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
to which 177 countries have signed up (see Brems, 2006). On the other 
hand, they also realize that, given the apparently chronic diffi  culties it has 
in even forming an administration that can hold the country together, 
the Belgian political class has had other things on its mind. In any case, 
bans are almost always responses to domestic rather than international 
pressure, and tend to occur when regimes face threats from parties that 
look like they are on the up rather than on the wane.
Conclusion
Th e motives for banning parties are rarely beyond question wherever in 
the world such bans are allowed for, proposed and enacted. Th ey include 
‘sheer partisan self-serving, prejudice, an expressly exclusionary national 
ideal, a unitary political identity hostile to multiculturalism, or simply 
a disproportionate response to fear of disorder’ (Rosenblum, 2007: 25; 
see also Randall, 2008). But nor are those motives wholly ulterior: there 
are good reasons, recognized by a host of international conventions and 
ranging well beyond the possibility of violence, for states to take such 
action or at least to assert their right to do so if they deem it necessary 
– and as long as it is proportionate and done within the law (see Brems, 
2006).
Th ese noble (or at least less base) motives do not necessarily give rise 
to outcomes which are perverse or futile or which jeopardize previous 
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achievements. But those outcomes, being political and being of only 
recent provenance, remain as disputed and debateable as the ‘necessity’ 
of banning parties in the fi rst place (see Rosenblum, 2007: 71-3). In no 
small part this is because outright prohibition is by no means the only 
(and defi nitely not the fi rst) weapon that states keen to contain internal 
threats should reach for (see Rummens and Abts, 2010). We would of 
course be wrong to claim that the consequences in every country in which 
a ban is actually implemented (rather than simply kept on the books as a 
deterrent) are uniformly positive. Research both from Europe and further 
afi eld suggests mixed results (see Minkinberg, 2006, Bieber, 2008: 109-
110, Moroff , 2010, Moroff  and Basedau, 2010), as well as ‘unintended – 
and not so unintended – consequences’ (Randall, 2008: 252-58). However, 
we would clearly be mistaken if we were to suggest that they are always 
and everywhere malign – evidence, if you like of some kind of iron law of 
institutional interference. After all, those consequences not only take time 
(if not necessarily as much time as Mao supposedly implied) to emerge but 
also vary considerably between polities. Th is is also the case, incidentally, 
for another of the strategies sometimes employed by ‘mainstream’ parties 
to discipline their more extremist counterparts, namely an attempt to 
ostracize them politically rather than legally via a cordon sanitaire (see 
Van Spanje and Van der Brug, 2009: 375-6; see also Rummens and Abts, 
2010).
Looking again at developments in Turkey, Spain, and Belgium, it 
seems clear that diff erent judgements apply in each country and might 
even had been diff erent had events taken a diff erent turn. In Turkey, for 
instance, both the perversity and futility arguments can on balance be 
dismissed when it comes to the AKP; so too can jeopardy – but only 
because the judges’ decision to avoid an outright ban on the governing 
party meant that the country’s long-sought EU candidature was not put 
at risk. Th e less high-profi le case of the DTP, however, should prevent us 
from making too sweeping a judgement in that case. In Spain, perversity 
and jeopardy can be dismissed and, although some might like to argue that 
the eventual decision to allow the Bildu and Amaiur electoral coalitions to 
stand candidates in 2011 constitutes futility, this ignores both the degree 
of separation with ETA and even Batasuna, and the fact that the former 
has now apparently ended its terrorist campaign for good. On the other 
hand this rather more sanguine conclusion should not blind us to the 
fact that previous bans throw up injustices (particularly those done to 
individual candidates) which may or may not be possible to mitigate. In 
Belgium, neither perversity nor jeopardy is the problem, but, given the 
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continued ethno-cultural extremism of the Vlaams Belang, futility might 
be.
Our earlier fi ndings, then, need not be thrown overboard but they 
may require some qualifi cation – not only right now but in the future, 
too. Whether, as political scientists or legal scholars, rather than, say 
historians, our fi ndings can ever be much more defi nitive than that is a 
moot point. Only slightly less moot is an additional fi nding made possible 
by this return visit to two of the cases concerned – Turkey and Spain. Th is 
is that ‘the authorities’, especially where the bans in question are seen to 
have ‘worked’, tend not to repeat them holus bolus but instead to employ 
rather more sophisticated or ‘surgical’ (Issacharoff , 2007: 1446) methods: 
where previously they might have reached for the cosh, they now prefer 
the scalpel. States, then, would appear to travel along a learning curve, 
albeit one characterized not so much by cool consideration of abstractions 
but instead (and rather appositely) by trial and error. Th is process, not 
surprisingly perhaps, gets more attention from academic lawyers (see Sajó, 
2004b: 217 and Th iel, 2009b: 420) than from political scientists, who, 
despite their increased interest in path-dependence, are always anxious to 
avoid explanations that seem to smack of particularism. Th at said, as the 
diff erent treatment handed out to AKP and DTP (and BDP) in Turkey 
reminds us, we are dealing with a trend that, even within a single polity, is 
far from linear or unqualifi ed. Speaking normatively, that is perhaps how 
it should be: as recent work on combating racism, for example, emphasizes 
(see Bleich, 2011), solutions – presuming there are solutions – have to be 
contextually appropriate as well as proportionate.
Notes
1 Put briefl y, the adherents of ‘procedural democracy’ value pluralistic political 
competition primarily for its capacity to determine and give eff ect to the 
preferences of the electorate, irrespective of what those preferences may be; 
the adherents of ‘substantive democracy’, on the other hand, fear that goods 
such as liberty, human rights, equality, etc., will not necessarily be protected 
by a majority vote, especially if that vote brings to power actors that will 
ignore them. Arguably, the former is a ‘thinner’ conception of democracy 
than the latter.
2 For an interesting critical discussion on whether such labels really help 
us, given how diffi  cult it is to come up with categories or clusters that are 
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genuinely mutually exclusive, and attempt to come up with an alternative, 
see Th iel, 2009b.
3 Strictly speaking, it would be more accurate to use the formulation ‘and/or’ 
because, as Issacharoff  (2007: 1434) rightly notes, the perceived threats and 
resulting rationales ‘cannot be hermetically walled off  from each other.’
4 Pragmatists, of course, can always seek refuge in the (not necessarily 
philosophically illegitimate) ‘lesser of two evils’ argument – one that bleeds 
into a consequentialist logic (see Darwall, 2002) that an action’s morality 
cannot, indeed should not, be separated from its outcome.
5 Translation by Sinan Ikinci, ‘Turkey’s chief prosecutor seeks to ban the ruling 
AKP’, WSWS, 2 April 2008, available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/
apr2008/turk-a02.shtml.
6 Some 27 parties have been banned in Turkey since 1923 – 19 of them since 
1983. Not all attempts to ban parties, however, have been successful: up to 
and including the two most recent cases, 17 have escaped that fate.
7 Th e CHP may now present more of a threat to the AKP after its 
uncompromising leader, Deniz Baykal, was forced to step down after a sex-
scandal and replaced by the potentially more popular Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
8 For a series of increasingly critical articles on AKP rule, see the Turkish Research 
Program pages of the US think-tank, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org.
9 Technically, a new Constitution would actually be an amendment to the 
1982 document and, in order to stand any chance of being accepted without 
a full-blown crisis, would have to leave in place its unamendable articles 
which, among other things, protect Turkey’s territorial integrity and its 
secular nature.
10 It should be noted, in all fairness, that the organization has long been an 
important – and open –ally of the party (Gumuscu and Sert, 2009: 954). 
Moreover, its involvement hardly makes AKP an outlier: one only has to 
look to the US to see a centre-right party winning backing from groups that 
are liberal on economics but conservative (often religiously so) on almost 
everything else under the sun (see Insel, 2003).
11 Islamism must of course be distinguished from Islam. According to one 
uncompromising defi nition (Tibi, 2008) ‘Islam itself is basically a faith, a 
cultural system, and an ethics’, whereas ‘Islamism…is a political ideology, 
albeit one based on religion’ held to by those who ‘seek to “shari’a-tize” Islam’ 
and to ‘establish an “Islamic state” or “Islamic order”‘ in which ‘diff erence 
appears as heresy and politics is placed within the ambit of that which is 
sacred and hence nonnegotiable.’ For a detailed discussion, see Ayoob, 2008. 
12 Sceptics, of course, may very well claim that the AK’s resort to such values 
is instrumental rather than because they have been internalized – after all, 
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one man’s attempt fi nally to get a supposedly ‘fascist’ military under civilian 
control is another’s plot to dupe Western liberals and neutralize the one force 
that, when it comes to the crunch, stands a chance of preventing Turkey from 
falling into the hands of ‘fundamentalists’ (see, for example, Tibi, 2009). 
13 See ‘EU slams Turkish Court’s decision to hear AKP ban’, EurActiv, 1 April 
2008, available online at http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-slams
-turkish-court-decision-hear-akp-ban/article-171240.
14 For evidence of the Jewish community’s resistance to VB’s overtures, (but 
also perhaps of concern lest they strike a chord) see ‘De 10 Hoofdzonden 
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chapter 9
Ethnic Party Regulation in Eastern Europe





Th e representation of minorities – ethnic and others – in the political 
process is an important indicator of the quality of democracy and can 
take various forms. Minorities can have their own representatives in the 
legislative institutions at both national and regional level; they can have 
minority “experts” in various consultative bodies to the government. 
Alternatively, minorities can also be given a right to self-government. 
Achieving legislative representation can also be done in several ways – 
minorities can participate in the political process through non-minority-
specifi c parties or they can try to form their own parties and achieve 
representation along ethnic lines. Th ere are also various ways in which 
the state, through its political institutions and legislative framework, can 
encourage or discourage the representation of its minorities. It is this 
relationship which we examine.
Th e chapter investigates the link between one of the forms of ethnic 
political representation – ethnic parties – and one of the possible ways 
through which state policy can impact upon it – the type and nature of 
regulation of ethnic parties found in the Constitution, Party Law, and 
Electoral Law of a given country. Ethnic parties – parties that aim to 
represent a specifi c ethnic minority group – exist in virtually all East-
European states, but the legal and institutional frameworks of these 
countries treat such parties in several quite diff erent ways. Albania and 
Bulgaria, for example, ban ethnic parties, while the Czech and Slovak 
Republics allow ethnic parties to exist and subject them to equal treatment 
by their electoral laws. Hungary and Poland, on the other hand, not only 
permit ethnic parties to form and run in parliamentary elections but 
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also make it easier for them to gain representation at diff erent levels of 
government. Finally, Romania and Slovenia provide the most extreme 
form of positive discrimination by guaranteeing seats to minorities 
(subject to some limitations). As the countries of Eastern Europe 
countries have substantial proportions of their population belonging to 
minority groups – about 15% on average – the legal treatment of political 
parties based on ethnicity has important consequences for the political 
representation and participation of these groups.
Th e chapter off ers a comparative analysis of the legal regulations of 
ethnic minority parties. Concentrating on the EU10 East-European states, 
we trace the development of regulation on parties’ activity and identity. As 
we shall see, Romania proves to have increased the amount of regulation 
in that category most signifi cantly.
To delve more deeply into the diff erences and contextual specifi city of 
regulation of minority parties we further examine the Party and Electoral 
Laws, as well as the Constitutions, to fi nd that the most restrictive 
and most encouraging in their regulation towards minority parties are, 
respectively, Bulgaria and Romania. Finally, the chapter provides a 
comparison between these two most diff erent forms of minority electoral 
arrangements and analyses the impact they have had on the success of 
ethnic parties in the two countries. Our analysis concentrates on the 
political parties of the Hungarian and the Roma minorities in Romania 
and on the Turkish and the Roma minorities in Bulgaria. We conclude 
that the electoral arrangements have made a signifi cant and consequential 
diff erence in the case of only one minority – that of the Roma – in both 
countries. Th e larger minorities, on the other hand, have done similarly 
well in both Romania and Bulgaria despite diff erences in the institutional 
constraints on their behaviour.
Finally, in an attempt to link institutional arrangements with the 
political behaviour of individual members of minority groups, the paper 
investigates whether the diff erent electoral fates of Roma parties have had 
any impact on the levels of political participation of the Roma minorities 
in the two countries. For this purpose, the paper uses survey data from 
the UNDP Avoiding the Dependency Trap database (UNDP 2003) and 
the Legal Regulation of Political Parties in Post-war Europe database (van 
Biezen 2009).
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Th e Regulation of Ethnic Parties
Many of the methods used to promote the representation of minorities 
have been controversial, in large part because many appear to be opposed 
to the basic “individualistic” principles of liberal democracy. One in 
particular – the formation of “ethnic,” “minority” or “ethno-regionalist” 
political parties – has been particularly contentious. Th ese are parties 
which, formally or in practice, speak for the interests of a particular group, 
which are delineated in ethnic terms (Chandra 2011). As such, ethnic 
parties aim to fulfi ll a descriptive representative function for these groups 
in the national political arena.
Th e ethnic party is an interesting nexus of group-driven eff orts to 
achieve representation and the state’s policies regarding representation. No 
party can form without individuals willing to be part of it, making ethnic 
parties a refl ection of the minority group’s cohesiveness, socio-economic 
situation, and political ambition. However, the party’s existence is often 
subject to diff erential treatment by the Constitution and other laws of the 
state. While many African and some European states (such as Albania and 
Bulgaria) simply ban ethnic parties, others, such as Romania and New 
Zealand, provide for the preferential treatment of those organizations. Th e 
presence of ethnic parties in contemporary democracies has recently been 
encouraged by the policy recommendations of international organizations 
such as the OSCE, which has included “establishing political parties based 
on communal identities” as part of a minority group’s right to freedom of 
association (OSCE Lund Recommendation, article 8, 2000).
However, academic research provides divergent conclusions about 
the link between ethnic parties and democratic stability. In his works on 
consociational democracy, Arend Lijphart, for example, saw the existence 
of group-based parties as a positive and necessary institutional mechanism 
to provide for the representation and participation of the various segments 
of society (Lijphart 1977). Quite in contrast, Donald Horowitz (1985) 
has made a strong argument against ethnic parties by maintaining that 
ethnic parties tend to divide a divided society even further. As ethnic 
parties often represent strictly group interests, they are unable to concern 
themselves with issues of national importance and their behaviour is 
dangerous for the good government of the country (Horowitz 1985, 294). 
States that fear secessionist movements can, therefore, choose to ban 
ethnic parties. Bulgaria and Albania are examples of systems in which 
ethnic-based parties are banned in the Constitution or the Law on Parties 
and where their activities are discouraged by the electoral laws (Juberias 
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2000, 37). Reilly (2003) has similarly argued that because ethnic parties 
make their political appeal specifi cally on ethnicity, their emergence 
‘often has a centrifugal eff ect on politics.’ Th e resulting fragmentation of 
the party system has a detrimental eff ect on the stability of democracy and 
government in such situations.
In contrast, other authors have argued that ethnic parties pose 
challenges to democratic government only in deeply divided societies. 
Stroschein, for example, has maintained that ethnic parties “domesticate” 
ethnic issues into institutional forms, thus allowing them to be resolved 
in parliament rather than through violence. Confl icts between these and 
other parties are routinized and the political process allows the parties 
to “fi nd a way to bargain over heated issues and negotiate alternatives” 
(Stroschein 2001, 61). Birnir has made an even stronger argument: ethnic 
parties might in fact help the stabilization of the party system in the early 
years of democracy by providing a stable link between voters and parties 
for at least some part of the electorate at a time when such links are not 
well developed overall. Chandra (2005) has argued that, even in deeply 
divided societies, ethnic parties might not lead to centrifugal tendencies 
in the party system, while van Cott (2007) maintains that the formation 
and success of ethnic (indigenous) parties in Latin America has had a very 
benefi cial eff ect on the quality of democracy in the region.
A natural extension of either of these two positions is the legal and 
institutional framework which states impose on all political actors. 
Constitutional provisions and electoral and party legislation are the most 
common instruments of state policy that can infl uence the success or 
failure of any political party, including an ethnic minority party. Th e actors 
that make the policies, however, are the parties themselves – something, 
which Rashkova and Biezen (2014) refer to as the ‘paradox of regulation’. 
Th us, in an era of growing party regulation, and especially considering the 
areas of spoils for successful competitors and gate-keeping for potential 
entrants, Katz and Mair (1995) argue that the link between the parties 
and the state has gained strength, and thus the party has become a public, 
rather than a private, utility (Biezen 2004). Th at political parties are 
increasingly managed by the state, in that their activities are to a larger 
extent subject to regulations and state laws, is also the focus of Biezen and 
Kopecký’s (2007) study of the dimensions of the party-state link.
To estimate the extent to which ethnic minority parties are regulated, 
we begin by using the data from the Party Law in Modern Europe (PLME) 
database. Th e PLME database consists of detailed coding of European 
party laws. Th e content of party laws is codifi ed in twelve major categories 
ethnic party regulation in eastern europe 229
ranging from ‘democratic principles’ to ‘party organization’ and ‘party 
fi nance’. Each category is further broken down into additional, more 
specifi c, sub-categories – for example, the ‘democratic principles’ category 
includes texts related, but not limited, to principles of competition, 
equality, participation and pluralism. Th e database provides an overview 
of the range and magnitude of regulation (more detailed explanation of the 
coding scheme and the database is provided in Casal Bértoa, Piccio and 
Rashkova, chapter 6). 
For our purposes here, we are interested in the ‘party activity and 
identity’ category, as it refers to what parties do or seek to do; it off ers 
rules governing the activity, goals and behaviour of parties. We make a 
comparison between the raw magnitude of regulation, that is the number 
of times a particular category is mentioned in a given country’s Party Law, 
the weighted magnitude or how much of the regulation in a country’s 
Party Law relates to party activity and identity, and, fi nally, how the 
magnitude of regulation changes over time. Th e results show that not much 
attention is devoted to the ‘party activity and identity’ in any of the ten 
East-European democracies. In fact, the highest percentage of regulation 
devoted to ‘party activity and identity’ in any Party Law is 14.1 per cent 
in Lithuania’s 1995 Party Law. Th is fi gure however drops to less than 10 
per cent for all states in their current Party Laws, which shows that states 
are increasingly less interested in regulating the activity and identity of 
their parties. In addition to the amount of regulation, we also examined 
the change in regulation over time. We observe a general low regulation 
of parties’ activity and identity, which throws up no clear pattern of how 
the regulation changes. Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia are decreasing 
the amount of regulation; Estonia, Poland and Romania are increasing it, 
while the remaining four states remain neutral.
Despite providing a useful overview of the extent and directional 
change of regulation of a party’s activity and identity, the fi gures reported 
in table 1 leave the regulatory puzzle unsolved as we do not know how 
specifi c rules are worded and to what extent they are truly restrictive. 
Furthermore, table 1 presents an overview of regulation found only in the 
Party Law, while political parties are regulated also in the Constitution 
and the Electoral Law of a given country. To complete the picture, we 
go on to examine the actual content of legislation in both the Party and 
Electoral Laws, as well as the Constitutions of our countries. An in-depth 
analysis of the contents of all these legal documents reveals that there is 
a lot of variation on the regulation of ethnic, religious or other national 
minorities among the EU10. To encompass the diff erences in a way 
230 rashkova & spirova
which is useful for further investigation into how ethnic minorities are 
treated in the political arena in East-European states, we make a fourfold 
classifi cation of the types of minority references found in legal texts. Th e 
fi rst and to some extent least telling type is what we call the no reference 
category; simply, this category refl ects a legal document that makes no 
reference to minorities.1 Th e second category is what we call neutral, or in 
other words some references to minorities do exist, however they do not 
discriminate against these groups, nor do they strengthen their position in 
the political arena. Th e fi nal two categories refl ect the existence of positive 
discrimination, which we call encouraging, and negative discrimination 
references which we term restrictive.2 Th e four categories thus aid us in 
making an overall classifi cation of the political treatment of minority 
parties in East-European legal texts. Th e results of this examination are 
summarized in table 1. 
Table 1: Regulation of national minority electoral participation
Country Constitution Party Law Electoral Law
Bulgaria restrictive restrictive --
Czech Republic -- restrictive encouraging
Estonia neutral -- --
Hungary encouraging -- --
Latvia neutral -- neutral
Lithuania -- neutral --
Poland encouraging -- --
Romania encouraging encouraging / 
restrictive
encouraging
Slovakia encouraging restrictive --
Slovenia neutral restrictive --
Of the three types of laws examined, the Constitution appears to be 
the legal document in which minorities are referred to the most.3 As we 
see, only the Czech and the Lithuanian Constitutions have no reference 
to minorities and their participation in the political process. In terms of 
the overall variation in the regulation of minority representation, Romania 
and Bulgaria appear to be the two countries with consistent types of 
reference across all legal texts – the former strongly encouraging the 
representation of minorities, and the latter quite restrictive in that regard. 
Romania gives special treatment to its national minorities – they are 
guaranteed representation under some very basic conditions and they 
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are referred to in many places in the law (Constitution Art. 62.2 and 
in multiple places in the Electoral Law). In Bulgaria, on the other hand, 
both the 1990 Party Law (Art. 3.2.3) and the Constitution (Art. 11.4) 
state that a political party based on a religious or ethnic principle may 
not be established. Th us, Bulgaria is the only European Union member 
state which openly bans the existence of ethnic parties. While the clause 
prohibiting the existence of ethnic parties was removed from the 2009 
Party Law, multiple mentions restricting links to religious institutions 
and the prohibitive ethnic clause in the Constitution still remain. Besides 
in Bulgaria and Romania, restrictive clauses about ties with religious 
groups, propaganda promoting religious inequality, and the acceptance 
of funding from religious entities are also found in the Party Laws of the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Other 
states treat all their citizens equally and therefore pay little attention to 
specifi cally addressing minorities in their legislation. Finally, we have a 
group of states which mention ethnic or religious minorities but in clauses 
that do not in any way encourage or impede their political participation 
and are therefore considered to have no specifi c electoral eff ect on the 
minority – an example here is Latvia.
In addition to the regulation established by the Constitution and the 
Party Law, the specifi c relations between the electoral rules and ethnic 
parties also have substantial consequences for the ability of those parties 
to function in the political systems. Assuming that ethnic parties are not 
banned, the nature of the electoral laws can signifi cantly infl uence the 
chances of success or failure of ethnic parties, even without providing 
them with any special treatment. Th at electoral systems have an impact 
on who is represented in the legislative bodies is a long-standing law in 
political science. According to Duverger’s original formulation, in systems 
where winners take all, smaller parties are discouraged from competing, 
while proportional representation systems provide little or no reward for 
fusing and no punishment for splitting (Duverger 1951, 248-254) and are 
therefore benefi cial to both small and large parties alike. As proportional 
representation lowers the hurdles for smaller parties, ethnic parties are 
more likely to gain representation in those systems, thus providing for 
peaceful resolution of ethnic issues and, ultimately, for greater support 
for the political system by the members of the minority (Lijphart 1999, 
Norris 2004, 113-5).4
Interestingly, our analysis of legal texts shows that no restrictions 
on minorities are applied in the Electoral Laws in any of the 10 East-
European states. Moreover, in the three instances where minority groups 
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are mentioned at all, the law is either encouraging minority representation 
in some way or neutral towards it. Examples of the former treatment 
are the obligatory rule that municipalities establishing committees 
for national minorities must issue election announcements also in the 
language of the national minority concerned (Art 15.4 Czech Electoral 
Law) and guaranteeing legislative representation to all minority groups 
which have failed to get a member elected but have gathered at least 10% 
of the average vote awarded to an elected MP (Art 9.1 Romanian Electoral 
Law). Th e Latvian electoral law provides an example of neutral treatment. 
Th e restrictive treatment of ethnic parties by the Electoral Law is more 
diffi  cult to discern since, in addition to what we may term ‘descriptive 
discrimination’, i.e. direct bans on parties of ethnic minorities, they can 
also be subject to ‘substantive discrimination.’ Th at is, the very features 
that distinguish electoral systems within the PR family are likely to 
infl uence the chances of success of ethnic parties even when the rules 
are not directed at minorities per se. As ethnic parties are usually small, 
the nature and presence of an electoral threshold are probably the most 
important. Not only do higher thresholds hurt small parties (Rashkova 
and Spirova, forthcoming) and thus by default also minorities, but 
thresholds set around the percentage point that refl ects the minority 
proportion of the population also reduce the chances of an ethnic party 
gaining seats. Similarly, when substantially raised thresholds apply to 
coalitions, minority parties are hurt especially as the vote is limited by 
the size of the minority (Juberias 2000, 35). In terms of the classifi cation 
scheme established above in those cases the electoral law is restrictive 
towards ethnic political participation.
Most of the East-European countries discussed here use proportional 
representation with thresholds of 4-5% for individual parties. Romania, 
Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic have thresholds of between 
7 and 11% for political coalitions. Hungary is the only country with a 
mixed electoral system, with a 5% threshold in its PR part. Th us, even 
though electoral legislation does not de facto restrict ethnic parties from 
participating in the political competition, the existence of high electoral 
thresholds has a restrictive eff ect. Due to the (small) size of minorities in 
these countries – with the exception of the Russian minorities in the Baltic 
countries – their representation in the political process is often challenged 
by such thresholds.
Electoral arrangements can provide for the positive discrimination 
of ethnic parties by easing their requirements specifi cally for 
minority parties. As Juberias notes (2000, 38), countries may relax the 
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requirements for fi elding and registering candidates, running national 
campaigns, and they may even ignore the electoral threshold in the case 
of minority parties. Such measures have been introduced by Poland where 
the party of the German minority which receives between 0.4% and 
1.2% of the total vote has been able to secure a proportional number 
of seats in the Polish Sejm, and by Hungary, but only for local elections. 
Finally, the most direct way to encourage minority participation in the 
political process is to provide minority parties or minorities as a whole 
with guaranteed representation in the national legislative body. Th us, 
groups offi  cially recognized as minorities by the state or minorities that 
have a political party competing in the elections can be granted seats. 
Slovenia, for example, provides for the representation of two minorities 
that are constitutionally recognized as such, while Romania, as is also 
refl ected in table 2 above, provides the strongest system of positive 
discrimination as it does not limit the number of minorities that can obtain 
representation (Juberias 2000, 44-49) and it has encouraging references to 
national minorities in all three legal texts examined.
Both positive and negative discrimination of minorities – banning 
their parties or granting them special privileges – have been criticized 
by democratic theorists; the former for not allowing a basic right to all 
citizens, the latter for violating the equality of representation, one of 
the basic principles of democracy. Moreover, the impact of electoral 
arrangements is not as clear-cut as electoral engineers sometimes claim 
it to be. A close examination of these electoral arrangements and their 
impact on the success or failure of ethnic parties is thus necessary before 
any conclusions can be made.
Comparing Bulgaria and Romania
Ethnic Party Regulation and Ethnic Composition
Bulgaria and Romania provide a suitable comparison in an eff ort to look 
for the impact of ethnic party regulation on party behaviour since they 
represent the most restrictive and most encouraging modes of regulation 
of ethnic parties, but also have relatively similar ethnic make-ups and 
quite comparable histories of inter-ethnic relations and democratic 
transition.
As noted by the examination of the Constitutions and Electoral 
and Party Laws of the ten East-European EU member-states, Bulgaria 
and Romania represent the two extremes of the policy options discussed 
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here. Bulgaria’s restrictive form of institutional arrangements for ethnic 
parties makes any other electoral arrangement for minorities impossible, 
while Romania’s generous guarantee of a seat to every legally recognized 
minority organization circumvents the otherwise restraining eff ect of its 
high electoral threshold.
Th e restriction of certain types of parties is in line with the general 
spirit of the Bulgarian constitution which avoids any mention of the word 
minority and does not provide for any collective rights (Vassilev 2001, 
43). In general, Bulgarian political actors seem fearful of the association 
of the word national minority with secession and generally refuse to 
use the word in public discourse, calling national minorities “minority 
groups” (CEDIME 1999 and 2001). Despite allegations by minority rights 
advocates that the constitutional ban on ethnic parties is discriminatory 
and violates international laws, there has been no discussion about 
amending the constitution in any relevant way (Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee, various years). Bulgaria operates under a proportional 
representation electoral system,5 with a 4% national threshold which 
treats political parties and coalitions identically.
In contrast, Romania, as noted above, not only allows ethnic parties, 
but has introduced special provisions to guarantee that they have a seat 
in Parliament. Its general electoral rules until 2007 were proportional 
representation with 5% for parliamentary representation of political 
parties, which became larger for political alliances depending on the 
number of valid votes cast across the country (Law for the Election of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in Romania, 1992). Since 2008, 
a system mixed system with a 5% threshold for individual parties and 
8% threshold for two-party alliances has been used (Stan and Zaharia 
2009). Most importantly, since 1990, legally constituted organizations 
of citizens belonging to a national minority which have not obtained 
at least one seat through the general rules of the elections have had 
the right to a seat in Parliament with the only restriction that only one 
organization per minority group can obtain a seat. Since 2004 it has 
become more diffi  cult for such organizations to obtain a seat, since they 
need to meet a “symbolic threshold” of 10% of the average number 
of valid votes required for the election of one deputy on national level 
(Romanian Government Department of Interethnic Relations). Despite 
this qualifi cation, the Romanian system of positive discrimination 
of minorities is extremely strong, as it does not limit the number 
of minorities that can obtain representation.6 Th rough that system 
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about fi fteen minorities, on average, and 18 at present, have gained 
representation in Parliament.
In terms of their ethnic make-up, both countries have a clear dominant 
majority, a single, large and concentrated minority (Turks in Bulgaria and 
Hungarians in Romania) and a substantial but scattered second minority 
(Roma). Table 2 presents basic data on the ethnic composition of the two 
countries.










Armenians 6 552 0.10% - -
German - - 60 088 0.28%
Hungarians - - 1 431 807 6.6%
Roma 325 343 4.9% 535 140 2.5%
Russians 9 978 0.15% 35 791 0.17%
Serbs - - 22 561 0.10%
Tatars - - 23 935 0.11%
Turks 588 318 8.85% 32 098 0.15%
Ukrainians 1 789 0.03%
Vlachs 3 684 0.06%
Others 19 659 0.29%
Source: Bulgarian Statistical Institute, Census 2011, http://censusresults.nsi.bg/Reports/2/2/
R7.aspx; Romanian Statistical Institute, Census 2002, http://colectaredate.insse.ro/phc/
aggregatedData.htm
In Bulgaria, the majority group constitutes around 85 % of the total 
population. Th e largest minority – the Turks – makes up 8.8% of the 
population and is concentrated in fi ve of the 28 administrative regions of 
the country, in two of which they are a majority. Th e Roma (Gypsies) who 
constitute about 4.9% of the population according to offi  cial statistics, 
although Roma experts provide estimates of their number that are almost 
twice as large (CEDIME 1999), are the second largest minority and are 
territorially dispersed (National Statistical Institute 2011). Th e Russian, 
Armenian, Vlach and Ukranian minorities each make up less than 1% 
of the population and do not have a specifi c territorial concentration.
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Romania has a similar ethnic composition: Romanians constitute a 
clear majority, amounting to 89% of the population. Th e country has 
two large and several smaller minorities. Th e largest minority are the 
Hungarians, which make up around 6.6% of the total population 
and, like the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, the Romanian Hungarians 
are concentrated in six of the 32 counties of the country (Romanian 
Government Department of Interethnic Relations). Th e second largest 
minority, the Roma of Romania, are the most numerous Roma minority 
in Eastern Europe. However, given the size of Romania’s population, they 
constitute only 2.5% of it, which makes them a smaller proportion than 
the Roma in Bulgaria. However, just as in the case of the Bulgarian 
Roma, experts estimate their population to be much bigger than shown 
in offi  cial data. Some 1.8 million or 7.9% of the total population is the 
unoffi  cial estimate of the Roma count in Romania (CEDIME 2001). Like 
all Roma communities, the Romanian Roma are scattered throughout the 
country and therefore do not encourage any special electoral strategies 
of the political elite wishing to compete for their vote. Germans, Russians, 
Turks, Tatars and Serbs are minorities that make up less than 1% of the 
population.
We focus currently on four minorities – the Turks, the Hungarians 
and the Roma in the two countries. Until 1990, all four minorities were 
subject to various policies of assimilation and discrimination by the 
Communist parties. Th e Bulgarian experience of forcibly re-naming 
and re-locating the Turkish minority during the 1970s and 1980s is 
probably more brutal, but it is fair to say that both countries imposed the 
majority dominant culture and system on all ethnic groups in the two 
states. Democratic reforms in the two countries were also similar: the fi rst 
part of the 1990s was dominated by the successor parties – the Bulgarian 
Socialists and the Romanian PSDR. Still, and irrespective of the quite 
diverse legal treatments of politically mobilized ethnicity, all minorities 
of interest here have established their own political parties, making an 
examination of the comparative trends of ethnic party development an 
important insight into the ability of party regulation to impact upon 
party behaviour.
Th e Turkish and Roma Parties in Bulgaria
Th e presence of a constitutional ban on ethnic parties has not meant 
that no ethnic parties have existed in Bulgarian politics. Using Chandra’s 
(2011) multifaceted defi nition of ethnic party, which uses the party’s 
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name, platform, source of support, and political behaviour as alternative 
indicators of ethnic natures, ethnic parties have maintained a stable 
position in Bulgarian politics by not openly registering as ethnic political 
entities. However, for most of the 1990s, this was possible only for the 
relatively numerous and powerful Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Th e 
Turkish-dominated Movement of Rights and Freedoms (DPS) was 
founded offi  cially in January 1990. Although it does not have an openly 
stated ethnic platform and it includes ethnic Bulgarians in both its 
membership and its leadership, it represents the interests of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria and its support is heavily concentrated in the regions 
populated by the minority. As fi gure 1 illustrates, the party has been 
present in all legislatures since 1990. Its share of the vote was well below 
the proportion of the Turkish minority in society, but this changed 
substantially after 2001. Th is happened not only because of the stability 
of the DPS‘s voters and their turnout in comparison to the substantial 
decline of the general voter turnout in the country, but also because of 
an increase in the actual number of DPS votes. In addition, the party’s 
position and support were considered instrumental for the changes of 
government in 1991 and 1994 while from 2001 to 2009 the DPS was 
an offi  cial coalition partner in the Bulgarian government. Th e 2009 
election left the party and its latest partner, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, 
in opposition, yet this was reversed in 2013 when early elections put the 
BSP-DPS coalition back in power.
Figure 1. DPS Electoral Support, 1990-2014
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Th e ability of the DPS to function freely in Bulgarian politics was 
challenged in the early 1990s. In 1991, 93 members of Parliament, 
virtually all affi  liated with the former Communist Party, petitioned the 
Constitutional Court to declare the DPS unconstitutional because of its 
de facto ethnic base (Ganev 2004, 66). Th e Court rejected the petition 
with the argument that there was nothing in the formal documents of the 
party that made it exclusively Turkish, although its decision is considered 
to have been prompted by broader considerations of keeping the ethnic 
peace. Th e decision of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court ensured the 
party’s persistence in the system and thus greatly infl uenced political life 
and ethnic relations in the country. By the late 1990s, there was no major 
concern that the constitutional provision could prevent either the DPS 
or the fl edgling Roma political parties from participating in the political 
process (Vassilev 2001). Th is enabled the Turkish party to function in 
Bulgarian political life despite the constitutional ban and the absence of 
special electoral treatment of ethnic parties in Bulgaria.
Th is has also been made possible by factors beyond the regulatory 
regime. Th e Turkish minority is not only of substantial size, well above 
the electoral threshold of 4%, but the party and its leader (until 2013) 
Ahmed Dogan have also managed to cultivate a strong loyalty in a large 
part of the minority. Th e DPS has a very well encapsulated electorate – 
17% – measured as the ratio of its members to its voters; it is second only 
to the BSP in Bulgaria and way above any averages for non-ex-communist 
parties in the region (Spirova 2007, 130; van Biezen 2003). Its membership 
has continued to grow through the 2000s, uniquely among the Bulgarian 
parties, or indeed European parties more generally.
Th e DPS thus does not appear to have been substantially hurt by the 
constitutional or the electoral arrangements in Bulgaria. Th e 4% electoral 
threshold came close to posing a threat to the DPS only once, when in the 
1994 elections the party received just over 5% of the vote. In response, 
the DPS formed pre-electoral coalitions with other, not exclusively ethnic 
parties (these included the Green Party, three small centrist parties and 
one royalist party in 1997 and the Liberal Union and EuroRoma in 2001). 
Th is was an indication of a realization that the DPS could not expand its 
vote further unless it reached outside the Turkish minority (Dal 2003). 
Consequently, since 2001 the party has been making a conscious eff ort to 
transform itself into a “liberal” party concerned generally with minority 
rights. It has included more ethnic Bulgarians is its leadership, and joined 
the Liberal International. However, as Horowitz has suggested for ethnic 
parties in general (Horowitz 1984, 282), achieving broader electoral 
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support has proven extremely challenging because most Bulgarians 
do not associate the DPS with liberal values but, rather, with strong 
commitment to defending the interests of the Turkish minority. Yet, the 
party itself, as well as numerous commentators and analysts, has praised 
the “Bulgarian ethnic model”, despite the restrictive legal framework, 
for the incorporation of the DPS in mainstream democratic politics, the 
moderation of the party’s policy positions, and its law-abiding behaviour 
and considers it as a major factor for the preservation of ethnic peace in 
the country (Vassilev 2001, Tatarli 2003, Petkova 2002; Krasteva and 
Todorov 2011).7 However, the model has excluded all other minorities, 
a fact that is painfully obvious in the situation of the Roma. Roma parties 
were unable to secure a stable place in Bulgarian politics throughout the 
post-communist period. Several factors account for this. First, the initial 
registration of one Roma party – the Democratic Roma Union was not 
permitted in 1990 based on the Constitutional ban on ethnic parties, 
which stymied political mobilization early on. Second, the Roma 
minority is much more heterogeneous than the Turkish one, and is also 
scattered around the country. Th is makes it almost impossible for them 
to mobilize and support a single national party. Finally, the Bulgarian 
Roma represent just about 4% of the population, equivalent to the 
threshold of the electoral system, making the success of an even well-
organized and unifi ed Roma party doubtful. 
Th e Bulgarian Roma parties are not unique in this regard. As 
Stroschein has argued (2001, 61), in order to be successful an ethnic party 
must obtain a high percentage of votes from a fi nite political base – the 
groups that it represents. Ethnic parties thus require a lot of consensus-
minded politicians, which is hardly feasible option for the diverse, 
internally heterogeneous and politically fragmented Roma communities 
and organizations throughout Eastern Europe (Baranyi 2001, 3). Th e 
absence of any special electoral encouragement for ethnic parties in 
Bulgaria, however, has made Roma representation in Parliament even 
less likely than in most other post-communist systems.
For most of the 1990s the only political representation the Roma 
in Bulgaria got was through the mainstream political parties. Th is was 
a very limited form of representation in which one or two Roma 
had a symbolic presence in Parliament during each term.8 It was not 
until 1997-1998 that Roma organizations again began to show genuine 
political ambition and to take the fi rst steps towards organizing for 
elections (Mladenov 2003) but, due to the constitutional ban on ethnic 
political organizations, Roma organizations are either not registered as 
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parties or have non-Roma-specifi c names. In the period between 1997 
and 2003 some twenty one Roma political organizations were found in 
Bulgaria, including Free Bulgaria, the Party for Social and Democratic 
Change (PSDC), Evroroma and Citizens’ Union Roma as the more visible 
and active ones.9
Roma parties’ fi rst elections were the 1999 local elections where Free 
Bulgaria got three Roma elected as mayors and placed over 60 Roma 
as local councillors. Th e successful Roma participation led to quite 
high optimism about the impending parliamentary elections in 2001. 
However, the heterogeneity of the Roma population, which is divided 
into several self-enclosed sub-groups, and infi ghting among its leaders 
prevented a unifi ed Roma party from emerging despite numerous NGO 
eff orts to encourage this. Two of the main parties – Free Bulgaria and the 
PSDC – appeared in a coalition called National Union Tzar Kiro with 
six smaller organizations and parties. Th e Roma coalition received 
27,000 votes (0.6%). Very few Roma voted for the party although Roma 
participation in elections is estimated at around 65% (UNDP). After 
this defeat the coalition fell apart (Mladenov 2003). Evroroma chose to 
run in a coalition with the DPS, while Citizens’ Union Roma joined the 
BSP coalition. In the 2005 elections, Evroroma ran alone and managed 
to achieve electoral support of 1.25 per cent,10 enough to provide it 
with state subsidies, but in 2009 Evroroma joined the BSP coalition 
and secured one seat in Parliament through that coalition. Th e trend 
of uniting with the BSP continued in 2013, but neither Evroroma nor 
the other Roma party in the Socialist coalition was given an electable 
position in the electoral lists of the coalition and, consequently, failed to 
secure seats in Parliament.
Th e development of the Roma representation in Bulgaria has thus been 
characterized by individual representatives here and there elected on larger 
parties’ lists and fl uctuating enthusiasm about unifying all Roma parties 
and seeking to win their own electoral support. Th ese trends have also been 
infl uenced, among others, by the legal treatment of ethnic parties. Th e 
Constitutional ban on ethnic parties prevented the initial registration of 
a Roma party, while the absence of special electoral treatment of minority 
parties ends any hope for the representation of the heterogeneous and not 
very well organized group along ethnic party lines.
Th e Hungarian and Roma Parties in Romania
Like the DPS in Bulgaria, the party of the ethnic Hungarians in 
Romania, the Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR/RMDSZ) has 
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played a substantial role in Romanian political life. As ethnic parties are 
not banned in Romania the party has never had problems with displaying 
its ethnic basis, and it has managed to preserve itself as the exclusive party 
of the Hungarian minority. Th e UDMR has gained representation in all 
post-1989 parliaments at a level roughly corresponding to the Hungarian 
proportion of the population, while in the EP elections it has even achieved 
slight over-representation (Figure 2). In addition it has remained the only 
stable party in Romanian politics, apart from the communist successor 
party. It was part of the governing coalitions from 1996 to 2000, a fact that 
many saw as a major step towards achieving ethnic harmony in Romania. 
Its support is also very highly encapsulated. Its membership to electorate 
ratio was about 65% in 1996, a level that is much higher than in the 
DPS and any other party in the region as well. A large proportion of the 
Hungarian minority also voted for it, an important fact given how close 
the proportion of Hungarians in Romania is to the electoral threshold of 
the electoral system (Stroschein 2001).
Figure 2. UMDR Electoral Support, 1990-2014
Overall, the UDMR has benefi ted from the provisions of Romania’s 
PR system and mixed electoral systems, but not from the positive 
discrimination system that exists for other minorities in the Romanian 
system. Th e electoral system has discouraged it from forming electoral 
alliances so, unlike the DPS, the UDMR has never attempted to ally 
with other parties. It can be argued that given the nature of the minority 
and the experience of the DPS in Bulgaria, the UDMR would have done 
equally well under a typical PR system with no ethnic element. In fact, the 
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demands of the UDMR have at times reached much more extreme levels 
than those of the DPS. It threatened to leave the governing coalitions 
in 1997 and 1998 “if demands for state funded Hungarian university 
were not met” and has repeatedly called for some degree of autonomy 
for the Hungarian-majority regions (Stroschein 2001, 61). Th is trend was 
exacerbated by the internal split in the UDMR in 2003. Th e more radical, 
the Hungarian Citizens’ Party (MPP) supported territorial autonomy 
for Transylvania and presented itself as a “purer Hungarian alternative” 
(Stroschein 2011, 192). Fractionalization was somewhat stymied after 
2009 with the joint actions of the MPP and the UDMR, but the debate on 
what the real issue and demand of the Hungarian minority are continues 
(Spirova and Stefanova 2012).
Th e higher degree of radicalization along ethnic lines might be 
attributed to the acceptance of ethnicity as a legitimate political cleavage 
in Romania’s general legislation. Th e same feature has also allowed the 
Roma in Romania to do much better in terms of political mobilization 
and representation in comparison to their Bulgarian counterparts. Roma 
political activity has clearly been dominated by the Partida Romilor (PR), 
which “receives government subsidies, allowing it to further strengthen 
its network and better prepare for its next electoral campaign” 
(Roma Rights 2003).11 Roma parties have competed from the very fi rst 
democratic elections and Partida Romilor has obtained the guaranteed 
one seat in the legislature at every election. Its leader, Nicolae Paun, has 
served as Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights, Religious 
Aff airs and National Minorities in Parliament since 2000.
Th e Roma Parties in Romania seem to enjoy higher levels of support 
amongst the Roma minority than do Bulgarian Roma parties. Electoral 
results show that about twice as many of the Roma in Romania vote 
for Roma parties as do the Roma in Bulgaria. However, it can also be 
argued that the Romanian system of positive discrimination has caused 
the Roma minority to be underrepresented, while many others are 
overrepresented. Th e vote-seat ratio for the Roma parties ranges from 0.22 
in 1996 to 0.48 in 1990, with 1 being perfect proportionality. Electoral 
arrangements of the kind that exist in Poland (which allow ethnic parties 
to gain representation proportional to their vote no matter whether they 
have passed the electoral threshold or not) would have allowed for much 
stronger representation of the minority in the Romanian legislature.
Overall, however, the level of representation of Roma parties in the 
Romanian Parliament is still infi nitely larger than that of Roma parties 
in Bulgaria, and the Romanian Roma parties have gained much more 
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visibility in political life than have the Roma parties in Bulgaria. While in 
terms of numbers of Roma in Parliament there is no signifi cant diff erence 
between Bulgaria and Romania, the ability of the Romania Roma to 
achieve representation through their own parties has allowed them 
to gain more infl uence in Romanian politics. For example, as a result 
of the pre-election agreement between the PSD, the winning party in 
the Romanian 2000 elections, and Partida Romilor, the latter received a 
position in the state administration – under Secretary of State and Head 
of the National Offi  ce for Roma – as well as one Presidential advisor 
position. Partida Romilor also negotiated the appointment of members of 
the Roma minority to regional and local government offi  ces throughout 
the country (NDI 2003a). Clearly, these achievements go well beyond 
what the Roma in Bulgaria have managed to do, where Roma aff airs are 
entirely subject to the will of the governing majority parties. Th is suggests 
that even the token representation of Roma ethnic parties in the legislature 
can make a diff erence when compared to token representation of Roma 
leaders only.
Consequences for Minority Political Representation
Th e fi nal question that this chapter addresses is whether having Roma 
parties in Parliament elected on their own terms has had any eff ect on the 
political attitudes of the Roma minority in Romania. For this purpose, 
the research uses data from the 2001 Survey of Roma in Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics carried out by 
the UNDP (UNDP 2001).12 Th e data show that Roma in both Bulgaria 
and Romania exhibit high involvement in the electoral process – in both 
countries the voter turnout for the Roma is just around or above the 
national turnout rate, a fact that is remarkable, given the low education 
level and economic status of the Roma in society. However, the voter 
turnout of Romanian Roma is markedly higher than that of the Roma in 
Bulgaria – a diff erence of about 14 per cent.
Further, Romanian Roma exhibit a substantially higher familiarity 
with and trust in their own political parties. About 27 per cent can name a 
Roma party they trust in Romania, while only about 5% of the Bulgarian 
Roma can do the same. Th e contrast is even more striking when we 
compare these fi gures to the percentage of Roma who could name any 
other party that they would trust. About the same number of Roma in 
Romania could do so – a little over 28%, while the number of Roma 
who would name a trusted party in Bulgaria was more than three times 
more than the number of people who could name a trusted Roma party. 
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Th e results clearly indicate much greater familiarity with Roma parties 
at a similar level of general familiarity with political parties. When asked 
directly about the source of support for the Roma in their country, the 
Roma in Romania indicated t h a t  they can rely on the Roma parties 
at almost twice the rate of the Bulgarian Roma. Intriguingly, the 
Romanian Roma also exhibit much lower rates of relying on the state to 
support them.
However, the diff erence in familiarity with Roma parties might be 
a result of the fact that there have been many more Roma parties in 
Romania and they have been much more active over the years than their 
counterparts in Bulgaria. A more interesting question is whether there is 
a diff erence in how the Roma feel about the political process in general. 
Regretably, the only survey question that taps into the effi  cacy of the 
Roma is the question “Do you feel your interests are well represented (at 
diff erent levels of government)?”. Romanian Roma show much higher 
levels of satisfaction with the way their interests are represented at all 
levels of government. Th e active presence or absence of Roma parties in 
the political system seems to make a diff erence to the political attitudes 
and behaviour of the Roma minority in Bulgaria and Romania.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has provided an overview of the regulatory regimes of ethnic 
political parties in post-communist Europe through a comparison of the 
ways they are treated in the Constitutions, Party Laws and Electoral Laws 
of the states in the region. Th e policies vary substantially from positive 
discrimination for ethnic parties to outright bans on their existence. Th e 
chapter focused on two extreme examples of regulatory positions – those 
in Bulgaria and Romania – and examined the ways the regulation of 
ethnic parties and their activities has impacted on their existence in both 
polities. Th e general conclusion is that regulatory regimes matter for the 
ability of political parties to function in the political system. However, 
there are two major qualifi cations to this: (1) their eff ect is felt more 
by smaller minorities than by larger ones, and (2) their eff ect is often 
indirect: it acts to set up the dimensions of political competition rather 
than directly to pressure political actors. 
While the constitutional ban on ethnic parties in Bulgaria has not 
hurt the Turkish minority, it seems to have at least originally impeded 
the development of Roma political parties. In addition, the absence of 
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any positive discrimination with respect to ethnic minorities and the 
4% electoral threshold have further prevented the Bulgarian Roma 
from sending their own representatives to Parliament. In Romania, the 
arrangements of positive discrimination do not appear to have made 
much of a diff erence to the electoral fate of the Hungarian minority 
party, but have infl uenced the development of Roma parties. Electoral 
arrangements thus seem to matter, but to do so mostly in situations where 
other factors of political mobilization make representation uncertain. Th e 
eff ect of electoral arrangements on the success of ethnic parties is clearly 
mitigated by the size and dynamics of the minority they represent.
Th e diff erences in political attitudes and behaviour between Bulgarian 
and Romanian Roma lend further support to the argument that 
constitutional treatment and electoral rules can infl uence the nature of 
politics in a country. Th e politicization of ethnicity, attributable to the 
encouraging treatment of minorities in the Constitution and electoral 
legislation in Romania, may have allowed the development of more radical 
nationalism in the case of the Romanian Hungarians than the offi  cially 
non-ethnic representation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. While 
DPS policy positions have been moderated over the 1990s and 2000s, 
those of the UMDR seem to have become more radical. Clearly, there is a 
plethora of other factors that have infl uenced these developments, but the 
regulatory frameworks have clearly infl uenced them as well.
Notes
1 Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland, for example, do not mention ethnic 
parties in their Party Laws.
2 Our no reference, encouraging, and restrictive categories are similar to Janda’s 
(2005) proscriptive, promotional and prescriptive models of party regulation.
3 Party Finance Laws, which are the fourth main legal document in which 
parties and party competition are regulated were also examined. However, 
with the exception of two articles classifi ed as ‘neutral ’in the Romanian PFL, 
no other country’s PFL refers to minority representation.
4 It has to be mentioned, however, that in cases when the ethnic minorities are 
highly concentrated in only several regions, SMD electoral systems can also 
benefi t them. However, cases like this are relatively rare (Norris 2004).
5 Prior to the 2009 elections one plurality-elected seat was introduced in each 
electoral district, reducing the number of seats elected through the PR part 
(Kolarova and Spirova 2011).
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6 Th e breadth of the rule has been criticized for allocating the same status to 
minorities of various sizes and positions in society (Juberias 2000, 44-49).
7 Th is position was somewhat challenged during the 2005-2009 tenure of 
the party as coalition partner, when its engagement in clientelistic patron-
dominated and corrupt networks brought its behaviour under closer scrutiny. 
For many (ethnic) Bulgarians the problem the DPS posed in 2011 was not 
its ethnic nature but its rent-seeking behaviour (Krasteva and Todorov 2011, 
35).
8 Cooperation with the party of the Turkish minority, the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms (DPS), seemed to be a natural choice for some of the Roma 
leaders. Th e argument that the two minorities faced common problems as 
well as the proclaimed desire of the DPS to defend the rights of all people, 
minorities and individuals in Bulgaria made this an alluring possibility. 
Cooperation between the two ethnic groups did not pick up again until the 
2001 elections when the DPS formed an electoral coalition with Evroroma, 
an important Roma organization in Bulgaria, and placed a number of 
Roma representatives on its ticket, yet at unelectable positions (Illiev 2001). 
By 2003, the DPS dismissed any possibility of future cooperation with the 
Roma party (Dal 2003). Cooperation with the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP) has also been a common policy for the Roma political leaders and 
was relatively welcomed by the BSP leadership through most of the 1990s. 
Given that the problems of the Roma mostly call for active state involvement, 
they are placed on the left side of the political continuum and thus naturally 
expected to support the major political actor on the left – the BSP (Sega 
2002). However, the cooperation between the BSP and the Roma people 
has been far from fair to the minority, because the concern of the BSP with 
the situation of the Roma minority has been minimal despite the couple of 
Roma leaders who achieved representation through the BSP over the years 
(Illiev 2001).Th e Union of Democratic Forces, as the major anti-communist 
political organization in Bulgaria, was also a partner of some of the new 
Roma political organizations in the early 1990s. Manus Romanov – the fi rst 
Roma representative in Parliament after 1989 was elected on the UDF list. 
However, for the rest of 1990s the UDF became “notorious for disregarding 
Roma as possible partners during elections (Iliev 2001).
9 Free Bulgaria was originally led by Tzar Kiro – the self-proclaimed tsar of the 
Roma in Bulgaria and was established in 1997. It is currently led by his son, 
Prince Angel. ROS Kupate is an organization primarily concerned with the 
economic development of the Roma and has an ideology that is close to the 
“democratic idea” (i.e. the UDF). (Mladenov 2003) Th e organization’s leader 
established the Party for Social and Democratic Change (PSDC) in 2000. In 
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1998, Tzvetelin Kunchev established Evroroma after being elected to the 
National Assembly through the Bulgarian Business Block lists in 1997. By 
2000, his immunity as a member of Parliament was removed to allow the 
courts to prosecute him for several crimes.
10 Public funding of political parties in Bulgaria was previously provided for 
parliamentary parties only (Smilov 1999, IDEA 2004). Currently, parties 
that have received more than 1 per cent of the national vote are entitled to 
state subsidy equal to 5 per cent of the minimum wage per vote (Rashkova 
and Spirova 2014).
11 Public funding for Romanian political parties is rather complex, but most 
recently the parties which have more than 50 councilors have been eligible for 
some state funding (previously the barrier was 2, then 4 per cent). For more 
detail see Ghergina et al. (2011).
12 Th e data used here are somewhat outdated, but with the refocusing of the 
UNDP toward discrimination against rather participation of the Roma, this 
is the most recent available report. 
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Introduction
As the contributions to this volume make clear, laws regulating political 
parties have become increasingly common in new democracies. In this 
context, Mexico stands out with regard to the depth and breadth of 
party regulation as well as the frequency of reforms. Over the course 
of the last four decades, particularly since 1977, party regulation has 
grown steadily. Detailed legal provisions now govern all aspects of party 
behaviour, including the organizational structure of parties, fi nances, and 
electoral campaigns. Th e number of articles in the electoral code alone 
has quintupled, from 115 in 1954, to 394 in 2007, and most recently to 
an excess of 600 articles across the three electoral laws that replaced the 
electoral code as of May 2014.1 Parties are recognized by the constitution, 
which explicitly defi nes them as “entities of public interest” (entidades de 
interés público, Art.41). During Mexico’s gradual transition to democracy, 
changes in the regulation of party competition were one of the major 
dimensions along which the democratization of the regime took place. 
Substantial changes to electoral laws occurred frequently in the last three 
decades of the authoritarian regime (1970s-1990s), and have continued 
into the democratic era. With each new reform, additional aspects of 
party life came under the umbrella of legislation. 
Th e Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) – an autonomous monitoring 
body established in 1990 (and replaced, as of 2014, by the National 
Electoral Institute (INE) – is credited with cleaning up the electoral 
process in a country where electoral fraud and vote rigging were 
commonplace. Yet, after initial enthusiasm about democratic progress the 
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sense that democracy was incomplete remained widespread. In the public 
debate about the nature of Mexican democracy, this stagnation was at 
least partially attributed to insuffi  cient regulation of party behaviour since 
the perception was that inadequate laws left room for parties to violate 
democratic norms. Th us, even after a major reform in 2007 – the fi fth 
major reform of its kind in 30 years – there were increasing calls for yet 
another round of reforms, which then took place in 2014. 
Both the depth of party regulation and rate of change over time make 
Mexico a compelling case in the study of the regulation of parties. Th e 
success of the IFE in organizing clean elections meant that the institute 
became a model for electoral institutions. Representatives from the IFE 
were frequent guests in the capitals of other democratizing countries. Yet, 
even though changes in public law have been associated with progress 
towards democracy, the Mexican case also illustrates forcefully that even 
extensive and detailed regulation is insuffi  cient to guarantee responsible 
party government. It therefore provides a note of caution to the debate 
about the “engineerability of political parties” and the hope that all-
encompassing and “good” regulation by itself can induce parties to behave 
as responsible democratic actors. Th e debate about party regulation in 
Mexico is often characterized by an enduring formalist faith that all will 
be well if we can just “get the laws right”.
Th is excessively formal, technical approach to party regulation stands 
in sharp contrast to the political motivations that have underpinned 
regulatory reforms in Mexico over the past decades. During fi rst the 
consolidation and later the democratization of the authoritarian regime, 
the regulation of political parties in public law has been an important 
arena of political struggle. For instance, in the earlier hegemonic era, 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, by its Spanish initials) used 
public law to safeguard its position against outside challengers, but also 
to maintain party discipline and internal cohesion. Legal provisions 
rendered defection from the PRI extremely costly. Rather than outright 
repression of dissent, the PRI shaped the formal rules so as to limit 
political opportunities for independent actors, especially parties. What 
is noteworthy about the Mexican case is the extent to which the PRI 
succeeded in stifl ing opposition by codifying specifi c normative ideals 
of what a party should look like. Regional antagonisms during the 
Mexican Revolution, which led to considerable bloodshed, were used, for 
instance, to justify the notion that parties wishing to compete in elections 
should have a nationwide support base. In practice, however, high spatial 
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registration requirements were an eff ective means to exclude potential 
challengers. 
Th is chapter examines how provisions in public law regarding political 
parties have changed over time, and how the extent of regulation has 
grown from the consolidation of the authoritarian regime to the present 
day. More specifi cally, while we provide an overview of changes in the 
regulation of parties since the 1950s, we focus on legal barriers to party 
formation and how they have been employed by political actors. In the 
historical sketch we highlight the dual motivation underlying the growth 
in regulation, i.e., the political motivations of elites and the technical desire 
to ‘fi x’ past abuses through increasingly detailed regulation. Looking 
ahead, we show that party regulation has increased steadily since the 1950s 
and that it has had mixed eff ects on contestation, cleaning up elections 
while simultaneously generating an electoral landscape that is markedly 
unfair and tilted in favour of major parties. We close by highlighting 
successes of party regulation, remaining challenges, and possibilities for 
future research, including research that examines the still undetermined 
consequences of the most recent set of reforms in 2014, some of which are 
not scheduled to become eff ective until after 2018. 
From Authoritarianism to Democracy: Th e Development of 
Party Regulation
Any exploration of party politics in Mexico has to begin with an 
acknowledgement of the extraordinary position of the PRI, the long-term 
‘goliath’ of Mexican politics (Bruhn 1997). Th e PRI was forged in the 
aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1929) with the explicit goal 
of holding power. In fact “from the time it was founded as the National 
Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 until 1988, the PRI had never lost 
a presidential, gubernatorial, or federal senatorial race it contested” 
(Klesner 2005: 105). Th is is all the more remarkable in light of the 
constitutional ban on consecutive re-election, one of the legacies of the 
Revolution, which essentially eliminated all candidate-specifi c advantages 
of incumbency.2 Th e PRI dominated all levels of government, and its 
organization extended even into the remote corners of the country. How 
did the PRI manage to establish and maintain its hegemonic position? 
Why did challengers fi nd it so diffi  cult to take on the PRI at the polls? 
A closer look at party regulation and specifi cally at the rules governing 
party formation can help to answer these questions. Th e PRI skillfully 
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employed public law to promote internal discipline and to prevent the 
formation of viable opposition parties. Th e PRI thus used public law to 
serve its organizational needs. During the process of democratization, 
major opposition parties also found that they stood to benefi t from 
maintaining some of these provisions. Th is section traces the development 
of the regulation of parties through public law.
During the early years of the hegemonic party the organizational 
imperative was the consolidation of centralized one-party rule. Presidential 
succession was a particularly diffi  cult time for the revolutionary party, 
as there was always the threat that those who considered themselves 
presidenciables, but who were not chosen as the party’s nominees, would 
break away and go it alone. Th e post-revolutionary electoral law did not 
deter this kind of behaviour. It allowed for independent candidacies, and 
the bar for registering new political parties was low. Under the Federal 
Electoral Law of 1918, parties merely had to have the support of 100 
citizens and publish governing rules in order to appear on the ballot 
(Edmonds-Poli & Shirk 2009: 168–170). Th e main restriction imposed 
by the law was a ban on parties that had a religious or racial denomination 
(Molinar Horcasitas 1991: 27). 
After a few tumultuous years, the electoral law of 1946 reduced the 
space for electoral challenges to the PRI through stricter ballot access 
requirements. Th e new law banned independent candidacies and raised 
the bar for parties wishing to appear on the ballot. Only legally registered 
parties were now eligible to compete in federal elections. Th e authorities 
also enshrined a particular normative ideal of what constitutes a political 
party into law. To obtain the required registration aspiring parties had 
to demonstrate that they were national political parties and, as such, 
that they possessed broad and territorially dispersed membership bases. 
Specifi cally, only parties able to prove a minimum of 30,000 members 
and at least 1,000 members in two-thirds of Mexico’s federal entities 
could register (Story 1986: 46). However, even parties that could meet 
these requirements were not necessarily guaranteed a place on the ballot. 
Th e 1946 law had also centralized the organization of electoral processes 
in the hands of the powerful and PRI-controlled Ministry of the Interior 
(Secretaría de Gobernación). Th e recognition of registration was, therefore, 
in the hands of the PRI.
Registration requirements became even more stringent in 1951, when 
aspiring parties had to demonstrate 30,000 supporters, and then again 
in 1954, when parties had to demonstrate 75,000 supporters nationwide, 
and a minimum of 2,500 members in at least two-thirds of Mexico’s states 
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and territories (Navarro 2010: 225, n. 118; Edmonds-Poli & Shirk 2009: 
168–170; Ley Electoral Federal 1955, art. 33).3 Th ese measures stifl ed the 
development of opposition parties. Th ey also limited the exit options for 
disgruntled priístas because there were no viable electoral alternatives (Ward 
et al. 1999: 31; Langston 2006b: 151). While the requirements of nation-
wide organization and national orientation were normatively justifi ed as 
a way to overcome the territorial divisions of the Revolution, they clearly 
served the needs of the hegemonic party by preventing challenges at the 
ballot box. Th e PRI thus found a way to exclude opposition groups because 
they fell short of a specifi c normative ideal.
During the hegemonic period the PRI, with its supermajorities at 
all levels and in all branches of government, controlled the rules of the 
game. Yet in using electoral law as an instrument to defi ne the terms of 
competition, it had to strike a delicate balance (Crespo 2004). On the one 
hand, the cohesion of the party depended on its monopoly on power and 
access to the resources of the state. Th is ensured that all political career 
ambitions were focused on the hegemonic party. Party recalcitrants were 
discouraged from defecting because there was essentially no political life 
outside the party – at least, not for an ambitious politician hoping to win 
offi  ce. Th e PRI’s access to public resources meant that the playing fi eld 
was biased against opposition parties, even those that had been able to 
meet the high registration requirements. Mizrahi (2003) aptly described 
the motivation of the early opposition leaders organized in the National 
Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) as a form of martyrdom. 
Th ey had few illusions about their political career prospects, but stayed in 
the game for programmatic and ideological reasons. 
On the other hand, to maintain the legitimacy of the regime, it 
was crucial that “the opposition neither leave the fi eld nor perish in 
electoral terms, thereby turning the regime into a single-party system 
and depriving it of internal and international legitimacy” (Crespo 2004: 
59). Th e opposition thus had to have suffi  cient incentives to participate, 
but could not be successful enough to launch a credible threat against 
the PRI. Electoral legislation was designed with this dual goal in mind: 
“When there was a danger of their disappearance or withdrawal, the 
electoral system would be opened up suffi  ciently to provide oxygen to the 
opposition; when it appeared that opposition forces might become strong 
or unite, the electoral system was closed off  in order to weaken or contain 
them” (Crespo 2004: 64).
Given the high registration requirements, only the best-organized 
opposition parties, or those with help from the regime, were able to 
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overcome the hurdles and obtain party registration. To maintain a 
semblance of political pluralism, the PRI propped up certain opposition 
parties, such as the Socialist Popular Party (Partido Popular Socialista, PPS) 
and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido Auténtico de la 
Revolución Mexicana, PARM). Th ese parties have been described as “PRI 
satellites” because they were fi nancially and organizationally linked to the 
PRI.4 During the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), 
the PRI also appears to have supported the foundation of the Worker’s 
Party (Partido del Trabajo, PT). To critical questions about the young 
party’s remarkable resource base, its leader, Alberto Anaya, nonchalantly 
replied: “In this country, the government pays for everything – even to be 
criticized” (Oppenheimer 1996: 142).
Th e PAN was the main independent opposition party and jealously 
guarded its autonomy from the regime. From its foundation in 1939, the 
party’s founding fathers emphasized strong organization as the basis for 
the advancement of their conservative doctrine (Shirk 2005). Th e PAN 
started fi elding candidates for municipal offi  ce in 1940 and ran its fi rst 
gubernatorial candidate in 1944 in the state of Aguascalientes. By 1977 
the PAN was nominating candidates for federal deputies in all 300 
electoral districts (Lujambio 2001).
Yet even though the territorial extent of the opposition grew, it remained 
weak electorally. Th e opposition may have been able to register and fi eld 
candidates, but they generally did not win. Th rough the introduction of 
“party deputies” in 1963 the PRI sought to revive its ailing opponents. 
Th e reform was the fi rst of a series of measures that introduced elements of 
proportional representation (PR) into what had previously been a purely 
majoritarian system. It granted parties that won at least 2.5 but less than 
25 per cent of the national vote special seats in the Chamber of Deputies.5 
Th at these reforms were fi rst and foremost an attempt to revive the 
opposition in order to ensure the legitimacy of the hegemonic system is 
underlined by the fact that the PRI was slightly underrepresented in three 
of the fi ve legislative periods between 1964 and 1976. Even though the 
PRI controlled virtually all seats in the Chamber, due to the introduction 
of party deputies it had fewer seats than it would have been entitled to 
under pure PR (Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001: 283–285).
While the introduction of proportional elements lowered entry barriers, 
it did not solve the PRI’s legitimacy problems. In 1976, due to internal 
diff erences, the PAN failed to nominate a presidential candidate. As the 
satellite parties PPS and PARM generally supported the offi  cial party’s 
candidate, the PRI contender José López Portillo ran unopposed. Th is was 
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a painful embarrassment for a regime trying to maintain the appearance 
of competitiveness. One of the fi rst legislative projects undertaken 
by the new president was, therefore, the constitutional reform of 1977 
and the introduction of the Federal Law of Political Organizations and 
Electoral Processes (LOPPE). LOPPE constituted yet another expansion 
of regulatory detail, as illustrated by the number of articles in the law. 
While the 1954 electoral law had 115 articles, this had increased to 151 in 
1970, 204 in 1973, and 250 in 1977. 
In addition, this reform granted parties a privileged place in the political 
system by recognizing them as “entities of public interest” (entidades 
de interés público). With this reform, the trend towards increasingly 
restrictive registration requirements for political parties was reversed and, 
for the fi rst time in decades, obtaining legal registration became easier for 
opposition parties. Under the new law, organizations now had two avenues 
available for party registration: conditional and permanent (condicional 
and defi nitivo). First, those organizations able to demonstrate four years of 
continuous political activity could appear on the ballot with conditional 
registration. If they then won at least 1.5 percent of the national vote, they 
would qualify for permanent registration (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk 2009: 
168–170). Second, the signatures requirement for permanent registration 
was adjusted. Previously, aspiring parties had been required to collect a 
minimum of 2,000 signatures in each of two-thirds (20) of the states, 
and in no case could the total number of signatures be lower than 65,000 
(LFE 1973, art. 23(I)). However, the 1977 LOPPE opened the political 
space for parties by reducing this barrier to 3,000 signatures in each of 
only half (15) of the states, adding the alternative of 300 signatures from 
each of half of the electoral districts (150). Th us, the 1977 law increased 
the required number of signatures in each state from 2,000 to 3,000, but 
reduced the spatial distribution requirement – dramatically reducing the 
burden of geographical extension throughout the country – by reducing 
the total number of states in which aspiring parties needed to collect 
signatures from two-thirds to half.
Th e 1977 reform also marks (a) the expansion of proportional 
representation, and (b) the introduction of direct public funding to 
political parties. First, the “party deputies” of 1963 were replaced with 
a true proportional system. Specifi cally, the Chamber of Deputies would 
now be composed of 300 deputies elected by majoritarian, fi rst-past-the-
post rules, and up to an additional 100 deputies elected based on PR 
rules. Th ese PR seats would be fi lled by members on regional party lists 
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according to the percentage of votes received in those regions (LOPPE 
1977, art. 3). 
Th e introduction of public funding is another illustration of how the 
PRI used public law for its own needs. Normatively, the new availability 
of public funding can be seen as an attempt to acknowledge the inequality 
of the playing fi eld.6 However, access to public resources – in the form 
of direct public funding and free television time – was supposed to off er 
opposition parties incentives for continued participation in elections.7 Th e 
PRI itself, which had almost monopolistic access to the resources of the 
state, was not dependent on party fi nancing at this time. Even though 
hard evidence is diffi  cult to come by, it was widely understood that PRI-
controlled executives at all levels of government made use of government 
resources to shore up electoral support for the hegemonic party (see, e.g., 
Greene 2007). 
Th e 1983 reform was yet another initiative to breathe life into the 
struggling opposition, as it opened up possibilities for the introduction of 
PR seats in state legislatures (González Casanova 1995: 593). In Mexico’s 
federal system, the 31 states and the federal district have their own legal 
framework for elections. Th e process of political democratization thus 
extended over multiple levels of government to include the subnational 
level. In 1987 the PR component of the federal electoral system was also 
strengthened by increasing the number of PR seats from 100 to 200, 
while the 300 single-member districts were maintained (Código Federal 
Electoral 1987, art. 14).8 While the electoral system moved closer to a 
mixed system, the reform discouraged the unifi cation of opposition forces 
against the PRI. It determined that voters were to cast only one vote in 
the single-member district race, which would automatically be counted 
for the allocation of PR seats. Voters were therefore unable to split their 
ballot, which rendered the coordination of opposition parties against the 
PRI in district races extremely costly (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001).9 
Moreover, the reform of the ballot also made the PRI eligible for PR seats. 
In the run-up to the 1988 presidential election, one of the PRI’s 
worst nightmares came true. For decades, the hegemonic party had 
succeeded in resolving the contentious issue of presidential succession 
internally. In 1987, amidst controversy about the party’s economic 
course, the so-called Democratic Current (Corriente Democrática, CD) 
and its leader, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, broke away from the PRI after an 
unsuccessful attempt to challenge the presidential nomination.10 Cross-
party endorsements, which had benefi ted the PRI when its satellites 
backed the offi  cial party’s candidate, facilitated the formation of a broad 
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electoral alliance of small left-wing parties to support Cárdenas’s bid for 
the presidency. In this sense, this episode highlights one of the elements 
of the transition era, namely that even carefully crafted laws are likely to 
have unintended consequences. 
After early vote counts on election night showed the challenger in the 
lead, the computer system tabulating the vote mysteriously “collapsed”, 
and when it was started up again, the PRI was ahead. Th is episode is 
known in Mexico as the caída del sistema or “breakdown of the system”. 
Whether the PRI “stole” the election from Cárdenas, or if his initial 
lead was just due to an urban bias in early counting, is a subject that 
still provokes heated debate in Mexico. In any case, it was clear that the 
incoming president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, would have to restore 
confi dence in the regime in order to gain legitimacy. As his predecessors 
did before him, Salinas drew on the time tested tool of revising public law. 
Th e reform of 1990, which took place during his presidency, brought the 
number of articles in the electoral code to an all-time high of 410. 
In the aftermath of the 1988 presidential elections the PRI reached 
out to the PAN. Th e two parties shared an interest in curbing the rise of 
the new leftist party formed by Cárdenas, the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD, by its Spanish initials). Th e PAN and the PRI cooperated 
in the elaboration of yet another electoral reform, which raised the bar 
for cross-party presidential candidates such as Cárdenas. Under the new 
law, parties nominating a common candidate for the presidential elections 
were required to coordinate candidacies for all congressional races taking 
place at the same time. Th is had to be done prior to the offi  cial start of 
the campaign, which created substantial transaction costs and therefore 
impeded the coordination of the anti-PRI opposition (Díaz-Cayeros & 
Magaloni 2001).
Th e two parties arrived at an agreement which stipulated that the PAN’s 
cooperation with the regime would be rewarded with the recognition of 
subnational electoral victories (Haber et al. 2008: 133–134). During the 
state elections of Baja California, the PRI made good its promise and the 
panista Ernesto Ruff o became the fi rst opposition candidate to compete 
successfully for gubernatorial offi  ce. Th e willingness of the PAN elite to 
cooperate with the PRI should also be seen in light of the experience of 
the 1986 gubernatorial election in Chihuahua, where a strong electoral 
showing of the PAN had been met with fraud and repression by the PRI. 
Th e PAN elite came to realize that the recognition of electoral victories 
required the goodwill of the upper echelons of the PRI hierarchy, at least 
until meaningful electoral reform could be achieved. Th us, while the 
262 harbers & ingram
Salinas presidency showed the fi rst signs of electoral democratization at 
the subnational level, conditions continued to be less than democratic. 
Electoral victories were awarded directly by the president, rather than by 
autonomous electoral institutions. It was the will of the president, rather 
than the will of voters, that determined electoral outcomes (Lujambio 2001: 
70). In his eff orts to reach out to the PAN, in some controversial instances 
Salinas went so far as to force apparently victorious PRI candidates to 
resign and yield to challengers from the PAN (Haber et al. 2008: 134). 
Th e informal and extra-institutional arrangements between the PRI and 
the PAN surrounding these elections are known as concertacesión.11
As pressure on the PRI to democratize the political system mounted, 
the ruling party was forced to make more and more concessions. During 
this period, the goal of party legislation gradually shifted. While the 
primary objective of legislation had been to safeguard PRI hegemony, the 
legitimacy crisis faced by the regime now forced the PRI to agree to reforms 
aimed at promoting a level playing fi eld. Winning rigged elections was no 
longer suffi  cient. Th e PRI – still aiming to hold on to power – revised the 
rules to reduce outright procedural bias against the opposition. 
Th e opposition had two main grievances. First, the highly unequal 
access to resources made it diffi  cult for the opposition to compete 
successfully when the PRI, with access to the resources of the state, 
had so much to off er to voters. Second, electoral fraud became a focus 
of criticism and there was substantial pressure for more transparency in 
electoral processes. In both of these fi elds, the Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE), created in 1990 by the adoption of the new federal electoral law 
known by its Spanish acronym COFIPE (Código Federal de Instituciones y 
Procedimientos Electorales), came to play a key role. In addition to the IFE, 
the 1990 reform also established the Federal Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal 
Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, TEPJF). Th e TEPJF, 
frequently referred to as TRIFE, was created as an autonomous body to 
resolve electoral disputes and to certify electoral results. 
In the direct aftermath of the 1988 presidential elections, opposition 
parties were primarily interested in putting in place mechanisms to prevent 
bias in the electoral institutions. Th is, therefore, was the aspect that 
received the most attention in the 1990 reform. A follow-up reform in 1993 
strengthened the IFE’s autonomy vis-à-vis party infl uence. Since the IFE 
was responsible for registering new parties, the process was removed from 
PRI-controlled authorities. Th e barriers for new parties, however, remained 
relatively high. To register as a political party an organization needed at 
least 65,000 members. As in previous legislation, party membership had 
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to be geographically dispersed, with either 3,000 members in half of the 
states or 300 members in half of the country’s electoral districts (Art. 24). 
Th e continuation of the high registration requirements is not surprising. 
Th e opposition parties that sat at the negotiation table had managed to 
obtain their registration despite high barriers. Th ey had no interest in 
opening the fi eld to additional challengers.
Th e IFE played an important part in ensuring that the presidential 
elections of 1994 were free and clean. Even though the election was won 
by the PRI, the process itself was commended for its transparency, and 
President Zedillo was widely perceived as the legitimate winner. Yet 
Zedillo himself acknowledged that the election had been clean but highly 
inequitable (Lujambio 2003: 382). Th e analysis of campaign fi nance 
reports showed that the playing fi eld continued to be tilted in favour of the 
PRI, even in the absence of large-scale rigging of votes. Of all campaign 
resources reported to the IFE, 78.3 per cent had been spent by the PRI. 
Th e PRI had outspent the runner-up 4:1 (Iturriaga Acevedo 2007: 24).12 
Creating a more equitable distribution of fi nancial resources between 
parties, therefore, became a key issue on the political and legal agenda. 
Th e 1996 constitutional reform, which was negotiated against this 
background, was one of the milestones in the development of the federal 
public funding system. Th e new Article 41 explicitly states that, due to their 
role as entities of public interest, registered national parties are entitled to 
public funding, and that the distribution of such funds should be guided 
by the principle of equality. Th e COFIPE recognizes fi ve legitimate 
sources of party income: 1) public funding, 2) funding provided by party 
members, 3) funding provided by party sympathizers, 4) income obtained 
from fundraising activities such as conferences, and 5) income obtained 
from fi nancial investments. It also requires parties to submit income and 
expenditure reports on an annual basis.13 Th e PRI had a stake in the new 
system because the lavish supply of government funds for the party had 
started to dry up, as the Finance Ministry was increasingly unable and 
unwilling to foot the bill for the party’s fi nancial needs. In the run-up 
to the 1994 election, the PRI’s eff orts to solicit fi nancial support from 
business tycoons who owed their burgeoning fortunes to the privatization 
of state-owned corporations had landed the party in a fully fl edged party-
fi nance scandal (see Oppenheimer 1996: Ch. 5). Th e PRI thus shared 
with its competitors an interest in ensuring a stable and predictable fl ow 
of funds to the party.
While the constitutional reform of 1977 had already defi ned parties as 
entities of public interest, the electoral reform of 1996 strengthened this 
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notion by stipulating that public funding had to account for the majority of 
party income. Formally, this reduced the scope for parties to raise revenue 
from society, even from members. While private funding accounted for 
about three-quarters of total party income in 1994, its share dropped to 
less than 10 per cent over the next three years (Lujambio 2003: 383). 
Th ese federal funds were delivered directly to the central party, which 
had to justify the use of these funds in its annual audit reports. In case of 
violations, IFE could impose severe fi nes on parties, and it has exercised 
this authority to sanction several parties (Crespo 2004).
Another notable aspect of the 1996 reform was a strengthening of the 
Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE) in terms of autonomy from political 
actors and in terms of authority, i.e., an increase in its responsibilities. 
Th e court was established as an important institution not only in charge 
of certifying federal electoral results, but also authorized to resolve 
complaints about federal electoral matters and competent to evaluate the 
constitutionality of actions taken by subnational electoral institutions. Th e 
law also puts the court in charge of protecting the political-electoral rights 
of citizens (derechos político-electorales). Th is rather broad formulation 
became important, because the court interpreted this responsibility 
to mean that it was competent to receive complaints about intra-party 
disputes. Confl icts regarding internal leadership elections and candidate 
selection procedures frequently ended up before the high electoral court, 
a development unintended by reformers and resented by party elites as 
judicial meddling in internal organizational matters. 
Reforms during the 1990s thus played an important role in 
strengthening electoral institutions. Advances in the fairness of elections 
did not come cheap, however, and Mexico has invested massively in the 
development of its electoral bureaucracy. During the election years of the 
1990s, funding for the IFE and TRIFE exceeded the combined cost of the 
legislative and judicial branches of government (Eisenstadt & Poiré 2005: 
5). Nonetheless, Mexicans were “justifi ably proud of their great success 
in converting one of the most fraudulent electoral systems in the world 
to one of the cleanest in less than a decade” (Eisenstadt 2007: 42). When 
the presidential elections of 2000 brought to offi  ce the fi rst opposition 
president, many observers considered this as the fi nal step in Mexico’s 
transition to democracy. Yet, while the election of Vicente Fox (PAN) 
was certainly a milestone, the gradual nature of the transition meant that 
parties would remain subject to the same legal framework. 
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Party Regulation after 2000
Th e pattern of frequent electoral reforms characteristic of the transition 
period continued after 2000. Ironically, however, reforms during the new 
democratic period did not always lead to more political openness. While 
the trend towards increasingly detailed regulation continued, the eff ect of 
reforms on the responsiveness and responsibility of parties as organizations 
has been mixed at best. 
Th is general pattern is perhaps most obvious with regard to party 
registration requirements. Even though there had been considerable 
progress in reducing bias against already registered opposition parties vis-à-
vis the PRI, barriers for new political groups remained so high as eff ectively 
to deny them entry to the electoral arena. Furthermore, with the 2003 
reform, the fi rst after the election of Vicente Fox, barriers for new groups 
even increased. Specifi cally, the reform established a narrow window of 
time in which aspiring parties had to notify the IFE of their intention 
to seek formal registration. Previous laws, including the fi rst COFIPE in 
1990, required this notifi cation as part of the registration process, but 
never set any specifi c dates or limitations on when this notifi cation could 
be made. As of January 1, 2004, however, aspiring parties were restricted 
to a seven-month window from January 1 to July 31 following any federal 
election to make this notifi cation to the IFE (COFIPE 2006, art. 28). 
Groups that missed the July 31 deadline would have to wait at least three 
more years before starting the registration process. Further, the 2003 
reform increased the number of signatures required for the party formation 
process. With this reform the bar to the entry of new parties was raised 
again for the fi rst time since 1977, as it returned to the 1973 standard of 
requiring signatures from two-thirds of states (20) or electoral districts 
(200), rather than from half. Perhaps more importantly, the 2003 law 
increased the minimum requirement for the total number of signatures 
from 65,000 to 0.26% of the list of eligible voters (padron electoral) used 
in the prior federal election. Th is small fraction of a percentage point may 
seem very low, but it amounted to approximately 200,000 people in 2011, 
which constitutes a 300% increase in required signatures compared with 
the 1990 standard. Even in the post-transition era, barriers to new entrants 
thus remained high and even increased, tilting the electoral landscape so 
as to favour the existing major parties. 
Just as increased openness of the electoral arena failed to materialize, the 
elections of 2006 also shattered public confi dence in electoral institutions, 
one of the major accomplishments of the democratization period. On 
266 harbers & ingram
Sunday, July 2, 2006, after a fi ercely contested campaign, the presidential 
election in Mexico closed without a clear winner. Adding to the unease, 
the two leading candidates – Felipe Calderon (PAN) and Andres Manuel 
Lopez Obrador (PRD) – both claimed victory (McKinley 2006). Indeed, 
it took the IFE fi ve days to reach a fi nal vote tally, declaring Calderon the 
winner by a margin of less than one percentage point (0.58%). Th at tally 
was immediately challenged by the PRD before the nation’s high electoral 
court, leading to a partial recount. Two months later, after recounting 9 
per cent of the votes, the court acknowledged some irregularities in the 
electoral process yet still affi  rmed the result and rejected a full recount 
(McKinley 2006b; 2006c). Lopez Obrador continued to lead large 
protests that paralysed parts of Mexico City’s centre for several months, 
and Calderon eventually took offi  ce in early December in a highly 
polarized context. During the election and in its immediate aftermath, 
Mexico’s political institutions seemed newly unstable and vulnerable, and 
its electoral institutions – principally the previously unimpeachable IFE – 
suff ered from new criticisms. 
Concerns in the aftermath of the 2006 elections were twofold. For 
one, the electoral institutions were criticized for falling short in upholding 
existing electoral law and regulations, specifi cally for failing to (a) rein in 
the intervention of sitting President Vicente Fox in favour of Calderon, 
and (b) deliver a clear and timely result. In addition, however, the run-up 
to the election also witnessed a high volume of attack advertisements 
and negative campaigning, revealing what many perceived as gaps in 
the regulatory capacity of electoral laws. A new reform process began as 
an immediate consequence of the 2006 electoral crisis. Th e main thrust 
of the reform aimed to address perceived weaknesses that generated or 
exacerbated the 2006 crisis, including uneven access to the media, negative 
campaigning, and the process of making (and resolving) legal challenges 
during the electoral process. 
After legislative approval in the closing months of 2007, the new 
COFIPE was published on January 14, 2008, taking eff ect the following 
day (COFIPE 2008, Transitorio Primero). Th e new law kept many 
of the earlier features of electoral regulation, but made several notable 
modifi cation or additions. Th e revised COFIPE continued the trend of 
increasingly detailed regulation, bringing new aspects of party behaviour 
and competition under the umbrella of the law, and even elevating several 
provisions to constitutional status. Particularly noteworthy in this regard 
were the further regulation of electoral campaigns and of the internal life 
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of parties. Yet, the democratizing eff ect of the reform was mixed at best 
(see also Serra 2009 for a critical reading of the reform). 
Th e fi rst area of concern was the regulation of electoral campaigns. 
Th e new law responded to some of the perceived problems of 2006 by 
reducing the offi  cial campaign season, regulating campaigning during 
the process of candidate selection (so-called “pre-campaigns”), and 
restricting electoral propaganda distributed by the sitting government. 
In light of a tradition of using social programmes to drum up support 
for the incumbent party these changes may well be justifi ed and seen 
as pro-democracy measures. However, the reform regulated electoral 
campaigns to the point of undermining the quality of public debate 
leading up to and during elections. Th is negative infl uence took two 
forms: (1) constraints on who can participate in this public debate, 
and (2) a sweeping prohibition against negative campaigns. First, only 
political parties could produce political advertisements, and they could 
do that for free – funded and supervised by the IFE. Th e advantage of 
organizing advertisement purchases through the IFE was that such 
control reduces the power of commercial radio and television networks 
and their ability to favour certain parties by selling airtime at discounted 
rates (see also Serra 2009). However, beyond curbing the disproportionate 
infl uence of commercial networks, the reform undermined the ability 
of ordinary citizens, businesses, or civic organizations to participate in 
the public debate, as they were barred entirely from political speech (art. 
49). In short, the range of actors able to participate in the public debate 
regarding political issues narrowed dramatically. Moreover, given that 
parties still received extraordinary sums of public funding but no longer 
had to pay for political advertising, the free advertisements acted as a kind 
of informal subsidy beyond the offi  cial funding. Th us, it is unclear why 
such generous public fi nancing of campaigns was necessary, how exactly 
the formal campaign funding was being used, or what this money was 
buying. Second, all negative speech was forbidden (art. 38). Parties were 
prohibited from “denigrating” (denigrar) or “slandering” (calumniar), even 
if the negative information they were communicating was true! Further, 
this prohibition was elevated to constitutional status (art. 41). 
A second area where the new law was controversial was in its eff ect 
on the internal life of parties. On the one hand, the new law placed high 
burdens on existing parties. Th ere was new regulation regarding duties 
of parties, including transparency and the publication of a wide range 
of information regarding their organization, functioning, and funding. 
Indeed, entirely new sections in articles 41 to 44 outlined a series of 
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responsibilities regarding transparency. Th is again illustrated the degree 
to which parties in Mexico had ceased to be private institutions, or 
were moving substantially towards the public end of the public-private 
continuum. While the extraordinary level of public support for political 
parties arguably justifi es far-reaching oversight to track how public funds 
are used and ensure accountability, it becomes harder and harder to 
conceive of parties as civic organizations within society. Even more than 
in other countries, Mexican parties have essentially become part of the 
state. 
Yet, even though the law further regulated the internal life of parties, 
it also aff orded considerable protection to party elites by determining that 
any challenges relating to internal party matters must fi rst be addressed 
to review bodies within the party itself (art. 46). Further, this protection 
was constitutionalized (art. 116). Previously, as explained above, the high 
electoral court, Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación 
(TEPJF, frequently referred to as “TRIFE”), had exceptional authority 
to intervene in internal party matters. While the regulation of disputes 
regarding the “internal life of parties” is highly unusual in comparative 
perspective, in Mexico it provided an eff ective brake on the power of 
party elites and therefore a way to democratize the internal life of parties. 
Th e need for an alternative is illustrated by the increasing number of 
challenges brought before the court. While in 1999 only four intra-party 
confl icts were received by the TRIFE, this number increased to 292 in 
2003 and 1,100 in 2006.14 Th us, while formally aligning with comparative 
standards, in the Mexican context the reform further defers to de facto 
authorities at the top of existing hierarchies within parties by restricting 
the opportunity for any challenges that may arise. Challenges must fi rst 
be made to an adjudicatory mechanism inside the party. Further, party 
statutes can be challenged only within 14 days of the time they are fi rst 
presented before the electoral authority for registration (Art. 47.2). Th e 
statute of limitations (SOL) poses an additional barrier to disputes relating 
to internal party life. Normally, a clock related to a SOL like this would 
begin to run (a) from the moment these documents are published (if 
abstract review is allowed) or (b) from the time an actual harm results 
from enforcing the provisions in these documents (in the case of concrete 
review). Th e fact that all challenges are barred beyond a very early window 
of time makes these documents virtually unchallengeable. Lastly, only 
party members can initiate these challenges. Previously, the COFIPE 
allowed other citizens and organizations to challenge party documents, 
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but the standing to initiate these kinds of challenges was dramatically 
reduced in 2007 (see also Sáenz 2007). 
As noted above, several new provisions were elevated to constitutional 
status. Indeed, beyond the prohibition on negative speech and the protection 
of internal party matters, other provisions that were constitutionalized 
included (a) media use by parties, (b) the funding of parties, and (c) the 
oversight of party funding. Th e constitutionalization of so much detail 
regarding electoral matters is highly unusual comparatively (see IFES 
2009), and off ers opportunities for constitutional challenges. Th e kind of 
detail seen in these provisions is usually left to ordinary legislation, which 
is easier to amend and adjust over time, a process that will probably be 
necessary. Th us, the constitutionalization of so much electoral regulation 
means that these regulations may lead to high-profi le and resource-
intensive constitutional challenges, and they will be that much harder to 
undo in the future.
Finally, barriers to entry for new parties, which were already high 
in Mexico, especially after the 2003 changes noted above, were raised 
even further by the 2007 reform. Prior to 2003, aspiring parties could 
notify electoral authorities at any stage of their intention to register. After 
2003, they had a seven-month window every three years to notify the IFE 
of this intention. Now, under the new law, aspiring parties have only a 
one-month window every six years to make this notifi cation. Specifi cally, 
they must notify the IFE no later than January 31 in the year following 
a presidential election (COFIPE 2007, art. 28). For instance, if a party 
wanted to register to compete in the 2018 elections, it had to notify IFE 
no later than January 31, 2013, more than fi ve years ahead of time.
Refl ections on Party Regulation and the Nature of Democracy 
in Mexico 
As mentioned at the outset, Mexico stands out comparatively because 
of the scope of party regulation through public law and the frequency 
with which electoral laws have been reformed. Over the past decades, the 
number of areas of party behaviour legally constrained and regulated has 
grown steadily. Th e scope of regulation has, at least in part, been legitimized 
by making reference to the “engineerability of political parties”, i.e., the 
hope that all-encompassing and “good” regulation can induce parties 
to behave as responsible democratic actors. Indeed, this formalist faith 
in the engineerability of organizations extends to other institutions in 
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Mexico, illustrated by the frantic pace of police reform, reforming and 
then re-reforming public safety agencies – especially at the federal level – 
for at least three decades (e.g., Sabet 2010). A specifi c concern regarding 
parties, however, is that reforms have to be agreed upon by the subjects 
of regulation – political parties themselves – and are therefore necessarily 
political. Th e process is unavoidably self-interested, so creating “good” 
regulation is only one among many motivations for reform, and in many 
instances not the most important one.
Th e explanation for the speed of reform is twofold: (1) following each 
election, there is a realization that the existing regulation was insuffi  cient 
to promote responsible party behaviour and clean campaigns; and (2) the 
balance of power among the major players has shifted, allowing actors to 
pursue their own agendas. Both of these factors highlight the importance 
of the electoral calendar or cycles. Elections illuminate lacunae, and as 
majorities change after elections, each incoming party brings with it a new 
agenda for regulatory reform. Th e frequency of elections therefore helps 
to explain the frequency of regulatory reform. Against this background, 
the elevation of many of the controversial provisions in the 2007 reform 
to constitutional status may be interpreted as an attempt to anchor 
these provisions in public law by constraining future reformers. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we review the successes and achievements of 
party regulation in promoting democracy, as well as some of the challenges 
that remain. 
First among the successes, parties in Mexico are well institutionalized 
with strong organizations. Th is is true especially compared to other new 
democracies, and is therefore no small achievement. Th e strength of 
parties is due in part no doubt to the resource-rich environment for parties 
since 1990, as well as the organizational legal-technical tutelage provided 
by the IFE and electoral courts. Yet, the fi nancial burden on public coff ers 
is considerable. In 2008, which was not a federal election year, the budgets 
of the IFE and TRIFE amounted to €588 million. Th e lion’s share of 
this went to the IFE, which passed €168 million of public funding on to 
registered political parties and spent €330 million on its own activities, 
such as maintaining the voter register and auditing party fi nances. Th e 
TRIFE’s operating budget was lower than the IFE’s but still consisted 
of €90 million. Compared to other democracies, Mexico thus invested 
heavily in monitoring compliance with party regulation. Overall, the cost 
of funding political parties and of maintaining the IFE and TRIFE in 
2008 was €8.90 per registered voter.15 Th is amount is outrageously high 
when compared to other democracies in the region. Th e cost of party 
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funding alone was 18 times the regional average.16 Th is makes Mexico the 
most expensive democracy in Latin America (IFES 2009).
Second, the IFE (now INE) has succeeded in preventing electoral 
fraud. Acknowledging that no system is perfectly clean, overall the IFE 
had an excellent record on this account, despite the criticisms levied during 
the 2006 election. Nevertheless, a crucial distinction exists between 
establishing “clean” elections (i.e., absence of fraud) and guaranteeing 
“fair” elections (i.e., a level playing fi eld), and the former is easier than the 
latter. Stated diff erently, the IFE has generally succeeded in preventing 
the outright stealing of votes or stuffi  ng of ballot boxes (the infamous 
urnas embarazadas, or “pregnant urns”), but there continue to be wide 
disparities in the eff ective power and infl uence of diff erent parties in the 
electoral landscape. 
Outstanding challenges include levelling the playing fi eld to correct 
for this unfairness. Even though the system has become more open over 
the past two decades, it still works in favour of the major parties, which 
limits the options available to voters. Th is is evident in, among other areas, 
the way funding is apportioned according to vote returns. Moreover, with 
the 2008 round of reforms, the balance of power within parties has been 
tilted more heavily towards party elites. Overall, party elites have been 
strengthened, while legal resources available to ordinary party members 
and citizens have weakened. A second challenge involves the extremely 
high cost of parties and the electoral apparatus, including the IFE (INE), 
a cost that undermines support for the system. An associated concern 
relates to the fact that, given the high levels of funding and the fact that 
parties can now broadcast their political advertisements for free via the 
IFE, it is increasingly unclear what parties are doing with their money, 
raising serious questions about accountability. 
Th ird, public confi dence in electoral institutions must be rebuilt. 
After 2006, there was widespread dissatisfaction with parties, offi  cial 
candidates, and electoral institutions, leading to the “voto nulo” campaign 
in the 2009 mid-term elections (e.g., write-in candidates like Esperanza 
Marchita, or “Hope Dashed”). Th e IFE itself has suff ered in public opinion 
polls, though perhaps this is not much of a concern since it continues to 
enjoy – along with the military and the TEPJF – some of the highest levels 
of public confi dence among Mexican institutions (LAPOP 2010). Still, 
confi dence in the IFE has been steadily dropping since the 2007 reform, 
from 68% of the population reporting some level of positive opinion and 
only 18% reporting any negative opinion in 2006, to 59% positive and 
25% negative in 2008, to 53% positive and 31% negative in 2010.17 From 
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2006 to 2008 alone, the IFE suff ered a 10-point drop, and public opinion 
has continued to slide. Th ese are not good signs after more than 30 years 
of substantial electoral reforms.
Symptomatic of the fetish with re-designing formal institutions 
described here, Mexico reformed its electoral laws once again in 2014, with 
a constitutional reform in January of that year followed by implementing 
legislation in May. Th e legislation passed May included three federal 
electoral laws (see note 1), which replaced the single electoral code that 
had been reformed only in 2007. Further, the states were mandated to 
make similar, harmonizing reforms to their local electoral codes. Principal 
changes in the latest federal reform included the following: (1) the IFE was 
reformed and renamed the INE, as noted in the introduction; (2) state 
electoral institutions acquired greater autonomy from state legislatures; 
(3) for the fi rst time in Mexico, re-election is allowed, though it will be 
phased in diff erently across diff erent posts; senators can hold up to two 
consecutive terms, federal deputies can hold up to four consecutive terms, 
and, as long as state constitutions allow it, mayors and other municipal 
offi  cials can hold up to four consecutive terms (Constitution, arts. 59, 
115); and (4) the threshold of votes required to retain party registration 
at the national level was increased from 2% to 3%. Th e consequences of 
these and other provisions of the 2014 reform are yet to be determined, 
and many provisions are not set to take eff ect until much later. For 
instance, the rules regarding re-election of federal senators and deputies 
do not take eff ect until 2015 and 2018, respectively, so the real impact on 
the re-election of those offi  cials will not be felt unless and until they run 
for their second term, which will not be until 2018 and 2024, respectively. 
For now, the 2014 reform is yet another example of re-engineering the 
electoral rules in Mexico, suggesting we can anticipate still more major 
formal transformations to come. 
Lastly, the same process of engineering electoral codes that is at work 
at the federal level is fi ltering through the 32 territorial units at the 
subnational level (Harbers and Ingram 2014). Indeed, as noted above, the 
2014 federal reform in Mexico requires all subnational units to re-adjust 
their electoral laws. Each of the federal units has its own local electoral 
code, electoral institute, and electoral court, and change and performance 
are highly uneven. Th is leads to great diversity in party regulation within 
the political system, with variation within states over time, across states, 
and across levels of government. Th is electoral federalism is perhaps one of 
the most exciting areas of research on public law and political parties, not 
just in Mexico but in other large, federal systems, including the other two 
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such systems in Latin America – Argentina and Brazil. Future research 
that examines the longitudinal, spatial, and cross-level variation in party 
regulation identifi ed here, along with the other challenges outlined above, 
should contribute important insights to our understanding of political 
institutions in old and new democracies alike.
Notes
1 Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Penales (LEGIPE; 493 articles), 
Ley General de Partidos Políticos (97 articles), and Ley General en Materia de 
Delitos Electorales (26 articles) (all published May 23, 2014, and eff ective May 
24, 2014).
2 Yet the multitude of offi  ces controlled by the PRI meant that there were 
ample opportunities for career politicians to move between positions. Voters 
were, therefore, often familiar with candidates because of their previous 
political offi  ces.
3 Th e 1946 membership requirement equals 1.2 per cent of all registered voters 
and 0.3 per cent of the national voting age population. Th e 1954 reform 
required support from 0.6 per cent of the voting age population. Data on 
the number of voters have been obtained from the website of the Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (www.idea.int). 
4 Th e PPS was established under the label Partido Popular in 1948. Th e PARM 
was offi  cially registered in 1957. Th at the electoral authorities were favourable 
to some parties while discriminating against others is illustrated by the fact 
that they recognized the PARM while simultaneously withholding the legal 
registration of the much better organized Communist Party (Scott 1964: 
148), or rejecting the registration of the outspokenly anti-PRI Partido de la 
Revolución (see Navarro 2010: 224-25).
5 Parties were to receive one seat for each 0.5 per cent of the vote they obtained. 
Th e maximum number of seats that could be obtained in this way was 20. 
Th e formula for the allocation of party deputy seats was revised in 1973, 
when the threshold for receiving PR seats was lowered to 1.5 per cent and the 
cap expanded to 25 seats (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk 2009: 168–170).
6 Prior to 1977 there had been indirect fi nancing for opposition parties, in the 
form of tax exemptions (since 1963) and access to electronic media (since 
1973). Even though the 1977 reform of the electoral law formally introduced 
direct party fi nancing, it did not specify the total amount of public funding 
or how resources were to be distributed between parties, which rendered the 
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process highly discretionary. A concrete framework for the allocation of state 
subsidies was not established until 1987.
7 Th e PAN, wary of the PRI’s eff orts to undermine the independence of the 
opposition, initially refused to accept public monies. Th e party’s position on 
the issue changed only in 1989 after a change in the party leadership (Wuhs 
2008: 83).
8 Th is reform also established the controversial “governability clause”, which 
grants the largest party an automatic majority of seats as long as it obtains at 
least 35 per cent of the vote. Th e “governability clause” survived a series of 
constitutional reforms. Yet it was not applied in practice because the PRI was 
able to win a suffi  ciently large share of the vote (Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 
2001). Th e 1996 reform fi nally capped the seat share of the majority party in 
the Chamber at 300 (out of 500), which meant that the largest party would 
lack the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution.
9 Note that this diff ers from the German system, which grants voters two votes, 
one for the district’s direct candidate and another for the preferred party.
10 Th e last challenge to the party’s presidential nomination had occurred in 
1952, when General Henríquez Guzmán broke away only to lose by a 5:1 
margin to the PRI candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. Henríquez Guzmán’s 
attempt to face up to the PRI ended with his inglorious retirement from 
public life. Th e registration of the party that had supported him was revoked 
by the electoral authorities because of an alleged illegal resort to force (Scott 
1964: 151).
11 Th e term concertacesión draws on the Spanish words for arrangement 
(concertación) and cession (cesión) (Prud’homme 1997: 1).
12 “Informe y Dictamen que rinde la Comisión de Consejeros constituida 
para la revisión de los informes fi nancieros de campaña presentados por los 
partidos políticos”, IFE, April 7, 1995. Unoffi  cial reports suggest an even 
more extreme spending imbalance during the presidential race, with the 
PRI’s campaign chest containing $700 million, compared to the PAN’s $5 
million and the PRD’s $3 million (Oppenheimer 1996: 110).
13 During the initial years of public fi nancing, parties had received state 
resources without any oversight. It is therefore unclear how much money 
parties received and how they spent it. Th e notion that parties have to justify 
their use of public funds was fi rst contemplated in the 1987 reform (Art. 
61VIII, Código Federal Electoral), and then developed further in the reform 
of 1993. Th e 1993 reform also prohibited donations from municipal, state, 
or federal authorities to political parties. As the electoral authorities lacked 
the auditing capacity to control and verify party reports, however, fi nancial 
oversight was essentially a paper tiger until the reform of 1996, which granted 
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the IFE authority to check party bank accounts and impose sanctions in cases 
of violation. Th e reform also called for the establishment of a permanent 
auditing committee, rather than the temporary ad hoc committees that had 
existed previously (Lujambio 2003; Peschard 2006). 
14 Data provided by the Coordinación de Jurisprudencia y Estadística Judicial, 
Dirección de Estadística Judicial, Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la 
Federación.
15 Per voter amounts are calculated on the basis of voting age population 
statistics, which include all citizens above the legal voting age. Th is 
information is available through the website of the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (www.idea.int, last accessed October 
19th, 20112). Th e exchange rate between the Mexican Peso and the Euro was 
16 to 1 in January 2008.
16 Th e average was US$ 0.94 per vote cast in 13 Latin American countries 
compared to US$ 17.24 in Mexico during the 2003 mid-term election (IFES 
2009: 69). Calculations are based on election years for all countries.
17 Th e LAPOP surveys ask respondents for scores on a scale of 1-7. Percentages 
are calculated by aggregating scores from 1-3 for negative opinion and 5-7 
for positive opinion. Alternately, public confi dence in the IFE has been 
dropping from a mean of 5.04 in 2006, 4.76 in 2008, and 4.44 in 2010. 
Th e AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org.
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